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SUMMARY TABLE 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
OUTPUT 
 
(Real Annual Growth %)     
Private Consumer Expenditure -1.5 -7.0 ¼ 1 ½ 
Public Net Current Expenditure 2.2 -4.4 -4 -3 
Investment -13.7 -31.0 -24 2 ¼ 
Exports -0.8 -4.1 5 4 ¾ 
Imports -2.9 -9.7 ¾ 3 ½ 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) -3.4 -7.6 ¼ 2 ¾ 
Gross National Product (GNP) -3.5 -10.7 - ½ 2 ¼ 
GNP per capita (constant prices) -5.3 -11.4 ¼ 2 ½ 
 
PRICES 
 
(Annual Growth %)     
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) 3.3 -1.7 -1 ½ ¼ 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 4.1 -4.5 - ½  1 ¾ 
Wage Growth 2.9 -2.0 -3 -1 
 
LABOUR MARKET     
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 2,100 1,928.5 1,856.9 1,854.9 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s))     141    258.6    285.7    279.7 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 6.3      11.8 13 ¼ 13 
 
PUBLIC FINANCE     
Exchequer Balance (€bn) -12.7 -24.6 -17.6 -19.9 
General Government Balance (€bn) -13.2 -23.4 -31.3 -16.5 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -7.3 -14.6 -19 ¾ -10 ¼ 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 44.4 65.6 85 ½ 93 ½ 
 
EXTERNAL TRADE     
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) -10 -4.9 0.0 0.3 
Current Account (% of GNP) -6.6 -3.7 0 ¼ 
 
EXCHANGE RATES (annual average) AND 
INTEREST RATES (end of year)     
US$/€ Exchange Rate 1.47 1.39 1.27 1.22 
STG£/€ Exchange Rate  0.79 0.89 0.85 0.83 
Main ECB Interest Rate  2.50 1.00 1.00 1.75 
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SUMMARY 
In recent months, economic indicators and data have produced a mixed picture of the 
performance of the Irish economy. While data on retail sales, consumer confidence and 
exports all point to signs that a recovery is already underway, the numbers from the Live 
Register, income tax returns and the most recent estimates of quarterly GNP would suggest 
that the economy is still contracting. Coupled with the recent difficulties on sovereign debt 
markets in Europe, and the on-going crystallisation of the banking losses for the government 
estimated to be at least €25 billion, the short-term prospects for the Irish economy continue 
to be precarious. In particular the forecasts we present in this Commentary are critically based 
on the assumption that difficulties in international financial markets will be resolved swiftly. 
 
Based on the most recent quarterly data from the CSO, we estimate that there could be 
marginal positive growth in GDP for 2010 of ¼ per cent. This is driven exclusively by a 
strong pick up in export growth, together with a very anaemic resumption of private 
consumption growth (¼ per cent).  Public consumption and investment are expected to 
continue to contract in 2010, and GNP is also likely to fall slightly by ½ per cent.  
 
We expect a resumption of growth in 2011, concentrated in growth in external demand, but 
also reflecting a modest resumption of domestic demand. The recession has led to a 
dramatic fall in investment’s share of GNP, from over 30 per cent in 2006 to an estimated 14 
per cent in 2010. We expect this adjustment to have ended in 2011, with total investment 
forecast to grow by 2¼ per cent. Overall we expect GDP to grow by 2¾ per cent, with 
GNP growing more slowly at 2¼ per cent. 
 
The implications for employment of the recession have been dramatic. We now expect 
employment in 2010 to be 72,000 lower than in 2009, on an annual average basis. This 
implies a cumulative fall in employment of 266,000 since 2007. Corresponding to this fall in 
employment, we expect to see the number unemployed averaging 286,000 in 2010. This 
implies that the unemployment rate would average 13¼ per cent. For 2011, we expect 
employment to stabilise, with unemployment falling marginally to 13 per cent.  
 
We expect the General Government Deficit to be 11½ per cent of GDP in 2010. Including 
the cost of the bailout monies for Anglo Irish Bank and INBS, this figure would be 19¾ per 
cent. For 2011, we expect the deficit to fall to 10¼ per cent of GDP. This is based on the 
assumption that a full €3 billion package of austerity measures is implemented in the 2011 
budget. 
 
In the General Assessment, we discuss the government’s plans for further fiscal austerity 
measures. Given the vulnerability of the Irish economy to the vagaries of market sentiment 
on our sovereign debt, we argue that it is imperative that the government adhere to its 
programme of fiscal consolidation. Within the confines of this austerity programme, it is 
vital that whatever resources are available be used strategically to help tackle the growing 
problem of unemployment. We argue that public funds would be better used in re-skilling 
and up-skilling people who are unemployed as opposed to using spending on infrastructure 
as a form of employment creation. 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2009 (Estimate) 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
  Estimate €bn % 
 €bn €bn Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 94.8 84.3 -10.5 -6.7 -11.1 -4.3 -7.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 29.2 27.7 -1.5 -1.3 -5.1 -0.7 -4.4 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 39.8 24.7 -15.1 -12.3 -37.9 -10.0 -31.0 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 150.2 144.8 -5.4 -6.2 -3.6 0.6 -4.1 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.3 -2.3 -2.6 -2.5    
        
Final Demand 314.3 279.3 -35.0 -29.0 -11.1 -2.1 -9.2 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 133.9 120.4 -13.5 -13.0 -10.1 -0.4 -9.7 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy 0.4 -0.7 -1.2 -2.4    
        
GDP at Market Prices 180.0 159.6 -20.3 -13.6 -11.3 -4.0 -7.6 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -25.3 -28.4 -3.1 -2.9 12.2 0.8 11.3 
        
GNP at Market Prices 154.7 131.2 -23.4 -16.5 -15.1 -5.0 -10.7 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
  Estimate   
 €bn €bn €bn % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.9 2.2 -0.7 -24.4 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 79.4 72.7 -6.7 -8.5 
  Other: 60.5 53.9 -6.5 -10.8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.2 1.0   
 Statistical Discrepancy 0.4 -0.7   
     
Net Domestic Product 143.0 129.1 -13.9 -9.7 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -25.3 -28.4 -3.1 12.2 
     
National Income 117.7 100.7 -17.0 -14.5 
Depreciation 16.6 14.4 -2.3 -13.6 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 134.3 115.0 -19.3 -14.4 
Taxes less Subsidies 20.4 16.2 -4.2 -20.4 
     
GNP at Market Prices 154.7 131.2 -23.4 -15.1 
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account 
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
  Estimate  
 €bn €bn €bn 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 16 24 8 
Net Factor Payments (F) -25.3 -28.4 -3.1 
Net Transfers -1.2 -0.9 0.3 
    
Balance on Current Account -10.2 -4.9 5.3 
as % of GNP -6.6 -3.7 2.8 
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
    
 2008 2009 2009 Volume 
Change 
  Estimate   
 €bn €bn €bn % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  1.4   
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 154.7 139.5 -15.2 -9.8 
GNDI* 153.5 138.6 -14.9 -9.7 
National Resources** 153.6 137.4 -16.2 -10.6 
• GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers. 
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2010 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product  
    
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
 Estimate Forecast €bn % 
 €bn €bn Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 84.3 83.5 -0.8 0.2 -1 -1 ¼ ¼ 
Public Net Current Expenditure 27.7 25.6 -2.1 -1.1 -7 ½ -3 ½ -4 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 24.7 18.0 -6.7 -6.0 -27 ¼ -4 -24 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 144.8 151.8 7.0 7.3 4 ¾ - ¼ 5 
Physical Changes in Stocks -2.3 -0.1 2.2 1.7    
        
Final Demand 279.3 278.9 -0.4 1.3 - ¼ - ½ ½ 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 120.4 120.7 0.3 0.8 ¼ - ½ ¾ 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7 0.0 0.0    
        
GDP at Market Prices 159.6 158.9 -0.7 0.6 - ½ - ¾ ¼ 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -28.4 -30.3 -1.9 -1.3 6 ½ 2 4 ½ 
        
GNP at Market Prices 131.2 128.7 -2.6 -0.6 -2 -1 ½ - ½ 
        
B:  Gross National Product by Origin  
    
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
 Estimate Forecast   
 €bn €bn €bn % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.2 2.3 0.1 5 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 72.7 68.2 -4.5 -6 ¼ 
  Other: 53.9 58.7 4.8 8 ¾ 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 1.0 -0.2   
 Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7   
     
Net Domestic Product 129.1 128.2 -0.9 - ¾ 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -28.4 -30.3 -1.9 6 ½ 
     
National Income 100.7 97.9 -2.7 -2 ¾ 
Depreciation 14.4 14.4 0.1 ½ 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 115.0 112.4 -2.7 -2 ¼ 
Taxes less Subsidies 16.2 16.3 0.1 ½ 
     
GNP at Market Prices 131.2 128.7 -2.6 -2      
     
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
    
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
 Estimate Forecast  
 €bn €bn €bn 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 24.4 31.1 6.7 
Net Factor Payments (F) -28.4 -30.3 -1.9 
Net Transfers -0.9 -0.9 0.0 
    
Balance on Current Account -4.9 0.0 4.9 
as % of GNP -3.7 0.0 3.7 
    
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
    
 2009 2010 2010 Volume 
Change 
  Estimate   
 €bn €bn €bn % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  0.3   
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 131.2 130.9 -0.3 - ¼ 
GNDI* 130.3 130.0 -0.3 - ¼ 
National Resources** 130.4 128.7 -1.6 -1 ¼ 
• GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers. 
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2011 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product  
    
 2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 Estimate Forecast €bn % 
 €bn €bn Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 83.5 85.6 2.1 1.3 2 ½ 1 1 ½ 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.6 24.6 -1.0 -0.8 -4 -1 -3 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 18.0 18.3 0.3 0.4 1 ¾ - ¾ 2 ¼ 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 151.8 159.8 8.0 7.2 5 ¼ ½ 4 ¾ 
Physical Changes in Stocks -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1    
        
Final Demand 278.9 288.4 9.5 8.5 3 ½ ¼         3  
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 120.7 126.2 5.5 4.3 4 ½ 1 3 ½ 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7 0.0 0.0    
        
GDP at Market Prices 158.9 162.9 4.0 4.2 2 ½ - ¼ 2 ¾ 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -30.3 -32.4 -2.1 -1.5 7 2 5 
        
GNP at Market Prices 128.7 130.5 1.9 2.8 1 ½ - ¾ 2 ¼ 
        
B:  Gross National Product by Origin  
    
 2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 Estimate Forecast   
 €bn €bn €bn % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.3 2.4 0.1 5 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 68.2 67.3 -0.9 -1 ¼ 
  Other: 58.7 62.1 3.4 5 ¾ 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0 
 Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7 0.0 0 
     
Net Domestic Product 128.2 130.8 2.6 2 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -30.3 -32.4 -2.1 7 
     
National Income 97.9 98.4 0.5 ½ 
Depreciation 14.4 14.7 0.3 2 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 112.4 113.2 0.8      ¾ 
Taxes less Subsidies 16.3 17.4 1.1 6 ¾ 
     
GNP at Market Prices 128.7 130.5 1.9 1 ½ 
     
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
    
 2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 Estimate Forecast  
 €bn €bn €bn 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 31.1 33.6 2.5 
Net Factor Payments (F) -30.3 -32.4 -2.1 
Net Transfers -0.9 -0.9 0.0 
    
Balance on Current Account 0.0 0.3 0.4 
as % of GNP 0.0 0.3 0.3 
    
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
    
 2010 2011 2011 Volume 
Change 
  Estimate   
 €bn €bn €bn % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  -0.7   
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 128.7 130.7 2.1 1 ½ 
GNDI* 127.7 129.8 2.1 1 ¾ 
National Resources** 127.9 129.9 2.1 1 ½ 
• GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers. 
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THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY 
The recovery in the global economy continues to strengthen, albeit at a 
slow and uneven pace, and a number of international forecasters have 
revised their growth projections upwards since our last Commentary. The 
OECD now expects the world economy to grow by 4.6 per cent in 2010 
and by 4.5 per cent in 2011. Underlying these forecasts, however, are 
significant regional differences. The recovery has been particularly buoyant 
in the emerging and developing economies, where domestic demand has 
been strong and external demand continues to be boosted by the recovery 
in world trade. Sustaining the recovery has proved somewhat more 
challenging in the advanced economies, where activity has been dependent 
on highly accommodative macroeconomic policies. The legacy of the crisis 
is manifested in high unemployment rates, weak private and public balance 
sheets and the increasingly urgent need for fiscal consolidation in a number 
of advanced economies. The slower recovery in advanced economies is 
reflected in the more modest growth forecasts for the OECD area, where 
GDP is expected to increase by 2.7 per cent in 2010 and by 2.8 per cent in 
2011.  
 
Among the advanced economies, the US appears to be leading the way 
and has registered relatively strong rates of growth in recent quarters. In 
the first quarter of 2010, GDP increased by 0.7 per cent, following growth 
of 1.4 per cent in the previous quarter. 1 The recovery has been largely 
stimulus-driven, with substantial monetary and fiscal easing providing a 
boost to the economy throughout 2009. The change in private inventories 
has also been a significant contributor to growth in recent quarters. Private 
consumption growth remains relatively subdued, largely due to ongoing 
balance-sheet adjustment by households and persistent labour market 
weakness. Financial market conditions have improved, although credit 
conditions remain tight and this may act as a drag on growth, in particular 
for small and medium-size enterprises that cannot access capital markets.  
Reflecting all these conditions, the recovery is expected to proceed at a 
more gradual pace over the coming quarters, particularly when the effects 
of the policy stimuli subside. Overall, GDP in the US is expected to grow 
by 3.2 per cent both in 2010 and 2011. 
 
 
1 In this section, growth rates which refer to the performance in a particular quarter are 
seasonally adjusted quarter-on-quarter growth rates.  
Source: Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-04062010-
AP/EN/2-04062010-AP-EN.PDF 
  
Main 
Developments 
 6 
Having suffered a sharp contraction of 4.9 per cent in 2009, the UK 
has now enjoyed two consecutive quarters of growth, as shown in Figure 1. 
The pace of recovery has been slow, however, and ongoing weakness in 
consumption and investment continues to act as a drag on growth. 
Furthermore, the new government has recently announced a cumulative 
£120 billion fiscal consolidation plan for the period 2011-2015 in order to 
tackle the deficit, which is among the largest of the advanced economies. 
The National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) 
estimates that the announced consolidation plans will reduce GDP growth 
by 0.2 percentage points in 2010 and by 0.4 percentage points in 2011.2 
Household spending is likely to remain subdued into next year given the 
freeze in public sector pay, the VAT increase taking effect in January 2011, 
cuts to transfer payments and expected job shedding in the public sector. 
Current forecasts suggest that the UK economy will grow by 1.3 per cent 
this year, although much of this growth is expected to come from 
inventory accumulation. The VAT increase may lead to a surge in 
consumption in the fourth quarter of this year, prior to the introduction of 
the higher rate in January. Projections for next year suggest that the 
recovery will spread to most sectors of the economy, with the exception of 
government spending, bringing the overall rate of GDP growth to 2.5 per 
cent. Export volumes are expected to become the largest positive 
contributor to GDP growth, driven by the gain in competitiveness arising 
from the depreciation of sterling since the start of the crisis. 
Figure 1: Quarter-on-Quarter GDP Volume Growth (%), Seasonally 
Adjusted 
-3.0
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2010Q1 
%
Euro Area UK US
Source : Eurostat.  
 
Sustaining and broadening the recovery has proved particularly 
challenging in the Euro Area and only modest rates of growth were 
recorded in recent quarters. The recovery continues to be supported by 
substantial macroeconomic and financial sector measures, as well as 
coordinated assistance from European and other international institutions, 
designed to strengthen the position of some of the hardest-hit economies 
in the Euro Area. The recovery in world trade and strong external demand 
should result in a pick up in activity throughout this year, although 
 
2 See http://www.niesr.ac.uk/pdf/220610_165331.pdf  
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domestic demand will continue to be constrained by modest income 
growth, high unemployment, continued balance sheet adjustments by 
households and banks, and significant fiscal consolidation in a number of 
member countries. Against this backdrop, Euro Area growth is likely to 
remain subdued over the forecast horizon. The OECD is projecting GDP 
growth of 1.2 per cent in 2010 and 1.8 per cent in 2011. 
 
Although the recovery in the global economy is proving to be more 
robust than previously anticipated by observers such as the OECD, the 
downside risks are arguably greater now. Undoubtedly the biggest threat to 
the recovery, particularly in the Euro Area, is the growing market concern 
about long-term public debt sustainability in a number of countries. The 
associated solvency and liquidity risks have already caused severe disruption 
to the normal functioning of European financial markets. The rapid 
increase in risk premia in a number of Euro Area countries resulted in the 
announcement of a series of coordinated rescue measures between EU 
member countries, the IMF and the ECB. Following the implementation of 
these measures, the significant market volatility that characterised the first 
week of May has been contained. However, government bond yields 
remain elevated in some of the Euro Area’s peripheral economies, as 
shown in Figure 2, and the long-run concerns about debt sustainability 
remain, with associated downside risks for the forecast pace of recovery. 
Failure on the part of high-risk countries to produce and implement 
credible consolidation plans may result in a further loss of confidence, 
raising the prospect of more widespread financial market instability. 
Increased borrowing costs could potentially crowd out private 
consumption and investment, further hampering the recovery process. In 
addition, the ECB has highlighted a concern that the sizeable near-term 
funding requirements of governments could potentially crowd out issuance 
of bonds by banks.3 The implications for bank funding costs could present 
a further setback to the recovery in this sector. 
Figure 2: Ten Year Government Bond Spreads Relative to Germany  
(July 2008 – June 2010) 
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
2008M07 2009M01 2009M07 2010M01
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 P
oi
nt
s
Greece Spain Ireland Portugal
Source: Datastream.  
 
 
3 ECB Financial Stability Review, June 2010. 
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Related to this point is the wider concern regarding the likely timing 
and nature of exit strategies from the range of exceptional policy measures, 
as highlighted in a number of previous Commentaries. In relation to fiscal 
policy, as outlined above, some countries have no choice but to curb their 
excessive borrowing immediately. For other economies, where fiscal 
sustainability is not in question and where the risk of default is essentially 
zero, the pace of fiscal consolidation should be sufficient to ensure 
continued credibility over the medium-term, while remaining supportive of 
the recovery in economic growth. Many commentators have argued that 
premature fiscal tightening is as big a danger as delayed tightening, 
particularly given the fragile nature of the recovery thus far. At the release 
of the IMF World Economic Outlook Update, Olivier Blanchard recently 
stressed that while fiscal adjustment should start soon, a sharp cut in 
deficits this year would be counterproductive. The focus should be on 
developing a credible plan to stabilise the debt to GDP ratio over the 
medium term, with the goal of decreasing it substantially over the longer 
term. 
 
With regard to monetary policy, exit from the massive stimulus injected 
over the last two years is gradually starting. The exception to this is in the 
Euro Area, where the process of removing special liquidity provisions has 
been reversed in recent months, in an attempt to overcome the growing 
concerns about sovereign debt. In early May, the ECB decided to reactivate 
some of its longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) at both three and 
six-month maturities. It also re-established the temporary foreign exchange 
swap lines with the US Federal Reserve and resumed US dollar liquidity-
providing operations. Elsewhere, similar measures have been scaled back or 
withdrawn. Asset purchase programmes in the US and the UK are nearing 
an end, or have been put on hold indefinitely, while central bank-
determined official interest rates have started to rise in a number of 
countries (such as Australia, Brazil, Norway and Sweden, among others). In 
the Euro Area, it is likely that monetary policy will remain highly 
accommodative for the remainder of the year. Recovery prospects are still 
sluggish and inflationary pressures remain subdued. In both the US and the 
UK, where there are indications that inflation expectations are increasing, it 
is possible that official interest rates will start to rise before the end of the 
year.  
 
 
EXPORTS 
Irish exports continue to perform strongly, according to the latest Quarterly 
National Accounts. During the first quarter of 2010, exports of goods and 
services increased by almost 7 per cent in volume terms, compared to the 
previous quarter. Over the same period, total Euro Area exports grew by 
just 2.5 per cent. The outlook for Irish exports over the forecast horizon 
depends crucially on an ongoing recovery in the international economy, 
particularly in the economies of our main trading partners. Export 
prospects also rely on the recovery in world trade, following the 
unprecedented collapse at the end of 2008. As shown in Figure 3, world 
trade has rebounded strongly since the middle of 2009 and has essentially 
returned to pre-crisis levels. Research by the OECD into the drivers of the 
world trade collapse suggests that tight credit conditions and the sharp 
drop in world demand were the most important factors, and the reversal of 
Implications 
for Ireland 
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both of these now appears to be driving the recovery. Temporary factors 
are also playing a role, such as trade-intensive stock building and a variety 
of fiscal stimulus programmes, for example car scrappage schemes. Once 
these measures are phased out and the upturn in the inventory cycle starts 
to fade, it is likely that the rebound in trade will moderate somewhat, unless 
a strong pick-up in private final demand takes hold. Overall, world trade is 
projected to grow by 10.6 per cent in 2010 and 8.4 per cent in 2011. While 
this would obviously be a positive development from an Irish perspective, 
it should be noted that the acceleration of growth in trade is being driven 
by non-OECD countries, with whom Ireland has relatively little trade..  
Figure 3: Index of World Trade 
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EXCHANGE RATES 
The euro has fallen by almost 10 per cent on a trade weighted basis since 
the beginning of 2010, with a substantial part of this decline occurring in 
May, largely due to the sharp rise in the risk premium associated with Euro 
Area sovereign debt. The single currency fell to a four-year low of $1.19 
against the dollar and an eighteen month low of £0.82 against the pound in 
early June, and has weakened against the exchange rate of each of its main 
trading partners since the start of the year. Although the rapid decline in 
the value of the euro appears to have come to a halt, a further weakening 
of the single currency is possible. In spite of the introduction of the €750 
billion support package from the European Union and the IMF, markets 
remain concerned about sovereign risk and the possibility of a debt default 
in one of the Euro Area’s weakened economies. The forecasts in this 
Commentary assume that exchange rates are unchanged from their June 2010 
levels. This implies annual average exchange rates of $1.27 and £0.85 
against the dollar and the pound respectively in 2010, and $1.22 and £0.83 
in 2011. The Irish economy should benefit from the currency’s decline in 
recent months, as it may provide a further boost to exports outside the 
Euro Area. It could also be argued that the euro has fallen from an 
overvalued position against many currencies. In the 2001-2008 period, the 
average value of the euro against the dollar was $1.19, and against the 
pound it averaged £0.68. 
    
Table 1: Short term International Outlook 
 
             
 GDP Output Growth Consumer Prices* 
Inflation* 
Unemployment Rate 
 
General Government 
Balance 
       % % of GDP 
             
Country 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
             
UK -4.9 1.3 2.5 2.2 3.0 1.5 7.6 8.1 7.9 -11.3 -11.5 -10.3 
Germany -4.9 1.9 2.1 0.2 1.3 1.0 7.4 7.6 8.0 -3.3 -5.4 -4.5 
France -2.5 1.7 2.1 0.1 1.7 1.1 9.1 9.8 9.5 -7.6 -7.8 -6.9 
Italy -5.1 1.1 1.5 0.8 1.2 1.0 7.8 8.7 8.8 -5.2 -5.2 -5.0 
             
Euro Area -4.1 1.2 1.8 0.3 1.4 1.0 9.4 10.1 10.1 -6.3 -6.6 -5.7 
USA -2.4 3.2 3.2 -0.3 1.9 1.1 9.3 9.7 8.9 -11.0 -10.7 -8.9 
Japan -5.2 3.0 2.0 -1.4 -0.7 -0.3 5.1 4.9 4.7 -7.2 -7.6 -8.3 
China 8.7 11.1 9.7 -0.7 2.5 2.5    -0.9 1.0 1.6 
             
OECD -3.3 2.7 2.8    8.1 8.5 8.2 -7.9 -7.8 -6.7 
             
Ireland -7.6 - ½ 2 ¾ -1.7 -1 ½ ½ 11.8 13 ¼ 13 -14.6 -19 -10 ¾ 
             
 Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 87, May 2010. 
*HICP for UK and Euro Area countries.  
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Figure 4: Exchange Rates 
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INTEREST RATES 
The ECB main refinancing rate has remained at a historic low of 1.0 per 
cent for over a year now. The Euro Area emerged from recession in the 
third quarter of 2009, but the pace of the recovery thus far has been slow 
and the outlook over the forecast horizon is subdued, as outlined above. 
The current OECD forecasts suggest an average HICP inflation rate of 1.4 
per cent in the Euro Area in 2010. Given the anaemic growth prospects 
and the absence of any significant inflationary pressures, the ECB has 
shown no inclination to raise interest rates and has repeatedly stated that 
the refinancing rate is at an appropriate level. The ECB had begun the 
process of gradually withdrawing its long-term refinancing operations 
(LTRO’s), however the impairments in financial markets arising from the 
Greek debt crisis forced a re-introduction of some of these measures. 
Given its assertions regarding the appropriateness of the current policy 
stance, combined with the likely ongoing fragility of market sentiment, it is 
unlikely that the ECB will consider raising interest rates until 2011 at the 
earliest. Therefore, our forecasts are based on the assumption that the 
refinancing rate will be held at 1.0 per cent for the remainder of the year, 
rising to 1.75 per cent by the end of 2011. From an Irish perspective, an 
unchanged rate in 2010 would certainly be welcomed, given the particularly 
fragile nature of the economic recovery here. In previous Commentaries, we 
have expressed a concern about the possibility of interest rate increases 
occurring at a time when the Euro Area recovery is well under way, but 
when activity in Ireland remains relatively subdued. Based on the current 
forecasts for a slow pace of recovery in the Euro Area, this outcome now 
seems increasingly unlikely.   
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Figure 5: Interest Rates 
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THE DOMESTIC 
ECONOMY 
The most recent Quarterly National Accounts (QNA), for the first quarter of 
2010, suggest that the economy may be starting to stabilise. In terms of 
GDP, the first quarter growth rate was a healthy 2.7 per cent, driven by 
very strong growth in exports (6.9 per cent). However, using GNP as a 
measure of growth, the first quarter results suggest a continuing decline in 
economic activity of 0.5 per cent as net factor income flows surged by 11 
per cent. The underlying pattern of activity in the data confirms that 
domestic economic activity is still sluggish, with significant further falls in 
investment, particularly in the building and construction sector.  
 
Using these first quarter figures, we have calculated the implied 
carryover growth rate for 2010, as shown in Table 2. This is the growth rate 
that would occur if economic activity were to remain unchanged from the 
level recorded in the first quarter of 2010. Based on pure carryover, the 
latest QNA estimates suggest GDP would increase marginally in 2010 by 
0.4 per cent. Our estimate for 2010 GDP growth is very close to this, 0.3 
per cent. We expect the domestic economy to continue to shrink, 
counterbalanced by growth in external demand as exports perform 
strongly.  
 
For 2011, we expect a resumption of more broadly-based growth, 
across all categories of expenditure with the exception of government 
consumption. For the latter category, we have revised downwards our 
numbers for 2010 and 2011. This adjustment partly reflects the very 
significant revision to the 2009 numbers, where the change in government 
consumption was revised from -1.3 per cent in March 2010 to -4.4 per cent 
in June 2010. However, while private consumption and investment are 
both forecast to grow in 2011, we expect that external demand will be 
significantly stronger that domestic demand, as further fiscal austerity 
measures restrain the growth in domestic demand. 
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Table 2: Revisions to QNA and Implied Carryover 
 
QNA 
March 
2010 
QNA 
June 
20104 Revision 
 
Implied 
Carryover 
from Q1 
Data 
QEC  
Summer 2010 
 2009 2009  2010 2010e 2011 
 
Private Consumption -7.2 -7.0 0.2% -0.6 ¼ 1½ 
Government Consumption -1.3 -4.4 -3.1% -3.5 -4 -3 
Investment -29.7 -30.8 -1.2% -24.4 -24 2¼ 
Exports -2.3 -4.2 -1.8% 5.8 5 4¾ 
Imports -9.3 -9.8 -0.5% -0.3 ¾ 3½ 
GDP  -7.1 -7.6 -0.5% 0.4 ¼ 2¾ 
Net Factor Income 17.4 11.4 -6.1% 12.1 4¼ 5 
GNP -11.3 -10.7 0.6% -2.6 -½ 2¼ 
       
 
In relation to unemployment, our latest forecasts imply a slight 
reduction in the unemployment rate for 2010 compared to our earlier 
estimates. As discussed in some detail in the previous Commentary, these 
changes reflect the very rapid fall in the labour force, with our estimates of 
total employment in 2010 broadly unchanged. Figure 6 illustrates how 
significant the fall in the labour force has been since the beginning of the 
recession. In 2008Q1 the labour force was 2.25 million, total employment 
was 2.14 million and the number unemployed was 110,000.5 By 2010Q1 
total employment had fallen by 268,000, and if participation remained 
unchanged that would have led to unemployment of 378,000 and an 
unemployment rate of 16.8 per cent. However 100,000 left the labour force 
so total unemployment in 2010Q1 is 279,000, an unemployment rate of 
12.9 per cent.  
Figure 6: Changes in Employment, Unemployment and the Labour Force 
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4 These figures differ slightly from the annual National Income and Expenditure estimates 
used in this QEC. These differences are minor and are due to the fact that quarterly 
seasonally adjusted data do not exactly sum to annual totals. 
5 These are seasonally adjusted numbers from the CSO, total employment and 
unemployment numbers do not exactly sum to the labour force. 
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We have revised upwards our figures for net outward migration, to 
70,000 in 2010 and 50,000 in 2011. Together with limited further declines 
in participation, this will be sufficient to see the unemployment rate decline 
marginally in 2011 to 13 per cent. However, these figures imply no increase 
in employment levels in 2011. This reflects our view that we expect the 
recovery to be driven by an increase in exports, which are less 
employment-intensive than consumption. We have implemented in full a 
package of €3 billion cuts, which includes €1 billion cuts in the capital 
programme, €1 billion cuts in current expenditure and €1 billion increase in 
taxation. This austerity package will ensure that domestic demand remains 
subdued in 2011. However it does help to reduce the general government 
deficit to 10¼ per cent of GDP. By the end of 2011 we forecast that the 
gross government debt will be equivalent to 94 per cent of GDP, 
compared to 44 per cent in 2008. 
 
 The Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) for Q1 2010 show that 
consumption fell by 7 per cent in 2009. This was a small upward revision 
from the previous estimate contained in the QNA for Q4 2009, which was 
-7.2 per cent. In Figure 7, we show quarter-on-quarter changes in 
consumption (seasonally adjusted). The dramatic fall in consumption in Q1 
2009 is very stark. Since then, the pace of decline moderated significantly 
but the trend has generally stayed in negative territory. 
Figure 7: Quarter-on-Quarter % Change in Volume of Consumption, 
Seasonally Adjusted 
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Source: Quarterly National Accounts , CSO.  
 
In Table 3, we show trends in a range of indicators of consumption. 
The data in this table show annual rates of change and this explains, for 
example, why large negative numbers appear under retail sales throughout 
2009. The more moderate pace of annual decline in Q1 2010 reflects in 
part the lower base that resulted from the Q1 2009 decline. A recovery in 
car sales, possibly in response to the Government’s scrappage scheme, also 
added a positive impetus. 
 
 
 
 
Consumption 
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Table 3: Recent Indicators of Consumption (Annualised Volume Growth 
Rates) 
     
 Retail Sales (unadjusted) 
Trips 
Abroad 
New 
Vehicle 
Sales 
All Vehicle 
Sales 
 
All 
Businesses 
 
Excluding 
Motor Trade    
 % % % % % 
2008Q1 4.8 5.9 11.6 -1.5 -2.6 
2008Q2 0.6 3.5 8.3 -10.3 -13.7 
2008Q3 -3.0 0.7 6.2 -12.8 -18.0 
2008Q4 -6.4 -2.5 2.1 -15.4 -20.9 
2009Q1 -11.4 -5.1 -3.1 -31.9 -44.7 
2009Q2 -13.1 -6.6 -5.0 -37.3 -53.3 
2009Q3 -14.1 -6.9 -9.6 -46.1 -62.2 
2009Q4 -14.0 -6.8 -10.5 -47.1 -62.5 
2010Q1 -8.6 -5.7  -32.1 -38.8 
      
 
The latest readings from the KBC/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index 
show improvements in consumer sentiment. The index, on a three moth 
moving average basis, rose to 66.3 in June, up from 64.3 in May and from 
the historic low of 41.7 in August 2008. 
 
Looking ahead, we now expect that the volume of consumption will 
increase marginally this year, by ¼ per cent, and that it will increase by 1½ 
per cent in 2011. This relatively subdued rate of consumption growth is 
anticipated due to factors such as continued weakness in the labour market 
into 2011 and on-going expectations of tax increases. The subdued rate of 
growth is reflected in our forecast for the saving rate which we see 
remaining above 10 percent in both 2010 and 2011.6 
 
 The pace of decline in investment accelerated in the first quarter of 2010, 
according to the Quarterly National Accounts, and is shown in Figure 8. The 
volume of investment fell by just under 14 per cent in Q1, compared to the 
final quarter of 2009. Looking at the various components, the decline in 
housing investment continues to drive the overall slump in gross fixed 
capital formation. In the first three months of the year, investment in 
dwellings fell by 53 per cent, compared to the same period in 2009. Other 
building and construction fell by 30 per cent over the same period, while 
investment in machinery and equipment declined by 17 per cent.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 As recently as 2007, the savings rate was 2.7 per cent. 
Investment 
    
Table 4: Gross Fixed Capital Formation   
        
 2008 % Change in 2009 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 
           
 €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn 
           
Housing 15.1 -41.0 -51.2 7.4 -43 ½ -46 4.0 2 ¾ -1 ¼ 3.9 
           
Other Building 12.9 -24.3 -33.1 8.6 -20 -28 6.2 -5 ½ -8 ¼ 5.7 
           
Transfer Costs 1.7 -62.4 -65.7 0.6 -20 -25 0.4 5 0 0.4 
           
Building and   
Construction 29.7 -34.9 -44.2 16.6 -31 -35 ¾ 10.6 -2 -5 ¼ 10.1 
           
Machinery and 
Equipment 10.1 -19.3 -19.4 8.1 -8 -9 ½ 7.4 10 11 ¾ 8.2 
           
Total 39.8 -31.0 -37.9 24.7 -24 -27 ¼ 18.0 2 ¼ 1 ¾ 18.3 
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Figure 8: Quarter-on-Quarter Growth in Investment, Seasonally Adjusted 
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Source: Quarterly National Accounts, CSO.  
 
The situation in the housing market continues to deteriorate and Figure 
9 indicates the latest trends in activity in the sector. In the year ending April 
2010, total house completions fell by 50 per cent, while registrations fell by 
64 per cent. Data for the first three months of this year show total 
commencements of 1,706. Based on these latest indicators, we are 
forecasting total house completions of 10,000 in 2010 and this implies a fall 
of 43½ per cent in housing investment this year. For 2011, we expect the 
number of house completions to stabilise at 10,000 units. While the 
contraction in house building will no longer act as a drag on economic 
growth, this sector will not make any  significant  contribution to growth in 
Figure 9: Housing Statistics, Annualised Numbers 
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2011.7 In relation to house prices, the pace of decline is showing no sign of 
slowing. In the first quarter of the year, house prices in Dublin registered 
their largest quarter-on-quarter decline, equivalent to 10.3 per cent, while 
house prices nationally fell by 4.8 per cent. At this time, house prices in 
Dublin were 42 per cent below their peak, and nationally they were 34 per 
cent below peak. We expect the cumulative fall in the price of new houses 
to be close to 50 per cent from the peak by the end of 2011. 
 
Overall we expect the volume of investment to fall by 24 per cent in 
2010. Underlying this is a fall in housing investment of 43½ per cent, a fall 
of 20 per cent in other building and construction and a fall of 8 per cent in 
investment in machinery and equipment. We are forecasting a return to 
growth in overall investment in 2011, although the pace of growth is 
expected to be a very modest 2¼ per cent. This will be driven by an 
increase of 10 per cent in the volume of investment in machinery and 
equipment. We expect to see a small increase in the volume of housing 
investment, although this growth is assumed to be in repairs and 
renovation, rather than an increase in house completions. Finally, we 
expect other building and construction to fall by 5½ per cent, partly as a 
result of the expected cuts to capital spending in Budget 2011.  
 
 The most recent exchequer returns for the first six months of 2010 
recorded further declines in revenue across all of the major tax headings. 
Total tax revenue in June 2010 was €1.4 billion lower than in the same 
period in 2009. (The equivalent decline between June 2008 and June 2009 
was €3.3 billion.) Figure 10 charts the exchequer receipts for the first six 
months from 2005 to 2010. The total tax take for the first six months of 
2010 was €14.4 billion, a level last recorded in 2003.  However in June 
2003, voted expenditure was just €14 billion, while in June 2010 voted 
expenditure was €21.5 billion.   
Figure 10: Exchequer Returns, € millions 
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7 The volume growth of 2¾ per cent in housing investment indicated in Table 4 relates to 
investment in improvements in the existing housing stock, rather than an increase in house 
building. 
Government 
Spending 
and the 
Public 
Finances 
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Table 5: Public Finances  
        
 2008  
€bn 
% 
Change 
2009 
€bn 
% 
Change 
2010 
€bn 
% 
Change 
 2011 
€bn 
        
Current Revenue 41.6 -18.6 33.9 3 ¼ 35.0 - ¼ 34.9 
   of which: Tax Revenue 40.8 -19.0 33.0 -1 ¼ 32.6 3 ¾ 33.8 
Current Expenditure 44.7 1.2 45.2 4 ¾ 47.4 2 ¾ 48.7 
   of which: Voted 40.8 -1.2 40.3 0 40.3 ¼ 40.4 
        
Current Surplus -3.1  -11.4  -12.4  -13.8 
        
Capital Receipts 1.4 4.8 1.5 14 ¼ 1.7 -2 ½ 1.6 
Capital Expenditure 11.0 33.5 14.7 -53 ¾ 6.8 12 ¾ 7.7 
   of which: Voted 8.6 -19.3 6.9 -13 ¼ 6.0 -16 ¼ 5.0 
        
Capital Borrowing -9.6  -13.3  -5.2  -6.1 
        
Exchequer Balance -12.7  -24.6  -17.6  -19.9 
 as % of GNP -8.2  -18.8  -13 ¾  -15 ¼ 
        
General Government 
Balance* -13.2  -23.4  -31.3  -16.5 
 as % of GDP -7.3  -14.6  -19 ¾  -10 ¼ 
        
Gross Debt as % of GDP 44.4  65.6  85 ½  93 ½ 
        
Net Debt as % of GDP** 22.6  38.2  56 ¼  63 ½ 
        
2010 and 2011 figures are based on National Accounts estimates. 
**Net of NPRF, Social Insurance and Exchequer Balances. 
 
Despite the very poor figures, the cumulative numbers show the first 
signs that the decline in total exchequer tax receipts may finally be 
stabilising. Figure 11 shows the rolling annual total between December 
2005 and June 2010. It confirms the continued downward trend which 
began in the middle of 2007.  For the year ended June 2010, total tax 
revenue was just below €32 billion, a fall of €15 billion from the peak in 
October 2007.  
 
Our forecast of tax revenue for 2010 is for an overall decline of 1¼ per 
cent. This is equivalent to a full-year tax take of €32½ billion. Given that 
the current annualised number is below €32 billion, this estimate is based 
on a pick-up in revenue in the second half of this year as the economy 
begins to recover. If this forecast proves correct, and assuming budgetary 
targets for current and capital expenditure are met, then we estimate that 
the General Government Balance will be -11½  per cent of GDP in 2010. 
In Table 5 this figure is 19¾ per cent, this includes the €12.9 billion once-
off cost of the promissory notes given to Anglo Irish Bank and Irish 
Nationwide.  
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Figure 11: Total Exchequer Tax Revenues, Rolling Annual Total8 
30.0
32.5
35.0
37.5
40.0
42.5
45.0
47.5
Dec-05 Aug-06 Apr-07 Dec-07 Aug-08 Apr-09 Dec-09
€ 
bi
lli
on
Source: Department of Finance.  
 
For 2011 we have implemented a stylised budget based on the pre-
announced targets included in the Budget 2010 document. In the document 
these include total cuts of €3 billion, with €2 billion targeted at the current 
side of the budget and a €1 billion reduction in capital expenditure. We 
have assumed an increase in €1 billion in taxation, split between increases 
in income tax (including PRSI) and some form of property taxation.9 On 
current expenditure we have assumed a freeze in welfare payments and 
public sector pay rates together with further reductions in the volume of 
public consumption which is forecast to fall by 3 per cent in 2011. It is 
important to stress that this is not a prescriptive recommendation; we have 
implemented these measures to estimate the impact of the pre-announced 
budget plans on the public finances and the wider economy. 
 
We estimate that such a budget package would reduce the General 
Government Deficit by between 1½ and 2 percentage points of GDP. The 
impact on the wider economy is to reduce the growth rate by 
approximately one percentage point.10 In addition, the level of employment 
is lower and emigration flows higher than in the absence of such a package. 
These are real costs attached to the programme of fiscal consolidation 
being pursued by the government. Despite these costs it is the view of this 
Commentary that such measures are necessary to ensure the medium-term 
sustainability of the public finances.  
 
For 2010, we have assumed that the Government will transfer €13 
billion to fund the recapitalisation of Anglo Irish Bank and INBS. Since 
these monies are in the form of promissory notes, they will not increase the 
exchequer deficit in 2010 but are included in the General Government 
 
8 There is a discrete shift in the last two months of each year. This reflects the impact of 
collection of capital gains tax and corporation tax, which are concentrated in the last two 
months of the year. 
9 The Government has ruled out the possibility of a property tax being introduced. In the 
absence of firm information of what alternative might be implemented, we have opted to 
implement the same stylised budgetary package as in the last Commentary. 
10 This estimate is based on comparing the “with budget” forecasts presented in this 
Commentary with the forecast growth rates which would arise given a neutral budget.  
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Deficit which we estimate to be 19 ¾ per cent of GDP in 2010. Excluding 
these transfers, the deficit would be 11 ½ per cent of GDP. At the time of 
writing it is not clear what the timing of further transfers of €8 billion to 
Anglo Irish Bank and INBS will be made. We have made a technical 
assumption that €0.6 billion will be transferred in 201111 and this figure is 
included in the Exchequer and General Government Deficit in 2011. In 
addition we assume that €1.3 billion of the promissory notes issued in 2010 
will be drawn down in 2011, this increases the exchequer deficit in 2011. 
These figures are purely illustrative. In relation to interest payments, which 
will also increase due to the cost of the bank bailout, we forecast that gross 
interest payments on the debt12 will be close to €6 billion, or 3½ per cent 
of GDP. For the purpose of reaching compliance with the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) target, it is the general government deficit excluding the 
cost of the promissory notes given to the banks which is the relevant 
measure. 
 
 The Quarterly National Accounts for Q1 2010 indicate a fall in the volume 
of total exports of 4.1 per cent in 2009. While this decline indicates that 
Irish exports were not immune to the collapse in world trade, the 
performance of exports over the course of 2009 was resilient by 
international standards in comparison to the double-digit declines in 
exports recorded in other Euro Area countries such as Germany (-14 per 
cent), France (-12 per cent) and the UK (-11 per cent). Exports of goods 
and services recorded small quarter-on-quarter declines of 0.8 per cent and 
1 per cent in Q3 and Q4 2009. The latest Quarterly National Accounts data 
indicate a reversal of this trend in Q1 2010 with exports of goods and 
services (seasonally adjusted) increasing by 6.9 per cent in volume terms 
compared to Q4 2009.  
 
The fall in exports in Ireland has been significantly less than that being 
experienced in our major trading partners due to the concentration of Irish 
exports in sectors which have been less affected by the slump in 
international trade. Exports of chemicals and related products (mostly 
medical and pharmaceutical products and organic chemicals) accounted for 
over half of the total value of merchandise exports in 2009. This sector has 
continued to grow despite the slump in international trade, thereby helping 
to insulate Irish exports from the worst effects of the slowdown in world 
trade. In contrast, manufacturing sectors in our major trading partners 
which are more reliant on capital goods or automobile production have 
experienced much steeper declines in exports in line with the dramatic fall 
in world trade. Exports of chemicals and related products grew by 6.5 per 
cent in value terms in 2009 compared to 2008 according to the latest 
External Trade statistics and were 1.8 per cent higher in the year ending 
March 2010. The strong performance of chemicals exports has helped to 
offset some of the significant declines in exports which have occurred in 
other sectors of the economy. Exports of computers and electrical 
equipment fell by close to 30 per cent in the year ending February 2010. 
Exports from the traditional sector and exports to the UK also declined 
over the same period reflecting the difficulties created for Irish exporters 
by the weakness of sterling together with the weak performance of the UK 
economy.  
 
11 Assuming that further transfers will be issued in tranches over the coming ten years. 
12 These numbers exclude any interest costs related to funding NAMA. 
Exports 
 Table 6: Exports of Goods and Services   
        
 2008 % Change in 2009 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 
           
 €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn 
           
Merchandise 81 -5.2 -4.9 77 5 ½ 5     81 4 ½ 5     85 
Tourism 4 -16.5 -18.2 4 - ½ -1     3 5 ¾ 8     4 
Other Services 64 -1.9 -0.8 63 4 ¾ 5     66 5     5 ½ 70 
           
Exports of Goods  
  and Services 149 -4.1 -3.6 144 5     4 ¾ 151 4 ¾ 5 ¼ 159 
           
FISIM Adjustment 1   1   1   1 
           
Adjusted Exports 150 -4.1 -3.6 145 5     4 ¾ 152 4 ¾ 5 ¼ 160 
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Services exports declined by 2 per cent in value terms in 2009 
according to the latest data from the Balance of Payments (Figure 12). This 
aggregate figure masks significant variation in the performance of various 
components of services exports over the course of the year. Exports of 
financial services, insurance and tourism registered declines of 13 per cent, 
7 per cent and 18 per cent respectively in 2009 compared to the previous 
year. In contrast, exports of I.T. services performed solidly last year and 
were 1.5 per cent higher for the year as a whole. There were also substantial 
increases in receipts  from royalties/licences,  business  services  and  other 
services. The latest data for Q1 2010 indicate a continuation of the trend 
which emerged over the course of 2009 with increases in exports of I.T. 
services and business services offsetting substantial ongoing declines in 
exports of tourism and financial services. Services exports in the year 
ending Q1 2010 were almost 1 per cent higher compared to the figure for 
the year ending Q1 2009.  
 
As discussed in the International section above, world trade recovered 
strongly during 2009 and that recovery has persisted into 2010. The latest 
data from the Centraal Planbureau (CPB) in the Netherlands indicate that 
following the collapse of late 2008, world trade has returned to its pre-crisis 
levels and is forecast to expand further over the coming months. We 
expect the upturn in the world economy and the recovery in world trade to 
boost demand for Irish exports over the forecast horizon. We estimate a 
return to export growth of 5 per cent this year following two years of 
contraction in export volumes. Having performed solidly in 2010, despite 
the slump in international trade, we expect the volume of merchandise 
exports to expand by 5½ per cent in 2010 and 4½ per cent in 2011. On the 
basis of recent trends in the manufacturing wholesale price index, which is 
a good leading indicator of merchandise export prices, we anticipate that 
exports will increase in value terms by 5 per cent in both 2010 and 2011. 
Figure 12: Exports and Imports of Services, Current Prices, Annualised 
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Regarding our forecasts for services exports, we expect non-tourism 
services exports to grow by 4¾ per cent in 2010 and 5 per cent in 2011 in 
volume terms. Services exports declined only marginally in 2009 despite the 
upheaval in international financial markets and we expect the gradual 
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improvement in conditions in that sector to support the return to services 
export growth. Following large declines in both 2008 and 2009, we 
envisage a further contraction in tourism exports of ½ per cent in 2010. 
For 2011, the volume of tourism exports is expected to grow by 5¾ per 
cent.  
 
 Imports fell sharply in 2009 as a result of the collapse in consumption and 
investment. As shown in Figure 13, total imports declined by almost 10 per 
cent in 2009 with the volume of services imports shrinking by 2.6 per cent 
while merchandise imports fell by over 18 per cent. The volume of tourism 
imports fell by over 10 per cent. The decline in imports continued during 
the first quarter of 2010, with the volume of imports down over 2 per cent 
on a year-on-year basis.  
 
The decline in imports has taken place across a range of categories, as 
shown in the latest External Trade statistics. Large year-on-year falls have 
been recorded in machinery and equipment (-31 per cent in value) and 
other manufactured goods. Large declines were also recorded in imports of 
consumption goods. Imports of road vehicles and other transport 
equipment fell by a massive 70 per cent in 2009 in value terms. Retail sales 
data for the first six months of the year have indicated a rebound in car 
sales and this is reflected in the merchandise imports data with imports of 
road vehicles and other transport equipment 102 per cent higher in March 
2010 compared to March 2009. With domestic demand expected to remain 
subdued in 2010, we are forecasting a decline of 1½ per cent in the volume 
of merchandise imports. On the basis of our projections for consumption 
and investment, we expect merchandise imports to grow by 2 per cent in 
volume in 2011.  
Figure 13: Exports and Imports, Seasonally Adjusted Quarterly Change,     
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Table 7: Imports of Goods and Services    
        
 2008 % Change in 2009 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 
           
 €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn 
           
Merchandise 57 -18.4 -22.0 45 -1 ½ -2 44 2 4 46 
Tourism 7 -10.3 -10.8 6 -2 ½ -3 6 2 4 6 
Other Services 69 -2.6 0.3 69 2 ½ 2 70 4 ¾ 5 74 
           
Imports of Goods  
  and Services 133 -9.7 -9.9 120 ¾ ¼ 120 3 ½ 4 ½ 126 
           
FISIM Adjustment 1   1   1   1 
           
Adjusted Imports 134 -9.7 -10.1 120 ¾ ¼ 121 3 ½ 4 ½ 126 
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Current price data from the Balance of Payments (not seasonally adjusted) 
show a small decline in the value of services imports in 2009. On an 
annualised basis, services imports were 0.9 per cent lower in value terms in 
the year ending March 2010 with higher imports of royalties and business 
services being offset by reduced imports of financial services and tourism. 
Looking ahead, we expect a small volume increase in non-tourism services 
imports of 2½ per cent in 2010 and 4¾ in 2011. Following a 10 per cent 
decline in 2009, we are forecasting a further decline of 2½ in tourism 
imports in 2010 with a modest 2 per cent increase anticipated in 2011. 
Based on the projected recovery in economic activity, consumption and 
disposable income in 2011, we expect an increase of 3½ per cent in total 
imports of goods and services next year. We expect the increase in Irish 
exports in 2010 and 2011 to contribute to the expansion in imports given 
the high import intensity of Irish exports.  
 
 The sharp fall in the value of merchandise imports in 2009 of over 22 per 
cent greatly exceeded the reduction in merchandise exports giving rise to a 
substantial expansion in the merchandise trade surplus of €8.6 billion last 
year (Figure 14). The 2 per cent decline in the value of services exports in 
2009 contributed to a widening of the services trade deficit of around €700 
million over the course of the year. Our forecasts for services exports imply 
a reduction in this deficit in 2010 to €6.5 billion. On the basis of our 
projections for merchandise exports and imports, we envisage a further 
increase in the merchandise trade surplus both this year and next year. 
These projections should see the overall trade balance on goods and 
services increase from 18 per cent of GNP in 2009 to 23¾ per cent in 2010 
and 25¼ per cent in 2011; the equivalent figure for 2008 was 10.4 per cent 
of GNP.  
 
Table 8: Balance of Payments*  
        
 2008 Change 2009 Change 2010 Change 2011 
 €bn % €bn % €bn % €bn 
        
Merchandise Trade  Balance 23.8  32.4  37.1  39.4 
Service Trade Balance -7.7  -8.4  -6.5  -6.3 
 
Trade Balance in Goods and 
Services on BoP basis 16.1  24.0  30.6  33.1 
% of GNP 10.4  18.3  23 ¾  25 ¼ 
 Total Debit Flows 109.2 -24.6 82.4 -9 ¼ 74.7 -2 ¾ 72.7 
 Total Credit Flows 84.0 -35.2 54.5 -17 ½ 44.9 -9 40.9 
Net Factor Flows  -25.2 10.9 -27.9 6 ¾ -29.8 7 -31.9 
Net Current Transfers  -1.2  -0.9  -0.9  -0.9 
 
Balance on Current Account -10.2  -4.9  0.0  0.3 
        
Capital Transfers 0.0  -1.3  0.1  0.1 
Effective Current Balance  -10.1  -6.1  0.1  0.4 
% of GNP -6.5  -4.7  0            ¼ 
      
*This table includes adjustments to Balance of Payments basis. 
 
 
Balance of 
Payments 
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Balance of payments data show a sharp fall in 2009 in both factor 
inflows and factor outflows. Factor inflows fell by 35.2 per cent driven 
mainly by a sharp decline in portfolio investment income of over 43 per 
cent. Factor outflows declined by almost 25 per cent as the reduction in 
other debit flows (portfolio investment income and other investment 
income) exceeded the combined increase in outflows from the payment of 
national debt interest abroad as well as the increase in profit outflows. Our 
forecasts imply a further reduction in both factor inflows and factor 
outflows in 2010 and 2011. While profit outflows (reflecting the projected 
increase in exports) and national debt interest payments abroad are both 
expected to increase in 2010 and 2011, this will be offset by the reduction 
in other debit outflows. Factor inflows are expected to decline by 17½ per 
cent in 2010 and 9 per cent in 2011 as a result of ongoing falls in portfolio 
investment and other investment income.  
Figure 14: Balance of Trade on Goods and Services, Current Prices 
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Despite the increase of almost 11 per cent in net factor income 
outflows in 2009, the expansion of the merchandise trade surplus gave rise 
to a rapid fall in the deficit on the current account of the balance of 
payments over the course of the year. The latest Balance of Payments statistics 
indicate that a small surplus of €17 million was recorded on the current 
account in Q4 2009, the first surplus since Q4 2003. As a result, the current 
account deficit for 2009 as a whole fell to €4.9 billion (4.7 per cent of 
GNP) compared to a deficit of €10.1 billion in 2008. The narrowing of the 
current account deficit which took place over the course of 2009 is 
expected to continue in 2010 with the result that we expect the current 
account to move into balance this year before recording a surplus of ¼  per 
cent of GNP in 2011. The movement into surplus of the current account is 
expected to be driven by the expansion in the merchandise trade surplus.  
 
The expected emergence of a surplus on the current account of the 
balance of payments over the coming years is a symptom of the structural 
realignment currently underway in the Irish economy as it readjusts 
towards export-led growth. The emerging surplus on the current account 
of the balance of payments in Ireland stands in stark contrast to the 
situation in other Euro Area countries such as Portugal, Italy, Greece and 
Spain, all of which are expected to record large current account deficits 
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over the coming years (Figure 15). While the government sector is currently 
running a large deficit, the absence of a “twin deficits” problem in Ireland 
represents a significant strength of the Irish economy and provides 
reassurance as to the overall financial sustainability of the State. Changes in 
the flow of funds between sectors of the Irish economy, which match these 
developments in the balance of payments, are discussed in Box 1.  
Figure 15: Current Account Balance, % of GDP 
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Box 1: Net Financial Position of Irish Households 
 
 
The Central Statistics Office Institutional Sector Accounts provide a 
comprehensive picture of Irish households’ net asset position by presenting 
a household balance sheet which shows household assets as well as 
household debt. While the growth in private sector credit and borrowing to 
fund housing investment has been well documented in recent years, the 
institutional sector accounts shed some extra light on the net worth of Irish 
households by allowing us to examine both sides of the balance sheet of 
Irish households.  
 
   The accounts show the dramatic rise in households’ indebtedness 
between 2001 and 2008. Over this period the financial liabilities of the 
household sector increased by almost 240 per cent (Table A). The increase 
in financial liabilities reflected the very large rise in borrowing by 
households for mortgages and other purposes. In the period 2001 to 2008, 
borrowing in the form of long-term loans accounted for over 90 per cent 
of the increase in total financial liabilities. Having increased each year over 
the period 2001 to 2008, due primarily to the rise in borrowing to fund 
housing investment, household financial liabilities declined for the first 
time in 2009 by €4.6 billion (Table A and Figure A) 
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Table A: Net Financial Position of Irish Households 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total   
Financial 
Assets 180.4 191.3 219.2 241.4 276.0 314.8 314.3 287.0 307.3 
 
Total 
Financial 
Liabilities   60.4   73.8   90.0 110.3 140.6 169.3 192.0 206.1 201.5 
 
Net 
Financial 
Assets 120.0 117.4 129.2 131.1 135.4 145.6 122.3 80.9 105.8 
 
 
Figure A: Net Financial Assets, Household Sector 
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   The CSO sectoral accounts also provide information on the financial 
assets of Irish households. The composition of households’ financial assets 
is illustrated in Figure B. In 2009, total financial assets consisted of 
currency and deposits (41 per cent), insurance technical reserves (39 per 
cent), shares and other equity (18 per cent) and other (2 per cent). 13  The 
financial assets exclude housing and other physical assets. While the 
liabilities of Irish households increased sharply over the period 2001 to 
2008, the financial assets also increased by 60 per cent over the same 
period. Financial assets declined by almost 9 per cent in 2008 driven by a 
20 per cent fall in the value of households’ holdings of shares and other 
equity and a 14 per cent fall in insurance policies and pension fund assets. 
Together with an increase in financial liabilities of around €14 billion, this 
resulted in a significant further deterioration in the net financial position of 
Irish households in 2008, following a decline of 16 per cent in households’ 
net financial assets in 2007. 
 
13 Insurance technical reserves covers the net equity of households in both life insurance 
and pension fund reserves. 
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   The deteriorating trend in the net financial asset position of households 
which persisted since 2006 (Figure A) was reversed in 2009 according to 
the latest data, with the net financial assets of the household sector 
increasing by almost 31 per cent or €24.9 billion in the year. The increase in 
net financial assets in 2009 was due to a decrease in financial liabilities 
(mostly loans) of €4.6 billion and an increase in financial assets of €20.3 
billion due largely to an increase in the value of insurance policies and 
pension fund assets. The fall in households’ financial liabilities in 2009 was 
the first such decline since the series began in 2001. 
 
Figure B: Composition of Household Financial Assets 
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   While the financial position of households strengthened in 2009, with the 
majority of household liabilities in the form of property related loans, the 
continuing fall in house prices represents a threat to the net financial 
position of Irish households. 
 
   The decline in the financial liabilities of the household sector in 2009 
noted above is reflected by developments in the flow of funds in the Irish 
economy (Figure C). Our forecasts imply that as a result of the decline in 
the financing needs of the household sector as well as the increase in the 
savings rate, the rate of net acquisitions of the household sector should 
remain in surplus in 2010 and 2011. Net acquisitions of the household 
sector refer to the difference between household savings and household 
investments in each calendar year. The movement of the household sector 
into surplus in 2010 and 2011, combined with the accumulated value of 
their financial assets, strengthens the position of Irish households faced 
with ongoing declines in the value of their physical assets and the burden 
of debts accumulated since 2001. It is important to note that there is likely 
to be significant variation between households in the distribution of 
financial assets and liabilities. Younger households, who face high debts as 
a counterpart to their acquisition of new dwellings in recent years, face a 
more difficult environment than older households with accumulated 
financial assets and lower debts. 
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Figure C: Flow of Funds in the Irish Economy 
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 Table 9 provides details on economic growth, living standards and the 
composition of growth for recent years and for the forecast period. Our 
forecasts imply that by the end of 2010, national income as measured by 
GNP will have contracted by a cumulative 15 per cent in volume terms 
over the period 2008-2010. By the end of 2009, GNP per head was back to 
its 2001 level. As shown in the Table and in Figure 16, the decline in 
volume GNP per capita is estimated to be steeper in 2009 and 2010. While 
outward migration will act to reduce the population in 2009 and 2010, the 
natural increase in the population is expected to be larger, resulting in the 
steeper fall in per capita GNP.  
Figure 16: GNP Per Capita, Constant Prices 
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Measures of 
Performance 
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Gross national disposable income (GNDI) provides a comprehensive 
measure of the overall level of income by taking account of changes in the 
terms of trade and net international transfers. Improvements in the terms 
of trade are expected to lead to more modest declines in GNDI than in 
GNP in 2009 and 2010. Overall we expect a reduction in GNDI of ¼ per 
cent in volume terms in 2010 followed by a growth of 1¾ per cent in 2011. 
The cumulative fall in GNDI over the period 2008 to 2010 is estimated to 
amount to almost 16 per cent, providing a measure of the dramatic impact 
of the recession on living standards.  
Table 9: Performance Indicators 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010(f) 2011(f)  
GNP, constant prices 6.0 6.5 4.5 -3.5 -10.7     - ½ 
GNDI, constant prices 5.1 4.9 2.8 -6.0 -9.7     - ¼ 
National Resources 5.0 4.9 2.6 -6.0 -10.6      ¾ 
GNP per capita (constant 
prices) 3.7 4.0 1.9 -5.3 -11.4      ¼ 
Consumption per capita 
(constant prices) 4.6 4.2 3.8 -3.3 -7.8 1 
Investment in Housing/GNP 14.9 14.7 13.2 9.8 5.6 3 
Investment/GNP 31.4 31.2 30.8 25.7 18.8 14 
Domestic Demand 6.4 5.6 -5.0 -13.9 -4 ¼      1 ¼ 
Labour share of GNP 46.8 48.0 51.3 55.4 53    51 ½ 
 
Figure 17 shows the contribution of domestic and external demand to 
the overall rate of GDP growth.14 The data for 2008 and 2009, in addition 
to our estimates for 2010, suggest that the contractions in GDP in each of 
these three years are entirely driven by the contraction in domestic demand, 
with the external sector making a positive contribution to growth. In 2009, 
external demand contributed almost 4 per cent to overall GDP growth, its 
largest contribution since 1999. Our forecasts imply a similar contribution 
by the external sector to GDP growth in 2010.  
Figure 17: Contributions to Growth, % 
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14 The growth rates in external and domestic demand are weighted by their respective 
share in GDP. Therefore, these two growth rates sum to the overall growth in GDP.  
 34 
The collapse of the construction sector has contributed to the dramatic 
falls in investment recorded over the course of 2008 and 2009. The share 
of investment in GNP has more than halved since 2007 while our forecasts 
for housing investment imply a fall in the housing investment/GNP ratio 
to just 3 per cent in 2010, having peaked at close to 15 per cent. The 
contraction in investment since 2008 acted as a major drag on growth and 
our forecasts suggest that this painful adjustment is coming to an end.   
 
Turning to competitiveness, if our forecasts for economy-wide wage 
reductions materialise, there would be a significant improvement in 
competitiveness as reflected in the decline in labour’s share of GNP in 
2010 and 2011. This issue is discussed further in the Incomes section.  
 
 The recent trends in industrial output revealed in the QNA for Q1 2010 
are shown in Figure 18. Falling output in building and construction has, of 
course, been a feature of the economy since mid-2008. However, in the 
most recent quarter the fall in output has been at its steepest, with output 
falling by 16.3 per cent quarter-on-quarter, seasonally adjusted. For “other 
industry”, the picture that emerged from the QNA was very positive. The 
quarter-on-quarter growth rate in Q1 was 17.1 per cent and so well above 
recent readings. 
Figure 18: Quarter-on-Quarter Growth Rates in Industry, Seasonally 
 Adjusted 
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Just as there is a marked difference in the performances in the two 
broad industrial sub-sectors just discussed, there is also a marked difference 
seen in the relative performance of the modern and traditional sub-sectors 
within manufacturing. In Figure 19, we show quarter-on-quarter growth 
rates in the industrial production index for the modern and traditional 
sectors, seasonally. While the traditional sector did grow in Q1 2010, the 
pace of growth in the modern sector was vastly higher (2.8 per cent in the 
traditional sector as opposed to 22.2 per cent in the modern sector). 
 
 
 
 
Sectoral 
Output 
    35 
Figure 19: Quarter-on-Quarter Growth Rates in the Industrial Production 
Index, Traditional and Modern Sectors 
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Turning to services, the QNA show that services output fell by 0.1 per 
cent in Q1 2010 relative to Q4 2009 (seasonally adjusted). Output in 
distribution, transport and communications rose by 1.2 per cent but output 
fell in public administration and defence, by 1.8 per cent. Output in other 
services was constant.  
 
Looking ahead, we now expect that industrial output will fall by ¾ per 
cent in volume terms in 2010. Reflecting the discussion above on the 
divergent experiences across building and non-building industrial sub-
sectors, we expect other industry to grow by 6 per cent in volume terms 
and for building and construction to fall by 31¼ per cent. For 2011, we 
expect industry to grow by 4 per cent in volume terms. The corresponding 
figures for the building and non-building sub-sectors are -2¼ per cent and 
5 per cent respectively. 
 
For services, we expect total volume of output to grow by 1 per cent 
this year, driven largely by an increase of 1¼ per cent in other services. For 
2011, our expectation is for services output to grow by 2¼ per cent. The 
volume of other services is expected to grow by 2½ per cent but this will 
be offset slightly by a fall of 1 per cent in public administration and defence 
due to on-going cutbacks. 
 
 Above, in the section providing an overview of the domestic economy, 
we have already discussed falls in the number in the labour force and how 
this has impacted upon measured unemployment. Here, we develop the 
theme further. The Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) for Q1 
2010 showed that employment had fallen by 5.5 per cent in the year ending 
Q1 2010. As shown in Figure 20, this represented a slowing in the pace of 
annual employment decline relative to recent quarters. Employment began 
to fall (on an annual basis) in Q2 2008 and the falls accelerated through to 
Q3 2009. At that point, the annual rate of decline reached 8.8 per cent but 
the pace of decline has eased since then. 
 
 
Employment 
  
Table 10: GDP by Sector    
        
 2008 % Change 2009 % Change 2010 % Change    2011 
           
 €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn 
           
Agriculture 3.7 -3.6 -19.5 3.0 2 5 3.1 2 5 3.3 
           
Industry: 49.7 -7.8 -8.4 45.6 - ¾ -2 ¼ 44.5 4 3 ¼ 46.0 
Other Industry 37.4 -0.1 0.2 37.5 6 5 39.4 5 4 ½ 41.1 
Building & Construction 12.3 -31.4 -34.3 8.1 -31 ¼ -36 ¼ 5.1 -2 ¼ -5 ½ 4.9 
           
Services: 105.8 -3.8 -9.6 95.6 1 0 95.8 2 ¼ 1 ¼ 97.0 
  
Public Administration & 
 Defence 6.4 -0.5 -1.2 6.4 -1 -4 ½ 6.1 -1 -2 6.0 
  
Distribution, Transport 
 and Communications 24.1 -9.3 -9.7 21.8 1 -1 ¼ 21.5 2 3 22.1 
  
Other Services 
 (including rent) 75.3 -2.3 -10.3 67.5 1 ¼ 1 68.2 2 ½ 1 ¼ 69.0 
           
GDP at Factor Cost  159.2 -5.0 -9.4 144.2 ½ - ½ 143.4 2 ¾ 2 146.3 
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Figure 20: Year-on-Year % Change in Employment 
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We can get a better sense of shorter run dynamics by looking at 
quarter-on-quarter changes in employment (seasonally adjusted) and we do 
this in Figure 21. We also show the trend in the rate of unemployment. The 
decline in employment in Q1 2010 relative to Q4 2009 was 0.9 per cent and 
so lower than any quarter since Q2 2008. In terms of unemployment, 
Figure 21 shows how a fall in the rate occurred between Q4 2009 and Q1 
2010. The rate in Q1 2010 was recorded as 12.9 per cent but according to 
the Live Register for June 2010, the rate now stands at 13.4 per cent. 
Table 11: Employment and Unemployment  
  
 Annual Averages 000s 
     
 2008   2009   2010     2011 
  
Agriculture 115 96 85 88 
Industry 520 411 372 370 
Services 1,465 1,422 1,401 1,397 
Total at Work 2,100 1,929 1,857 1,855 
Unemployed 141 259 286 280 
  
Labour Force 2,241 2,187 2,143 2,135 
Unemployment Rate % 6.3 11.8 13 ¼ 13 
Net Migration 38.5 -7.8 -70.0 -50.0 
   of which: Inward Migration 83.8 57.3 10.0 10.0 
Change in Participation Rate* -0.3 -1.2 -1 ¼ ¼ 
     
Note: Participation rate measured as share of population aged 15-64 years; based on Q2 
figures as are migration figures. 
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This observed fall in the rate of unemployment, when combined with 
continuing falls in employment, suggest that rates of participation have 
been declining and/or that out migration is occurring. Both processes are 
evident in the QNHS data. Below, in a box on immigrants and the 
recession, we look at the issue of out-migration but here will we consider 
participation. 
 
In Figure 22, we show the trend in the overall rate of participation 
between Q1 2007 and Q1 2010. The rate peaked at 64.6 per cent in Q3 
2007 but has since fallen to 60.7 per cent. According to the CSO, 70 per 
cent of the fall in the labour force in the years ended Q1 2010 can be 
accounted for though falling participation. The actual fall in the labour 
force over this period was 55,700; 38,800 was the result of falling 
participation, with remaining 17,000 resulting from demographic shifts, in 
particular out-migration. 
Figure 21: Quarter-on-Quarter Employment Change and the 
 Unemployment Rate, Seasonally Adjusted 
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The aggregate fall in participation disguises large differences across age 
groups. The largest falls, by far, are among the youngest age groups. In the 
year ending Q1 2010, the overall fall in participation was 1.3 percentage 
points. However, the fall for those aged 15-19 was 4.4 percentage points; 
the corresponding figure for those aged 20-24 was 5.3 percentage points. 
When the rates of unemployment for these age groups are considered 
beside these falls in participation, it is clear that the recession has impacted 
severely on the labour market outcomes of younger people.15 The 
 
15 As discussed in the previous Commentary, in cases where lower labour force participation 
is mirrored in higher rates of educational participation, this can be beneficial in the long-
run for both individuals and the economy.   
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unemployment rate for those aged 15-19 is now 30 per cent; for those aged 
20-24, it is 24.9 per cent. For males, the rate of unemployment is one third 
for both age groups.16 The recession has also impacted severely on the 
labour market outcomes of immigrants and we develop this point below. 
Figure 22: Labour Force Participation Rate 
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Yet another dimension of the recent surge in unemployment is the fact 
that an increasing proportion of the unemployed are long-term 
unemployed, that is, unemployed for more than a year. In Q1 2009, when 
the unemployment rate was 10.2 per cent, the rate of long-term 
unemployment stood at 2.2 per cent. By Q1 2010, the overall 
unemployment rate had risen to 12.9 per cent but the rate of long-term 
unemployment had risen to 5.3 per cent. As the experience of long-term 
unemployment for an individual is a predictor of future labour market 
difficulties, this trend in long-term unemployment is a concern in terms of 
the impacts on individuals and also for the economy more broadly if it 
results in structural unemployment. 
 
Turning to our forecasts, we expect the numbers employed to average 
1.87 million this year; this would represent a fall of 3¾ per cent relative to 
2009. We expect that the number employed will be essentially unchanged 
between 2010 and 2011. We expect the rate of unemployment to average 
13¼  per cent this year, before falling to an average of 13 per cent in 2011. 
With employment forecast to be constant between 2010 and 2011, the 
expected fall in the rate of unemployment is related in part to an expected 
net outflow of 50,000 in the year ending April 2011, following an estimated 
net outflow of 70,000 in the year ending April 2010. 
 
16 The unemployment rate for females aged 15-19 is now 25.9 per cent; for females aged 
20-24, the unemployment rate is 16.3 per cent. 
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Box 2: Immigrants and the Recession  
 
 
 
By Alan Barrett and Elish Kelly 
 
 
 
 
 
The discussion in the section on employment above has shown that the 
recession has impacted more severely on the employment outcomes of 
younger people relative to others. Immigrants share with younger people a 
number of characteristics which may have made them similarly vulnerable 
such as shorter periods of labour market experience and tenure and a 
greater likelihood of being on temporary contracts. And immigrants are 
generally younger too. In this box, we report of on-going work in which we 
are exploring the extent to which immigrants have been affected by the 
recession, how they have reacted and whether any impacts were specifically 
related to being an immigrant as opposed to other characteristics, such as 
age. 17 
 
   In Figure A, we show annual rates of employment change for immigrants 
and Irish-nationals between Q3 2005 and Q4 2009. Going back to the 
earlier period, we can see the dramatic rates of employment growth among 
non-nationals, exceeding 30 per cent through 2006. However, the 
turnaround in the trend for immigrants was equally dramatic. In Q3 2007, 
the annual rate of employment loss among non-nationals was 20 per cent, 
with the corresponding figure for Irish nationals being less than half of this. 
 
   Figure B shows the rates of unemployment among national and non-
nationals, and also the rate of nationals of the EU’s Accession States. Up to 
the end of 2007, the unemployment rates for all groups were clustered 
around 5 per cent and there even appeared to be a degree of convergence 
occurring around mid-2007. However, since then the pattern observed in 
Figure A is apparent, with the rate of unemployment rising more rapidly 
among immigrants relative to Irish-nationals and especially so for the new 
accession states. 
 
   Given the fall in employment among immigrants and the rise in 
unemployment, an obvious question that arises is whether the negative 
turnaround in labour market outcomes has been reflected in out-migration 
and if so, to what extent. In Figure C, we use data from the QNHS to 
provide some insight. The figure looks at changes over the period Q1 2008 
to Q4 2009 and shows the following. Over the period, the number of non-
nationals employed in Ireland fell by  87,500 over the period in  question, a  
 
17 A working paper on this topic will be produced in the coming months. 
    41 
 
fall of 25 per cent. The number unemployed grew by 24,500, an increase of 
over 100 per cent. The increase in the number who declared themselves as 
being inactive grew by just 2,700; this was an increase of just over 2 per 
cent. However, in absolute terms the biggest adjustment was in the number 
still in Ireland. It fell by 60,200 or 12 per cent. 
 
   The discussion in the preceding paragraph could generate the impression 
that we are looking at the same people over time and assessing how those 
who lost their jobs reacted. It should be noted that the data being used here 
are not from a panel and so we need to be careful in making 
interpretations. However, these data are certainly consistent with a 
tendency for employment losses to have resulted in outflows. 
 
 
Figure A: Year-on-Year % Change in Employment 
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Figure B: Unemployment Rates 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
2004Q3 2005Q3 2006Q3 2007Q3 2008Q3 2009Q3
%
Irish Non-Irish Accession
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey, CSO.  
 
 
Figure C: Changes in Employment Status of Non-Irish Nationals Between 
Q1 2008and Q4 2009 
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   We noted at the beginning of this box that the employment of younger 
people has fallen more steeply in this recession relative to others. To the 
extent that immigrants are also younger on average relative to other 
workers, the effect we have been discussing could be the result of age as 
opposed to immigrant status. In order to explore this we conducted the 
following analysis.  
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    We merged micro-data from the QNHSs of Q1 2008 and Q1 2009. For 
each individual, we constructed a dummy variable which was coded as 1 if 
the individual was employed and zero if unemployed or inactive. We then 
ran probit regressions in which the dependent variable was the dummy 
variable just described and the controls included variables such as age, 
education, whether the person was an immigrant or not and whether the 
person was observed in 2008 or 2009. By adding an interaction term 
between immigrant and year, we could assess whether the probability of 
being employed declined for immigrants relative to Irish-nationals between 
2008 and 2009, as the recession deepened. 
 
   Our results suggest that there was indeed an independent effect of being 
an immigrant and that their employment chances fell between 2008 and 
2009, relative to Irish-nationals and controlling for factors such as age and 
education. However, the effect was restricted to immigrants from the EU’s 
accession states.  
 
 According to the latest figures from the CSO, average economy-wide 
weekly earnings in the fourth quarter of 2009 were 0.6 per cent lower than 
in the fourth quarter of 2008. As shown in the first column of Table 12, 
nine of the thirteen  sectors  of the  economy registered a  decline over  the  
Table 12: Year-on-Year % Change in Earnings and Hours Worked, All 
Employees, 2009 Q4 
    
 Weekly Hourly Weekly Hours 
 Earnings Earnings Worked 
 
All sectors -0.6 0.9 -1.5 
Industry 1.5 3.3 -1.8 
Construction -4.0 0.6 -4.6 
Wholesale and retail trade -2.4 -2.0 -0.6 
Transportation and storage -8.7 -6.3 -2.4 
Accommodation and food services -2.8 0.2 -2.9 
Information and communication -7.1 -3.2 -4.2 
Financial, insurance and real estate -1.9 -0.8 -1.2 
Professional, scientific and 
technical -3.6 -3.0 -0.3 
Administrative and support services 1.1 2.9 -1.6 
Public administration and defence 2.2 -0.4 2.5 
Education -3.3 0.9 -4.0 
Human health and social work 2.0 -0.2 2.3 
Arts, entertainment, recreation, 
other service -9.9 -3.5 -6.7 
    
Source: Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey (EHECS), CSO. 
Incomes 
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year, with the largest decreases in the transportation and storage, arts and 
entertainment, and information and communication sectors. Construction 
sector earnings continued to fall sharply, while weekly earnings fell by 2.4 
per cent in the wholesale and retail trade sector, which accounts for 
approximately 14 per cent of total employment.  However, weekly earnings 
continued to increase in industry, growing by 1.5 per cent in 2009, while 
health and social work earnings also increased by 2 per cent. These sectors 
account for approximately 13 per cent and 12 per cent of total employment 
respectively. 
 
As we have highlighted in previous Commentaries, the trend that emerges 
from the earnings data varies depending on the measure of earnings used. 
While the latest data confirm that economy-wide average earnings are 
falling on a weekly basis, they also show an increase of almost 1 per cent in 
average hourly earnings in 2009. Wage growth was particularly strong in the 
industry sector, where hourly earnings increased by 3.3 per cent over the 
course of 2009. This evidence suggests that the fall in weekly earnings is 
reflecting a reduction in weekly hours worked, and this is confirmed by the 
EHECS data. Average weekly hours worked decreased by 1.5 per cent in 
Q4 compared to the same period in 2008, and as shown in Table 12 the 
vast majority of sectors registered a decline in hours worked. Aside from 
adjustments to hours worked, evidence from the EHECS data suggests 
that employers may also be cutting their labour costs by reducing or 
removing bonus payments. While hourly earnings increased by 0.9 per cent 
in Q4 year-on-year, hourly earnings excluding bonus payments increased by 
1.3 per cent. Although this evidence on hourly earnings suggests that there 
have not yet been widespread nominal wage reductions, it should be noted 
that the pace of wage increase has moderated considerably throughout 
2009 and this can be clearly identified in Figure 23. 
Figure 23: Year-on-Year % Change in Hourly Earnings, All Sectors 
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The EHECS series also provides an estimate of private sector and 
public sector wages. The data show that average weekly earnings in the 
private sector fell by 2.1 per cent in 2009, while in the public sector they 
increased by 0.6 per cent. However, on an hourly basis, earnings in the 
private sector increased by 0.1 per cent and in the public sector they fell by 
0.3 per cent. The fall in weekly earnings in the private sector reflects a 
reduction in weekly hours worked – they fell by 2.4 per cent. By contrast, 
weekly hours worked in the public sector increased by 0.9 per cent over the 
course of the year. It should also be noted that earnings in the public sector 
are calculated before deduction of the pension levy that was introduced in 
March 2009.  
 
For 2010, we estimate a fall in average earnings of 3 per cent. This is 
partly driven by the cuts in public sector pay in Budget 2010, but also by an 
expectation that the weak labour market will continue to put downward 
pressure on private sector wages. We are forecasting a further fall of 1 per 
cent in average earnings in 2011. Combined with our forecasts for an 
increase in both the CPI and HICP in 2011, as outlined below in the 
Consumer Prices section, this implies a significant reduction in real wages next 
year.  
 
Taking account of our employment projections, these wage estimates 
imply a fall of 6¼ per cent in non-agricultural wage income in 2010. We 
expect current transfers to increase by 1½ per cent and direct personal 
taxes to fall by 1¾ per cent. As a result, we estimate that personal 
disposable income will fall by 1½ per cent this year. With consumption 
expected to fall by 1 per cent (in value terms) in 2010, our estimated fall in 
personal disposable income implies a marginal reduction in the savings rate, 
to 10¼ per cent.   
 
For 2011, we are forecasting an additional fall of 1¼ per cent in non-
agricultural wage income, while we expect direct personal taxes to increase 
by 3½ per cent. These will be offset by a 1 per cent increase in transfer 
income and an increase of 22½ per cent in other non-agricultural income. 
As a result, we are forecasting an increase of 2½ per cent in personal 
disposable income in 2011. Our forecasts do not imply any change in the 
savings rate next year, as households are expected to remain cautions in the 
face of a challenging labour market environment and the need to repair 
their balance sheets. 
 
 
 The pace of price decline continues to ease, according to the latest figures 
from the CSO. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) fell by 1.1 per cent in 
May, compared to May 2009. Year-on-year price deflation peaked in 
October 2009 at 6.6 per cent and has slowed considerably since then. The 
latest monthly figure represents the slowest pace of price decline in over a 
year. The Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices registered a year-on-year 
decline of 1.9 per cent in May.   
Consumer 
Prices 
      
Table 13: Personal Disposable Income    
        
 2008 Change  2009 Change    2010 Change 2011 
           
 €bn % €bn €bn % €bn €bn % €bn €bn 
           
Agriculture, etc. 2.9 -24.4 -0.7 2.2 5 0.1 2.3 5 0.1 2.4 
Non-Agricultural Wages 79.4 -8.5 -6.7 72.7 -6 ¼ -4.5 68.2 -1 ¼ -0.9 67.3 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 19.9 -29.7 -5.9 14.0 15 ¼ 2.1 16.1 22 ½ 3.6 19.8 
           
Total Income Received 102.2 -13.0 -13.3 88.9 -2 ½ -2.3 86.6 3 ¼ 2.9 89.5 
Current Transfers 24.6 10.5 2.6 27.2 1 ½ 0.4 27.6 1 0.3 27.9 
           
Gross Personal Income 126.8 -8.5 -10.7 116.0 -1 ½ -1.8 114.2 2 ¾ 3.2 117.4 
Direct Personal Taxes 23.4 -7.7 -1.8 21.6 -1 ¾ -0.4 21.2 3 ½ 0.7 21.9 
           
Personal Disposable Income  103.4 -8.6 -8.9 94.4 -1 ½ -1.4 93.0 2 ½ 2.4 95.5 
Consumption 94.8 -11.1 -10.5 84.3 -1 -0.8 83.5 2 ½ 2.1 85.6 
Personal Savings 8.5   10.1   9.5   9.9 
Savings Ratio 8.3   10.7   10 ¼   10 ¼ 
Average Personal Tax Rate 18.5   18.6   18 ½   18 ¾ 
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Figure 24: Year-on-Year % Change in Consumer Price Index and Selected 
Sub-Indices, May 2010 
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While the overall Consumer Price Index fell by 1.1 per cent in May, 
compared to May 2009, this figure masks the conflicting trends among 
some of the underlying components. Figure 24 shows the year-on-year 
change in a selection of the sub-indices of the CPI. The decline in the CPI 
relative to last May has been largely driven by a sharp decrease of 12.6 per 
cent in the price of clothing and footwear and a fall of 6.2 per cent in food 
prices. Both of these sub-indices represent goods that are heavily imported 
from the UK, and so their prices have been influenced by the weakness of 
sterling relative to the euro since late 2007. Prices of these goods have also 
been affected by ongoing sales and promotions, as retailers have attempted 
to stimulate demand among increasingly price-conscious consumers.  
 
By contrast, the mortgage interest component and energy products 
have been exerting upward pressure on consumer prices. These sub-indices 
have been the main contributors to CPI volatility over the last two years. 
The mortgage interest component increased sharply in 2007 and for much 
of 2008, before falling by 40 per cent in 2009 following the aggressive cuts 
to ECB interest rates starting in October 2008. However, mortgage interest 
has started to increase again and since the end of 2009 the mortgage 
interest sub-index has grown by 12.6 per cent. Similarly, energy prices 
peaked in July 2008 before falling back sharply in 2009. They have crept 
back up in the first five months of 2010 as international oil prices have 
increased, and in May energy prices were almost 14 per cent higher than a 
year previously. Petrol, diesel and home-heating oil have been particularly 
affected, registering year-on-year increases of 22 per cent, 24 per cent and 
49 per cent respectively.  
 
Looking ahead, we expect the CPI to fall by ½ per cent this year. This 
figure represents a downward revision to our projection from the last 
Commentary, when we expected inflation to be positive for the year. This is 
largely due to a slower than anticipated increase in mortgage interest rates. 
A significant number of Irish mortgage lenders have signalled their 
intention to increase their standard variable rates for mortgage holders. 
Based on the latest figures from the CSO on the average house purchase 
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loan interest rate, much of this adjustment has yet to occur and we expect 
further increases over the coming months. We expect the prices of food, 
clothing and footwear to continue falling for the remainder of the year, 
although the pace of price decline is likely to slow as the effect of a 
weakened sterling is reversed. We expect the HICP to fall by 1¾ per cent 
in 2010. For 2011, we are forecasting a CPI inflation rate of 1¾ per cent. 
This will be partly driven by an expected increase in ECB interest rates as 
the Euro Area recovery takes hold. Our forecasts are based on the 
assumption that the ECB will raise its main refinancing rate to 1.75 by the 
end of 2011. The UK VAT increase and the weakening of the euro should 
also help to stem the flow of crossborder shopping and support demand 
on the domestic front. For the HICP we are forecasting an increase of ¼ 
per cent.  
Table 14: Inflation Measures (%) 
      
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
CPI 4.9 4.1 -4.5 - ½ 1¾ 
Mortgage Interest 40.4 15.0 -40.0 14¼ 31½ 
HICP (Ireland) 2.9 3.1 -1.7 -1¾ ¼ 
HICP (Euro Area) 2.1 3.3 0.3 1.4 1.0 
      
*Euro Area HICP forecasts are from OECD Economic Outlook No. 87, May 2010. 
 
 
PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT 
The decline in the annual rate of change in headline private sector credit 
(PSC), which began in June 2009, continued during the first five months of 
2010. The ongoing falls in private sector credit reflect the tightening in 
credit supply due to the balance sheet constraints of lenders as well as the 
weak demand for credit, discussed in the section on Credit Conditions 
below.  Headline private sector credit declined by over 7.5 per cent in the 
year ending December 2009 with over two-thirds of this decline due to 
valuation effects, including write downs of loans, increased bad debt 
provisions and exchange rate effects (Table 15). The pace of decline in 
private sector credit accelerated during the early months of 2010, declining 
by almost €12.8 billion between January and May 2010.  
 
The factors accounting for the fall in private sector credit have changed 
over the course of 2009 and 2010. During 2009, the largest component of 
the year-on-year changes in credit outstanding to the private sector was 
valuation effects with the underlying stock of private sector credit only 
declining marginally. Since December 2010, this trend has been reversed 
with over two-thirds of the decline in credit to the private sector in March 
due to underlying transactions as debt repayment exceeded the drawdown 
of new credit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monetary 
Sector 
Developments 
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Table 15: Private Sector Credit 
       
 
End 
Month 
Private 
Sector 
Credit 
Unadjusted 
Growth 
Year-on-
Year % 
Adjusted 
Year-on-
Year % 
Residential 
Mortgage 
Lending 
Adjusted 
Year-on-
Year % 
  € million % % € million % 
 
2008 March  384,340 17.1 17.1 142,403 11.6 
 June  392,937 14.6 14.1 145,341 10.2 
 September 399,143 10.8 10.5 147,550 8.5 
 December  395,070 4.9 7.3 148,115 5.9 
2009 March  392,258 2.1 2.4 148,542 4.3 
 June  387,350 -1.3 -0.8 148,349 2.1 
 September 378,086 -5.3 -3.4 147,969 0.3 
 December  366,246 -7.3 -7.6 147,623 -0.3 
2010 January 363,872 -8.6 -8.6 147,356 -0.7 
 February 359,749 -9.7 -8.9 147,190 -0.9 
 March  355,008 -9.5 -9.3 146,473 -1.4 
 April 352,775 -9.6 -9.3 146,125 -1.6 
 May 351,112 -9.7 -10.4 145,773 -1.8 
 
Source: Central Bank Monthly Statistics. 
 
The level of residential mortgages outstanding (which accounts for 
around 40 per cent of total private sector credit outstanding) peaked in 
March 2009 at €148.5 billion. The latest data indicate that residential 
mortgages (including securitised mortgages) declined by €352 million 
during May and stood at €145.8 billion at the end of the month (Table 15). 
The decline in mortgage lending in May 2010 was the fourteenth 
consecutive monthly fall in mortgage debt outstanding. On a year-on-year 
basis, mortgage debt outstanding fell by 0.1 per cent in November 2009, 
the first annual decline in mortgage lending since the series began in the 
early 1990s. As shown in Table 15, the pace of decline in mortgage lending 
accelerated during May 2010 with the annual rate of change falling to -1.8 
per cent by the end of the month. A continuation of this trend of debt 
repayment exceeding the drawdown of new credit would reduce the overall 
liabilities of the banking system, both domestic and foreign. Deleveraging 
by the household sector is also reflected in the data from the Institutional 
Sector Accounts discussed in Box 1.  
 
Turning to credit card statistics, the number of credit cards in issue 
declined in February 2009 for the first time since September 2005. The 
number of cards declined for 16 consecutive months between February 
2009 and April 2010 reflecting the contraction in consumer spending and 
the weakness of the domestic economy. An increase of 14,000 in the total 
number of cards in May 2010 reversed this pattern leaving the total number 
of credit cards in issue at 2.3 million by the end of the month, a reduction 
of around 2 per cent in the number of cards in circulation compared to 
May 2009. Personal indebtedness on credit cards fell to just under €3 
billion in May 2010 as repayments on credit cards exceeded new spending 
by over €57 million in the month. The year-on-year growth in credit card 
indebtedness moderated sharply over the course of 2009 with the annual 
rate of change turning negative during the last two months of the year 
(Figure 25). Outstanding indebtedness on credit cards increased marginally 
by 0.2 per cent on an annual basis in May 2010.  
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Figure 25: Outstanding Indebtedness on Credit Cards, Annual % Change 
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CREDIT CONDITIONS 
The developments in private sector credit are consistent with the latest 
Irish results of the euro area Bank Lending Survey for Q1 2010 which 
point to an ongoing weakness in credit demand while credit supply remains 
tight. The contraction in credit supply reflects the balance sheet constraints 
of lenders and the higher cost of sourcing funds. The results of the latest 
Bank Lending Survey (Table 16), which is based on the responses of senior 
lending officers in the participating banks, indicate that credit standards on 
loans to enterprises tightened further during Q1 2010 continuing a trend 
which has been evident since mid 2007. The tightening of credit standards 
in the first quarter of the year was attributed to the balance sheet 
constraints of banks and their cost of accessing funds.  
Table 16: ECB Bank Lending Survey, Change in Credit Standards 
       
  
Q1 
2009 
Q2 
2009 
Q3 
2009 
Q4 
2009 
Q1 
2010 
Enterprises Overall 2.20 2.40 2.60 2.40 2.60 
 Loans to SMEs 2.20 2.75 3.00 2.75 3.00 
 
Loans to large 
enterprises 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.25 2.50 
 Short-term loans 2.20 2.40 2.60 2.40 2.60 
 Long-term loans 2.20 2.40 2.60 2.40 2.60 
Households House purchase 2.75 2.50 2.75 3.00 2.75 
 
Consumer credit and 
other lending 2.75 2.75 3.00 3.00 2.75 
 
1 = tightened considerably; 2 = tightened somewhat; 3 = basically unchanged;  
4 = eased somewhat; 5 = eased considerably 
 
 
Credit standards on loans to households for the purpose of both house 
purchase and consumer credit also tightened during Q1 2010. The 
tightening of standards on loans to households was attributed to 
heightened risk perception on the part of the banks who participated in the 
survey. Banks also reported a further weakening in credit demand during 
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the first quarter of 2010 related to concerns over housing market prospects 
and lower levels of investment.  
BANK FUNDING 
In discussing the liabilities of the banking system, it is important to 
distinguish between the liabilities of Irish owned banks and the liabilities of 
all credit institutions located in Ireland. In May 2010, the liabilities of all 
financial institutions resident in Ireland amounted to €1,330 billion. 
However, the liabilities of Irish-owned banks were €585 billion, less than 
half of the total, and not all of these are covered by the government 
guarantee.18 The large difference between the figure for the total liabilities 
and the liabilities of Irish banks is due to the presence of foreign credit 
institutions in Ireland, mostly IFSC companies.  
 
Tensions in interbank markets during late 2008 resulted in the adoption 
of a series of non-standard measures by the Eurosystem aimed at restoring 
normality to wholesale bank funding markets. The Eurosystem has 
provided liquidity to Central banks through its Longer Term Refinancing 
Operations (LTRO) and these measures contributed to a general 
improvement in money market conditions over the course of 2009 and 
2010. Three LTROs were offered in June, October and December 2009 
with €442 billion, €75.2 billion and €96.9 billion allotted respectively.  
 
Lending to credit institutions by the Irish Central Bank as part of the 
Eurosystem’s monetary policy operations peaked in June 2009 at over €130 
billion, equivalent to over a fifth of total Eurosystem lending to credit 
institutions in the euro area (Figure 26 and Table 17). As access to 
wholesale funding improved with the gradual return to normality in 
international money markets and the fall in interbank lending rates, credit 
institutions reduced their dependence on Central Bank funds with credit 
institutions’ borrowing from the Central Bank falling consecutively for 6 
months from mid 2009.  Lending to credit institutions by the Central Bank 
increased again in December 2009 coinciding with the offering of the final 
12 month LTRO.  
 
Borrowing by credit institutions from the Central Bank declined 
between January and April 2010 before increasing by €11.1 billion to over 
€90 billion in May. As part of the gradual withdrawal of the non-standard 
measures introduced during the financial crisis, the ECB announced the 
winding down of the LTROs at the 12 month and 6 month horizon, with 
the final 12 month LTRO offered in December 2009. The ECB will 
continue to provide funds to Eurosystem Central Banks through its 3 
month LTRO.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 The total value of the liabilities covered by the Credit Institutions (Financial Support) 
Scheme (CIFS) and the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee (ELG) Scheme stood at €269 billion 
as of end-March 2010. Liabilities guaranteed under the CIFS amounted to €130 billion 
while liabilities under the ELG amounted to €139 billion. 
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Figure 26: Net Foreign Liabilities of the Banking System and Credit 
 Institutions Borrowing from the Central Bank, % of GDP 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2006M
1
2006M
5
2006M
9
2007M
1
2007M
5
2007M
9
2008M
01
2008M
05
2008M
09
2009M
01
2009M
05
2009M
09
2010M
01
2010M
05
%
 o
f G
D
P
Net foreign liabilities of the banking system, % of GDP
Credit Institutions' borrowing from the Central Bank, % GDP
Combined NFLB+CB Borrowing
Source: Central Bank Monthly Statistics .
 
 
With the ECB’s June 2009 12 month LTRO having expired on June 
30th 2010, and with other exceptional policy measures being withdrawn as 
part of the exit strategy from the financial crisis, it is expected that credit 
institutions’ borrowing from the Central Bank will decrease in the months 
ahead. However, with tensions still remaining in interbank money markets 
as reflected in current high interbank lending rates, the liquidity provided to 
credit institutions in Ireland by the Central Bank through the Eurosystem’s 
monetary policy operations is likely to remain important. Given that a 
significant proportion of the liabilities of the Irish banking system are 
contingent liabilities of the Irish State, ensuring the orderly roll-over of the 
Irish banking system’s liabilities will remain a priority over the coming 
months.  
Table 17: Central Bank Lending to Credit Institutions in Ireland 
  
 
Lending by 
the Irish 
Central Bank 
to Credit 
Institutions in 
Ireland in 
Euro 
Eurosystem 
Lending to 
Euro Area 
Credit 
Institutions in 
Euro, related 
to MPO 
Irish 
Share 
Credit 
Institutions' 
Borrowing 
from the 
Central Bank, 
% of GDP 
 
2007 March 24,020 421,633 5.7 12.7 
 June 25,535 438,038 5.8 13.5 
 September 23,751 420,169 5.7 12.5 
 December 39,449 475,324 8.3 21.0 
2008 March 34,395 483,600 7.1 19.0 
 June 38,373 460,645 8.3 21.2 
 September 58,671 471,362 12.4 39.2 
 December 88,562 613,857 14.4 54.0 
2009 March 120,628 607,356 19.9 79.8 
 June 130,423 615,980 21.2 83.9 
 September 91,573 583,939 15.7 53.9 
 December 90,899 564,495 16.1 56.9 
2010 March 82,573 511,471 16.1 51.6 
 May 90,473 534,859 16.9 56.6 
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GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
Although the economy has emerged from recession, in the sense of GDP 
having grown in the first quarter, it is clear that the risks and challenges 
facing the economy are still immense. The sovereign debt crisis of recent 
weeks illustrated how some of the risks facing the Irish economy are 
beyond our control. It appeared to be the case that rising concerns about 
the capacity of Greece to avoid default led to a change in sentiment 
towards other peripheral EU countries, including Ireland. Further threats 
to Ireland’s recovery arise through accelerated programmes of fiscal 
austerity now being adopted in countries such as the UK and Germany. We 
have noted in previous Commentaries that any premature withdrawal of fiscal 
and monetary supports in the major world economies could lead to the so-
called double-dip recession, with negative consequences for Ireland. Some 
commentators, notably Paul Krugman, are arguing that the actions of the 
British and German governments are indeed unwarranted at this time so 
the risk of an Irish recovery being stalled through a return to recession in 
our larger trading partners remains. 
 
While some factors are beyond our control, others are within our 
control and so it is imperative that the correct policy choices are taken. 
Comments on fiscal austerity as applied to Ireland have given rise to some 
debate on whether the government’s programme of fiscal austerity is still 
the appropriate course of action. We would argue that it is. As noted 
above, recent weeks have shown how fragile market sentiment is with 
regard to Ireland’s sovereign debt. Even in the context of an austerity 
programme that has been heralded internationally as being a model for 
countries in financial difficulties, the spread on Irish government bonds 
relative to German bonds points to the need for on-going caution. Were 
the government’s fiscal targets to be scaled back, this would likely spark 
further concerns and hence lead to widening spreads and an increase in our 
costs of borrowing. 
 
While adherence to the programme of fiscal adjustment is crucial, it is 
clear that this remains a huge challenge. As the IMF recently noted, the 
possibility of “consolidation fatigue” exists, whereby the general willingness 
on the part of the public to accept the fiscal measures may diminish. 19 In 
this context, we would hope that the widespread political consensus that 
existed prior to Budget 2010 on the broad fiscal parameters will remain. 
One of the many lessons from the 1980s is that the absence of political 
consensus made the task of dealing with the public finances substantially 
more difficult relative to the situation when such consensus was in place. 
 
 
19 IMF (2010), Ireland – Concluding Statement for the 2010 Article IV Consultation 
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At a more micro-level, the discussion in this Commentary on the 
growing problem of unemployment, and in particular youth and long-term 
unemployment, prompt us to re-iterate points that we have made 
previously on the need to manage active labour market polices in the most 
efficient and effective ways possible. ESRI research in this area has 
identified two strands to the management of active labour market 
programmes.20 One strand is concerned with how people should be 
selected for participation on schemes, while the second strand is concerned 
with “what works” once people have been selected. 
 
A number of principles have emerged from this work. With regard to 
selection, more highly educated people and people with longer periods of 
previous labour market experience are more likely to move back from 
unemployment to employment without intervention relative to other 
groups. In a context of limited resources, this implies that resources should 
be focused on those who are most likely to need interventions, such as 
younger and less-educated workers.  
 
With regard to the second strand of “what works”, evidence 
accumulated during the 1990s suggests that the most effective programmes 
were those that were linked closely to demand in the labour market. In 
situations where individuals may not have had the levels of skills needed to 
participate in the most effective programmes, the lesson from this research 
was to provide progression routes through levels of training, and education 
where needed. Clearly, this is resource intensive and so reinforces the need 
for the appropriate targeting of resources if progression routes are to be 
used. Yet another dimension to policy in this area was highlighted by the 
OECD21 recently when it argued that job-search and other activation 
incentives which form part of the benefit and assistance system need to be 
strengthened. While there can be a trend towards a weakening of benefit 
conditionality during a recession, enforcements of the requirements to 
participate in training and employment programmes can yield benefits in 
the long-run  
 
It appears to us that public funds would be better used in re-skilling 
and up-skilling people who are unemployed as opposed to using spending 
on infrastructure as a form of employment creation. As argued by 
Morgenroth22, public capital projects should be undertaken on the basis 
that they have a long-run return to the whole economy and not because 
they create short-term employment. This is because of a relatively high cost 
per job created via public investment.  
 
It is clear that the labour market may well be the area where the legacy 
effects of the recession are highest in terms of the human cost. For this 
reason, enlightened policy in this area is critical. 
 
20 O’Connell et al. (2009), National Profiling of the Unemployed in Ireland, ESRI Research 
Series No. 10; P.J. O’Connell (2002), “Are they Working? Market Orientation and the 
Effectiveness of Active Labour Market Programmes in Ireland”, European Sociological 
Review, Vol. 18. 
21 OECD Employment Outlook 2010 – How Does Ireland Compare?, published July 
2010. 
22 Morgenroth, E. (2009), “Irish Public Capital Spending in a Recession”, ESRI Working 
Paper No. 298. 
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SUMMARY 
This paper explores a number of scenarios for future economic recovery 
and considers the implications of these scenarios for policy, in particular 
fiscal policy. The results for the main macroeconomic aggregates are 
summarised in Table A and Table B. 
 
Under all scenarios it is clear that the economy has experienced a 
permanent major loss of output relative to what might have happened if 
more sensible policies had been pursued over the past decade and the full 
severity of the recession had been avoided. Output could end up 15 to 20 
per cent below where it would have been without the crisis. Income per 
head is to-day back to where it was in 2000 and, even under our more 
optimistic scenario, it will be the middle of the coming decade before 
income per head will be back to its 2007 level. 
 
If the Irish economy responds to world economic growth and changes 
in competitiveness in the same way as it has done over the last twenty years 
there could be a vigorous recovery over the period 2012 to 2015, as set out 
in our High Growth scenario. Such a recovery would gradually move the 
economy back towards full employment. However, even with the cuts of 
€7.5 billion planned for the period 2011-14, the government deficit could 
still be 2 per cent of GDP in 2015.  
 
On the other hand, the Irish economy could record lower rates of 
growth over the medium-term for a number of reasons: for example, 
because the export sector had suffered long-term damage or because a 
continuing high interest premium seriously affected future investment or 
because structural unemployment remained high due to a failure of labour 
market policy. While under such a Low Growth scenario there would still be 
significant growth over the period 2012-15, it would not be enough to 
return the economy to full employment and, in 2015, the government 
deficit would still be around 4 per cent of GDP, even after the planned 
four years of cuts.  
 
We estimate that the austerity measures undertaken in the 2009 and 
2010 budgets have already achieved much of the heavy lifting in relation to 
reducing the structural deficit. However, the challenge of restoring order to 
the public finances has been aggravated by the direct fiscal cost of funding 
the losses in the banking system. The high risk premium facing Irish 
borrowers, including the government, also makes the cost of delaying 
further fiscal action much higher than it would have been in the past. It 
also raises the question as to whether a more rapid fiscal adjustment than 
currently planned would have a more beneficial outcome for the economy. 
 
Because of the uncertainty about the future and because of the 
asymmetric nature of the costs of being too optimistic relative to those 
arising from excessive prudence, the current situation calls for the full 
implementation of the Government’s programme of substantial further 
fiscal consolidation of €7.5 billion over the period 2011-14. Even under the 
56 
     57
more optimistic High Growth scenario this would be the minimum needed 
to restore the public finances to a sustainable trajectory. If the economy 
were to evolve in line with our Low Growth scenario, further cutbacks would 
be essential to minimise the long-term damage to income and employment. 
 
While past experience suggests that the labour market is sufficiently 
flexible to eventually return the economy to full employment, it is possible 
that labour market policy failures could instead leave Ireland with a legacy 
of unskilled long-term unemployment. To avoid such an eventuality, which 
could result in an outturn closer to our Low Growth scenario, it will be 
important that labour market policies, broadly defined, are developed to re-
skill the unemployed for the kind of jobs which will be available over the 
coming decade and to minimise the danger of poverty traps of the type 
experienced in the 1980s occurring in the future. 
 
The very high contingent liabilities that the State assumed as part of the 
banking ‘bail-out’ have greatly exacerbated the difficulties facing the Irish 
economy over the medium-term. However, without a banking system 
which is able to finance the economic recovery the very recovery itself will 
be put in doubt. 
Table A: High Growth Scenario, Major Aggregates 
 2009 2010 2011-15 2016-20 
Growth Rate Annual % Average Annual % 
GDP -7.1 -0.4 4.6 3.0 
GNP -12.2 0.0 4.2 3.1 
Non-agricultural Wage Rates -1.5 -3.0 2.4 4.2 
     
Year End: 2009 2010 2015 2020 
 
General Govt. Deficit, % GDP, excluding 
special payments to banks 11.8 11.3 1.8 -0.1 
Net Government Debt, % of GDP 32.1 51.2 63.1 51.2 
 
General Government Debt, % GDP 64.0 83.4 91.1 76.0 
Balance of Payments, % GNP -3.2 0.9 1.7 1.9 
Unemployment Rate, % of labour force 11.9 14.0 4.8 4.4 
Table B: Low Growth Scenario, Major Aggregates 
 2009 2010 2011-15 2016-20 
Growth Rate Annual % Average Annual % 
GDP -7.1 -0.4 3.2 2.1 
GNP -12.2 0.0 3.0 2.2 
Non-agricultural Wage Rates -1.5 -3.0 2.2 3.8 
     
Year End: 2009 2010  2015      2020 
 
General Govt. Deficit, % GDP, excluding 
special payments to banks 11.8 11.3 4.1 4.5 
Net Government Debt, % of GDP 32.1 51.2 73.6 80.7 
 
General Government Debt, % GDP 64.0 83.4 102.5 106.9 
Balance of Payments, % GNP -3.2 0.9 -1.3 -4.0 
Unemployment Rate, % of labour force 11.9 14.0 7.1 7.1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In late 2008, when the full impact of the financial crisis hit Ireland, it took 
some time to assess what was happening and what were the full 
implications of the disaster. Economic forecasts were changing frequently 
and the huge uncertainty about what was actually developing made policy-
making exceptionally difficult. Because of a growing dependence of the 
public finances on transaction taxes on the property sector in recent years 
(Addison-Smyth and McQuinn, 2010), the severe economic shock had a 
catastrophic impact on the public finances. Having averaged a small surplus 
on the public finances over most of the period 2000-7, government 
borrowing shot up to 14 per cent of GDP in 2009 and for 2010 estimates 
suggest that the deficit will average around 19 per cent of GDP if special 
payments to the banks are included.2  
 
In May 2009 we published a paper, Recovery Scenarios for Ireland, which 
considered possible paths to recovery for the Irish economy. This analysis 
suggested that the Irish economy would suffer serious permanent damage 
as a consequence of the recession. Nevertheless, Ireland could return to a 
period of quite rapid growth if the world economy itself entered the 
recovery phase. However, if the world recovery were postponed, this could 
have a further negative impact on the domestic economy.  
 
We now return to this work to provide an update one year on. Our 
approach revises this earlier work in relation to three specific areas: (1) 
forecasts for the world economy, (2) the size of medium-term fiscal 
measures to be adopted over the period 2011-2014, and (3) the long-run 
cost of the bank bailout to the Irish economy. In forming a fiscal policy 
response, the uncertainty concerning the future must be taken into account. 
As a result, in this paper we consider two main medium-term scenarios for 
the economy rather than presenting a single forecast. The objective of this 
analysis is to assess what would be a “no regrets” approach to tackling the 
current crisis, especially in terms of fiscal policy. 
 
In relation to the world economy, at the time of publishing in May 
2009, recovery was only a gleam in economists’ eyes. Since then there have 
been increasing signs of a return, if not to business as usual in the world 
 
2 These figures include exceptional items – a €4 billion transfer of money to Anglo Irish 
Bank to cover its losses in 2009. Excluding that transfer the deficit was 11.8 per cent of 
GDP. When further exceptional bank bailout transfers to Anglo Irish Bank and Irish 
Nationwide Building Society in 2010 are excluded, the figure for the debt will be around 
11.3 per cent of GDP. For the purpose of meeting compliance with the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) target, it is the general government deficit excluding exceptional transfers to the 
banks which is the relevant measure. As much of this paper is concerned with assessing 
the stance of fiscal policy under different scenarios, the discussion in later sections of the 
paper focuses more on the measure of the general government deficit excluding these 
exceptional bank payments. 
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economy, at least to significant growth. While the current liquidity 
problems in the Euro area (affecting both governments and banks in 
particular countries) could significantly impact on progress over the coming 
year, the most recent comprehensive forecasts for the world and the EU 
economy (the IMF, OECD, the EU and the UK National Institute for 
Economic and Social Research, NIESR) see a return to growth in the coming 
years at a faster rate than that envisaged when we published in May of last 
year. Because of concerns about the current turmoil on financial markets 
we also consider the sensitivity of our results to a less benign outturn for 
the international economy.  
 
In addition to the uncertainty about developments in the outside world 
and how it will affect the Irish economy, there is also significant uncertainty 
as to the long-term damage done directly to the economy by the recession 
and the related financial collapse. Many firms have closed as a result of the 
recession and will not be around to benefit from a recovery. The increased 
risk premium on borrowing is affecting the cost of capital and, hence, 
investment. Also the substantial burden arising from the dramatic increase 
in government debt will affect the economy for the foreseeable future. The 
cumulative impact of these shocks will permanently reduce the level of 
potential output in the economy. 
 
As a result of the uncertainty about the future, in this paper we 
consider two medium-term scenarios for the Irish economy – a High Growth 
scenario and a Low Growth scenario. These two scenarios differ significantly 
as to the future growth in potential output in the economy. The High 
Growth scenario assumes that, in response to renewed growth in the world 
economy and an improvement in competitiveness, over the next five years 
individual sectors of the Irish economy will respond in the same way as 
they have done over the last twenty years to such stimuli and that the 
labour market will also prove as flexible as in the recent past. While we 
have derived the Low Growth scenario by assuming a much lower 
responsiveness of Irish output with respect to world output than in the 
past, the resulting slower growth in potential output could also be 
produced by a range of other factors, such as a higher long-term cost of 
capital, a poorly functioning financial system, or problems in the labour 
market resulting in structural unemployment. What is important is that the 
two scenarios reflect the uncertainty about the future and that they can be 
used to test the robustness of any policy response in the face of such 
uncertainty. It should also be recognised that both a more favourable 
outcome (than in the High Growth scenario) as well as a less favourable 
outcome (than in the Low Growth scenario) are possible. 
 
In relation to fiscal policy, in the two main scenarios we implement in 
full the medium-term fiscal consolidation package, equivalent to €7½ 
billion, which was announced by the Irish government in December 2009. 
In the case of the banking bailout, we include in the government deficit and 
debt figures the effects of an estimated deadweight loss of €25 billion as a 
result of the losses incurred on Anglo-Irish Bank and in the Irish 
Nationwide Building Society.  
 
Section 2 summarises the assumptions underlying the scenarios 
presented in this paper. In Section 2.1 we discuss the recent experience of 
the Irish economy and the factors that are likely to drive output in the 
medium term. In Section 2.2 we outline the forecasts for the world 
economy which are used to develop both the High Growth and the Low 
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Growth scenarios. In Section 2.3 we set out our assumptions on the public 
finances and the cost of borrowing. In Section 3 we then spell out the two 
scenarios for the economy. The first of these scenarios is based on a 
growth path which sees the labour market clearing over the medium-term 
and the economy returning to its potential growth rate. The second 
scenario, the Low Growth scenario, considers an alternative growth path, 
which assumes that the growth potential of the economy, for whatever 
reason, has suffered even greater damage than in the High Growth scenario 
as a result of the crisis with one of the effects being an augmented level of 
unemployment. In Section 3 we also consider the sensitivity of these results 
to alternative assumptions on future world growth and alternative 
assumptions on the fiscal response by the Irish authorities. Using the 
results from these simulations we present estimates of the size of the 
structural deficit under alternative growth paths in Section 4. Section 5 
presents our conclusions. 
2. UNDERLYING 
ASSUMPTIONS 
In our publication last year (Bergin et al., 2009), we discussed the origins of 
the current crisis. Over the course of the last decade the Irish economy had 
steadily lost competitiveness. This loss of competitiveness was fuelled by a 
growing bubble in the housing market and the wider domestic property 
market. With expenditure on new housing reaching a peak of over 15 per 
cent of GNP by 2006, the building and construction sector gradually 
crowded out the tradable sector of the economy. The huge increase in 
output in the building and construction sector required a major reallocation 
of resources within the economy. This was achieved by raising the rate of 
inflation in domestic costs, especially that of labour. This reduced the 
demand for labour and other factors of production in the tradable or 
export sector, releasing resources demanded by the non-tradable (building) 
sector. In turn, output in the tradable sector was reduced below the level it 
would otherwise have achieved.  
2.1  
Modelling 
the 
Behaviour of 
the Irish 
Economy 
 
The consequence for the balance of payments of this loss in tradable 
output (and hence exports) was compounded by the huge demand for 
imports needed to sustain the boom in domestic demand. The result was a 
rapid rise in the balance of payments deficit. From a surplus in 2003, the 
balance of payments was in deficit by almost 6 per cent of GNP by 2006. 
While the public finances continued in surplus, the growing balance of 
payments deficit was the clearest indicator that the economy was on an 
unsustainable trajectory. 
 
The damage done to the Irish economy by the loss of competitiveness, 
consequent on the property market bubble, has been greatly aggravated by 
the related collapse in the financial sector. The failure to adequately regulate 
that sector (Honohan, 2010) facilitated the housing bubble. However, the 
ensuing collapse of the Irish financial sector has had much wider economic 
implications. As discussed later, the direct fiscal cost of the losses in the 
banking sector is very substantial. While the loss of competitiveness may, in 
time, be reversible, this wider damage will continue to affect the level of 
potential output for the next decade. 
 
Much of this damage to the economy, and the consequential dramatic 
rise in unemployment, was avoidable. If fiscal policy had been used to 
reduce demand rather than to exacerbate the inflationary pressures it could 
have defused the property bubble well before it became dangerous. This 
would have required budgetary policy to have targeted an increasing 
surplus over the period of at least 2003-2007. In addition, instead of using 
taxation policy to stimulate investment in building and construction it 
should have been used specifically to discourage such investment (Conefrey 
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and Fitz Gerald, 2010). The inappropriate nature of fiscal policy over this 
period was signalled as far back as 2001 (Fitz Gerald, 2001) and was 
repeated subsequently in a range of publications (see Fitz Gerald, 2009). 
 
Now that the crisis has happened, with the very serious consequences 
outlined above, a key factor in repairing some of the damage is for 
competitiveness to improve, so that the Irish tradable sector will gain an 
increasing share of the recovering world market. To a significant extent this 
will be delivered by the operation of the normal adjustment mechanisms in 
the economy. However, public policy can significantly speed this 
adjustment by tackling the lack of competition in key parts of the non-
tradable sector. 
 
The restoration of competitiveness will result in a gradual increase in 
output in exporting industries, an increase in profitability in the economy, 
and the movement of the balance of payments into surplus. This will 
eventually provide the platform for a recovery in domestic demand.  
 
However, output in the tradable sector tends not to be very 
employment intensive. It is only when demand for the output of the non-
tradable sector recovers that substantial employment growth will return. At 
present domestic demand is very weak. Consumers are depressed and many 
of them are, naturally, worried about their future employment status and 
future real disposable income. The result is a high rate of personal savings 
and a low level of consumption. The consequence of the housing bubble 
bursting is that the demand for new houses is at an all-time low and there 
are many vacant dwellings.   
 
When the economy eventually turns up as a result of increased external 
demand, confidence will begin to return to the domestic market. 
Employment will begin to rise rather than to fall. Then consumers will be 
prepared to reduce their current high rate of precautionary saving. In 
addition, as the stock of vacant dwellings in desirable areas declines 
(through new household formation) the decline in rents will eventually be 
halted and reversed. When that happens a return to a moderate rate of 
investment in building and construction, including housing, will be 
possible. (See Bergin et al., 2009, for an analysis of the factors affecting the 
demand for housing over the period to 2020.) 
 
Once domestic demand returns to growth, there is likely to be a much 
more vigorous increase in employment. This is because, as noted above, 
the major elements of domestic demand are more employment intensive 
than the export sector of the economy. In particular, a gradual return to a 
more “normal” level of activity in building and construction (albeit well 
below that seen over the last decade) will have a significant impact on 
numbers unemployed, especially on those with more limited levels of 
educational attainment.  
 
As outlined here, a key element in the recovery process will be the 
restoration of competitiveness through a real depreciation of the currency. 
Within a monetary union this can only be achieved through a fall in wage 
rates and other domestic costs relative to those in Ireland’s competitors. 
With a very low rate of inflation in Ireland’s Euro zone competitors this 
requires a fall in nominal wages or a very protracted adjustment period. 
Bergin et al., 2009, suggested that there was some uncertainty whether such 
a fall in nominal wage rates would actually occur as it has not been 
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experienced in the recent past in Ireland or other EU countries. However, 
over the past year a 15 per cent fall in wage rates in the public sector has 
been implemented and there is growing evidence of falling nominal wage 
rates across a proportion of the private sector.3  Our model of the labour 
market suggests that the current problems in the economy will result in a 
cumulative fall in nominal wage rates of 6 per cent over the period 2009-11 
(Barrett et al., 2010b). In addition, a wide range of other costs, such as rent, 
which affect the tradable sector, are showing a decline in nominal terms. 
 
In this paper we use the HERMES macroeconomic model of the Irish 
economy to examine the two scenarios for the medium term. HERMES 
treats the output of the tradable sector as a function of world output 
(especially in our main trading partners), technical progress, and the overall 
cost of production in Ireland relative to that in its main competitors (see 
Appendix 1 for details). Output in the non-tradable sector is modelled as a 
function of domestic demand, the cost of capital, and government demand. 
Domestic demand is also affected by consumers’ expectations, as reflected 
in the personal savings rate. 
 
A key feature of this model is its treatment of the labour market. In 
particular, the supply of labour through migration is highly elastic (Fitz 
Gerald, et al., 2008). The labour market in HERMES is modelled as 
clearing in the long term – wages and labour supply adjust over time to 
ensure full employment in the long term (Bergin, et al., 2010b). While this 
model has worked well in describing labour market experience over the last 
fifteen years, it is possible that policy failures could result in a permanent 
increase in the unemployment rate. For example, a combination of failures, 
e.g., to match the income support measures to labour market 
developments, to match training to the needs of the unemployed, and to 
implement appropriate activation policies, could interfere with the normal 
operation of the labour market, resulting in a permanently elevated level of 
structural unemployment. 
 
An important factor, not incorporated directly into the current version 
of the HERMES model, is the unquantifiable effect on “confidence” of 
changes in key aggregates. For example, the rapid deterioration in the 
government’s financial position had an impact on confidence, affecting 
interest rate premia paid by the State to finance its debt. Because of a 
paucity of data points it is not possible to directly model the relationship 
between this “risk premium” and developments in government borrowing 
or the national debt. Instead the approach taken has been to provide a 
calibration of this relationship and the results from the scenarios using this 
calibration, discussed below, must be considered in this light. For example, 
because the structural budget deficit is higher in the Low Growth scenario 
than in the High Growth scenario the risk premium is also assumed to be 
higher. We discuss in more detail the assumptions on the risk premia in the 
two main scenarios in Section 2.3.  
 
3 Here we treat the public sector pension levy, introduced in February 2009, as an effective 
reduction in nominal wage rates in the public sector.  
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The forecasts for the world economy underpinning the High Growth and 
Low Growth scenarios considered in this paper come from the National 
Institute Economic Review of April 2010.4 Following a decline in world output 
of around 1 per cent in 2009, the global economy is emerging from 
recession but the pace of recovery is more muted within the Euro Area 
bloc and the UK than in the US, where the rebound in activity has been 
quite strong. Countries outside of the OECD, especially China, but also 
India, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea have emerged from the global crisis 
relatively unscathed. Most of the world’s economies are forecast to grow at 
rates close to potential over the medium to long term. China and India are 
forecast to continue growing rapidly over the medium-term, accounting for 
an increasing share of foreign trade and global growth. Table 2.1 
summarises the growth prospects for the international economy over the 
medium-term.5 
2.2 
International 
Assumptions 
Table 2.1: Real GDP Growth 
      
 2009 2010 2011 2011-2015 2016-2020 
 
USA -2.4 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.3 
UK -4.9 1.0 2.0 2.8 2.7 
Euro Area -4.0 1.2 1.8 2.2 2.5 
World -1.0 3.9 3.8 4.1 3.8 
      
Source: NIESR. 
 
The risks to the international forecast tend to be on the downside. 
Concerns about sovereign liquidity and the risk of a debt crisis remain. The 
steep increase in public debt in many OECD economies may hamper 
medium-term growth prospects if risk premia on government debt (that are 
evident in many countries) remain high or if these premia spread to the 
private sector, raising the user cost of capital. The issue of country risk 
particularly affects the Italian, Spanish, Irish, Greek and Portuguese 
economies within the Euro Area – together these countries account for 
around one-third of Euro Area GDP. As a result of their size, slower 
growth in these economies could impact on the wider Euro Area in a 
negative fashion. Because of the weakness of the financial system generally, 
there may also be negative consequences in these economies, not just from 
a higher interest rate on government debt, but also from a higher interest 
rate for all domestic activity. There may also be knock on consequences for 
the financial systems of the rest of the EU.  
 
In relation to fiscal policy, some countries, like Ireland, have no choice 
but to curb their excessive borrowing immediately. For other economies, 
where fiscal sustainability is not in question and where the risk of default is 
essentially zero, the pace of fiscal consolidation should be sufficient to 
ensure continued credibility over the medium-term, while remaining 
supportive of the recovery in economic growth. Many commentators have 
argued that premature fiscal tightening is as big a danger as delayed 
 
4 The forecasts contained in the April 2010 National Institute Economic Review for Ireland’s 
main trading partners are broadly comparable to those in the April 2010 IMF World 
Economic Outlook, but the NIESR forecast covers a longer period. 
5 Section 2.3 outlines our fiscal assumptions and the assumptions for the risk premium on 
Irish government debt. The risk premium on Irish debt is measured relative to the interest 
rate on German debt.   
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tightening, particularly given the fragile nature of the recovery thus far. At 
the release of the IMF World Economic Outlook Update, Olivier 
Blanchard recently stressed that, while fiscal adjustment should start soon, 
a sharp cut in deficits this year would be counterproductive. The focus 
should be on developing a credible plan to stabilise the debt to GDP ratio 
over the medium term, with the goal of decreasing it substantially over the 
longer term. As an export-led economy, the decisions taken by these 
countries, will have a major impact on our pace of recovery. 
 
Given the risks to the international economy, in Section 3.4 we 
consider the international and domestic impacts of an International Risk 
Premium Shock, where the risk premium on government debt is assumed 
to be 2 percentage points higher from 2011 in the Euro Area, UK and US.  
 
 In the scenarios outlined in this paper, we assume that the government 
implements a series of austerity budgets in the period 2011-2014 as set out 
in the Stability Programme Update December 2009 (SPU) published in the 
Budget 2010 booklet.  These budgets are equivalent to a cumulative ex ante6 
retrenchment of €7½ billion over a four year period. The SPU provides no 
detail on the breakdown of the numbers across revenue, current and capital 
expenditure programmes7. In order to implement these cuts we have 
assumed a stylised package of fiscal measures spread over the years 2011-14. 
It is assumed that in 2011 the government will reduce the borrowing 
requirement by close to the €3 billion announced at the time of the 2010 
budget. For 2012 we have assumed a further package of fiscal measures of 
around €1.8 billion.  Additional measures to save a total of €1.4 billion are 
assumed to be implemented in 2013, and €1.2 billion in 2014. 
2.3  
Fiscal 
Assumptions 
Table 2.2: Assumed Discretionary Fiscal Policy Action 2011-14: Changes 
in Taxes and Expenditure, € billions 
  2011  2012  2013  2014 
Total 
2011-
2014 
 
Revenues 1 0.6 0.8 0.2 2.5 
 Property tax etc. 0.4 0.4 0.3  1.1 
 Carbon Tax 0.2    0.2 
 Tax on income 0.4    0.4 
 Water charges   0.3 0.2 0.5 
 Carbon auctions8   0.2 0.2  0.4 
      
Capital expenditure 1 0.4   1.4 
      
Current expenditure   1 0.9 0.7 1 3.6 
 Current expenditure on 
 goods and services 1 0.9 0.7 0.7 3.3 
 Transfers (Pension age)    0.3 0.3 
Total 3 1.8 1.4 1.2 7.4 
 
6 Because of the deflationary implications of such cuts the level of economic activity will 
be reduced so that the ex post reduction in borrowing will be somewhat lower than the €7.5 
billion. Using the HERMES model it is possible to estimate the ex post effect of different 
budgetary measures. 
7 With the exception of the 2011 budget where €1 billion in cuts on the capital programme 
are included in the figures. 
8 This figure includes a temporary windfall levy on free carbon credits in 2012. 
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It should be stressed that the composition of the fiscal package 
assumed here is not normative. In the absence of a fully spelt out 
government programme we have included a range of measures which 
might be considered as being consistent with the broad parameters of 
government policy and with the taxation measures recommended by the 
Commission on Taxation.9 These tax and expenditure measures should not 
be seen as a “desirable” or part of an “optimal” package.10  
 
Details of the stylised budgetary changes are set out in Table 2.2. This 
Table shows the increases in taxation and cuts in expenditure assigned to 
individual years. In each case it is assumed that these higher rates of 
taxation or cuts in expenditure are maintained in subsequent years and the 
cumulative total increase in taxation or reduction in expenditure is shown 
in the final column. As shown at the bottom of the Table, the cumulative 
ex ante cut in the deficit anticipated from this package is €7.4 billion by the 
end of 2014, consistent with the proposals in the SPU. 
 
The cuts assumed in capital expenditure would still leave government 
capital expenditure, excluding special payments to cover losses in the 
banking system, at around 4.5 per cent of GNP in 2015. The cuts in 
current expenditure on goods and services would involve a cut in public 
service employment of approximately 40,000 (largely achieved through 
natural wastage) bringing total public service employment back to 2006 
levels by the end of the period. No further cuts in public service wage rates 
are assumed for 2011 and subsequent years. 
 
The cut in expenditure on pensions in 2014 arises from the 
government decision to extend the retirement age for public old age 
pensions from 65 to 66. This saving in expenditure takes no account of the 
additional savings that might be expected through higher labour force 
participation by this cohort. By working a year longer the tax revenue 
accruing to the state would also be significant, as would the effect on 
output. For example, Barrell et al. (2010) have estimated the effects of an 
extension in the pension age in the UK in 2015; their estimates would 
suggest a bigger long-term economic impact than we have assumed here. 
 
We have assumed that over the course of the years 2011 through to 
2013 additional tax revenue of around €1.1 billion would be raised from a 
tax on property of a person’s primary residence. In addition, some limited 
changes in taxes on income in 2011 would raise just under €400 million and 
an increase in the carbon tax in 2011 would raise additional revenue of 
€160 million. We further assume the introduction of water charges in 2013 
and 2014, delivering an additional €500 million in revenue on an annual 
basis. And finally we include an estimate of €200 million in revenue from 
the auctioning of carbon credits beginning in 2013. 
 
 
9 We recognise that some of these measures (e.g. property tax) are no longer consistent 
with short-term government policy as recently announced. 
10 Bergin et al. (2010a) examines the macroeconomic impact of changes to various fiscal 
policy instruments. To the extent that the incidence of a tax lies with households and is 
not passed on, the output effects are minimised. In the case where the tax change results 
in changes in behaviour, such as higher wage rates, the costs are increased. Thus different 
packages could have somewhat different implications for future growth. 
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In the case of the costs of the banking crisis we have assumed that the 
final cost to the state of the losses in Anglo-Irish Bank and the Irish 
Nationwide Building Society is €25 billion, as suggested by the Minister for 
Finance in March 2010. This loss will be covered by exceptional payments 
to these institutions and these payments are excluded from the numbers on 
fiscal policy action in Table 2.2. However, for accounting reasons, they are 
included as exceptional items in the General Government Balance (GGB). 
 
Specifically we have taken account of a payment of €4 billion made to 
Anglo-Irish Bank in 2009 in respect of the loss and a further €11 billion 
paid in 2010 in the form of a promissory note.11 This promissory note is to 
be gradually redeemed for cash over the forecast period (other government 
borrowing would be substituted for it). We have also assumed that this 
promissory note will attract a market interest rate, with the resulting 
interest payments being added to national debt interest.  
 
The additional €10 billion to cover the rest of the eventual expected 
loss is assumed to be paid to these institutions over the coming decade, 
partly as interest on the promissory note and partly as an exceptional 
additional payment of €0.8 billion a year. This latter payment is included in 
the figures for the General Government Balance.12 As a result, the General 
Government Balance shown in this paper for the years 2010-2020 must be 
adjusted to exclude these exceptional payments to arrive at the deficit 
covered by the SGP. (These “exceptional” payments are not considered 
part of the deficit target set by the government for 2014, though the 
interest payable on them is considered part of that deficit.) 
 
In the case of the recapitalisation of the banks, this is assumed to be 
part of the investment of the National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF). It is 
also assumed that the state receives a normal return on this investment 
when it comes to sell off the shares in the performing banks. Thus it is 
assumed that there is no net effect on government borrowing or the 
national debt. 
 
Finally, in the case of NAMA, to simplify the exposition, we have 
assumed that all the assets (loans) are realised in 2020 and all NAMA’s 
liabilities are paid off with the proceeds. Thus we are assuming no net 
profit or loss for NAMA over its lifetime and consequently that there is no 
net effect on the national debt. However, the NAMA bonds are clearly a 
contingent liability of the State.13 Because of the large size of the NAMA 
balance sheet and the fact that its liabilities are guaranteed by the state, the 
inevitable uncertainty about the eventual return (or cost) of these 
investments is affecting the cost of borrowing by both the Irish 
government and Irish banks. As a result, while technically not part of the 
national debt, for some purposes it is useful to consider the pattern of the 
national debt with the NAMA liabilities included. 
 
 
11 Since completing the numbers this figure has been revised upwards to €13 billion. 
However, this involves bringing forward some of the expenditure we had assumed for 
later years. As a result, it does not significantly alter our analysis. 
12 Even if the timing of this payment proved rather different than we have assumed it 
would not greatly alter the numbers for the underlying structural deficit. 
13 As discussed elsewhere, we assume that in the long run there is no net cost to the state 
from NAMA. 
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The perceived higher level of risk pertaining to lending to the Irish 
government relative to Germany has resulted in a very substantial premium 
payable on such borrowing. The risk premium assumed for Irish borrowing 
is set out in Table 2.3, along with the forecast German long-term bond rate 
and the resulting forecast for the Irish bond rate. In the High Growth 
scenario the profile assumes that the government takes the planned fiscal 
action for 2011 with a further commitment to the necessary action for 2012 
and subsequent years. It also assumes that by the end of 2010 the liabilities 
and assets of the Irish banking system have become much more 
transparent. The bulk of the non-performing property loans will have been 
taken off the banks’ books at an appropriate “market” valuation. The banks 
will have been recapitalised and the likely magnitude of the losses in Anglo-
Irish and Irish Nationwide will be clearer, with the bulk of the cost having 
been already transferred to the state. 
Table 2.3: Risk Premium Relative to Germany Assumed for Irish 
Borrowing 
    
 German Irish High Growth Irish Low Growth 
 
 
Interest 
Rate 
Risk 
Premium 
Interest 
Rate Risk Premium Interest Rate 
      
2008 4.0 0.6 4.6 0.6 4.6 
2009 3.3 1.9 5.2 1.9 5.2 
2010 3.2 2.0 5.2 2.0 5.2 
2011 3.6 1.5 5.1 2.0 5.6 
2012 3.9 1.3 5.2 1.8 5.7 
2013 4.2 1.0 5.2 1.5 5.7 
2014 4.3 1.0 5.3 1.5 5.8 
2015 4.4 0.8 5.2 1.3 5.7 
2016 4.5 0.5 5.0 1.0 5.5 
2017 4.6 0.5 5.1 1.0 5.6 
2018 4.6 0.5 5.1 1.0 5.6 
2019 4.6 0.5 5.1 1.0 5.6 
2020 4.6 0.5 5.1 1.0 5.6 
      
 
In the case of the Low Growth scenario, as discussed below, the planned 
fiscal action would not be enough to eliminate the structural deficit by 
2015. As a result, lending to the Irish government would be perceived as 
being more risky than under the more benign High Growth scenario and this 
is assumed to be reflected in a permanent increase in the risk premium of 
half a percentage point. 
 
3. MEDIUM-TERM 
SCENARIOS  
Due to the uncertainty surrounding the future behaviour and growth 
path of the Irish economy we explore two main scenarios over the period 
2010-2015. We refer to these as the High Growth Scenario and the Low 
Growth Scenario. 
 
The High Growth scenario assumes that the financial system is 
rehabilitated and restructured so that it responds to the recovery in the 
economy in 2011 by providing adequate credit. The analysis in Bergin, 
Conefrey, Fitz Gerald and Kearney (2010a) highlights the sensitivity of 
Irish output with respect to changes in world demand. The High Growth 
scenario assumes that the structural behaviour of the Irish economy is not 
fundamentally altered as a result of the current crisis. In particular, the 
scenario is based on the assumption that the key drivers of output in the 
tradable sector of the economy do not change as a result of the current 
recession.    
 
The High Growth scenario is a relatively benign scenario and, because of 
the uncertainty about the future growth path of the Irish economy, it is 
prudent to consider an alternative scenario in which the economy under-
performs over the medium-term. There are many reasons why the 
economy might perform worse than in the High Growth scenario. For 
example, if the world recovery is increasingly driven by economies that 
Ireland does not have traditional trade links with, this could hamper future 
domestic export growth. Performance could also be negatively affected if 
the Irish tradable sector had experienced permanent damage as a result of 
the crisis or if there was a permanent major rise in the cost of capital facing 
the Irish economy. Yet another potential impediment to the economy 
realising its growth potential would be the failure of labour market policy to 
adapt to meet the new needs of the economy (Grubb, 2009). In this paper, 
we generate a Low Growth scenario by assuming that the Irish economy 
does not respond in a similar manner, as it has in the past, to an upturn in 
world demand. 
 
The HERMES macroeconomic model of the Irish economy has been 
used to develop these scenarios. The behaviour of this model is discussed 
in Bergin, Conefrey, Fitz Gerald and Kearney, 2010a. The two scenarios 
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are calibrated to the Spring Quarterly Economic Commentary (QEC) numbers 
for 2010 and 2011, published in April 2010.14  
 
In both scenarios we assume that the world economy recovers in 2010, 
as described in Section 2.2, and that the government implements a package 
of fiscal cuts equivalent to €7½ billion over the period 2011 to 2014, as 
outlined in Section 2.3. We also assume that Irish risk premium is 0.5 
percentage points higher in the Low Growth scenario than in the High Growth 
scenario. In Section 4, we use these two scenarios to examine various 
recovery strategies from the current public finance problems, assessing the 
extent to which the deficit in the public finances is structural.  
 
Some of the general conclusions from these two scenarios are 
considered in Section 3.3. We also consider some sensitivity analysis 
around the High Growth scenario. (The results would be very similar if we 
used the Low Growth scenario as a basis.) Given the very high degree of 
uncertainty surrounding events in financial markets so far this year, Section 
3.4 describes the effect of an increase in the risk premium in the 
international economy on the world economic forecasts. It then uses these 
International Risk Premium Shock figures to explore the impact that this would 
have on the path to recovery in the High Growth scenario. Finally, in Section 
3.5 we describe the impact on the High Growth scenario if the government 
had adopted a neutral fiscal policy since the advent of the recession in 2008 
– postponing the necessary fiscal adjustment for a number of years. Such a 
postponement would, inter alia, have involved a significantly higher risk 
premium for all borrowing, public and private. 
 
 This scenario assumes that the Irish economy’s relationship with the 
outside world is maintained after the current crisis, assuming that the 
behaviour of the Irish economy over the last twenty years provides a valid 
basis on which to formulate forecasts of the likely future path of the 
economy. As discussed in the recently published Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, following a major contraction in economic activity, we expect 
economic growth to resume from 2011 onwards (Figure 1). Our forecasts 
for economic growth out to 2015 in this scenario are lower than those 
contained in the World Recovery scenario of Recovery Scenarios for Ireland 
publication of May 2009. The reasons for the differences between our 
latest projections and those of May 2009 are discussed in Box A. Initially 
the recovery will be driven by exports. The combined effect of a return to 
growth in Ireland’s external markets and the significant improvement in 
competitiveness which is under way should see Irish exporters gaining an 
increased share of a growing export market. 
3.1 
High Growth 
Scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 Some of the numbers for 2010 differ from those in the latest QEC published in July. 
However, even if the latest QEC had been used as a basis for this exercise it would not 
have significantly affected the results. 
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Figure 1: GDP, % Change 
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The strong recovery in the Irish economy after 2011 envisaged in this 
scenario can be explained by two factors. First, the openness of the Irish 
economy, with over 80 per cent of manufacturing output being exported, 
means that an increase in world demand has a substantial effect on Irish 
output. Our estimates suggest that an increase in world output of 1 per 
cent in the long run increases the demand for Irish output by around 1.3 
per cent (Bergin, Conefrey, Fitz Gerald and Kearney, 2010a). Growth in 
world trade directly affects the Irish economy through the manufacturing, 
business and financial services and tourism sectors. A growing share of the 
output of the business and financial services sector is internationally traded 
which substantially increases the effect of growth in world demand on the 
Irish economy. This high degree of responsiveness to changes in world 
activity contributed to the depth and severity of the downturn in the Irish 
economy since 2008. In the same way this high sensitivity to world activity 
gives rise to the strong recovery in the Irish economy from 2011 in this 
scenario.  
 
The second factor, which explains the growth in the Irish economy 
after 2011 in this scenario, is the expected improvement in competitiveness 
in Ireland relative to the rest of the world. Ireland’s competitiveness 
relative to the rest of the world drives the output of the tradable sector in 
the domestic economy. Our estimates suggest that, if wage rates and input 
prices were one percentage point lower relative to our main competitor 
economies GNP would be around 0.2 per cent higher in the medium term 
(Bergin, Conefrey, Fitz Gerald and Kearney, 2010a). The combination of a 
fall in the cost of living in Ireland (including the cost of accommodation) 
and the increase in unemployment associated with the contraction in the 
economy over the period 2008-2010 is expected to lead to wage 
moderation in the private sector, as discussed in the latest QEC.  
 
As discussed in the latest QEC for 2010, we expect a further small 
contraction in GNP this year followed by a modest recovery in output in 
2011. Assuming that the elasticity of Irish output with respect to output in 
the outside world is maintained as it was in the past, and also assuming that 
competitiveness improves as the model would suggest, the recovery in the 
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international economy is expected to give rise to a strong recovery in 
output in the manufacturing and market services sectors over the period 
2011-2015, as illustrated in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1: High Growth Scenario, Major Aggregates 
 
 
   2009  2010 2011-15 2016-20 
Growth Rate Annual % Average Annual % 
GDP -7.1 -0.4 4.6 3.0 
GNP -12.2 0.0 4.2 3.1 
Total Employment -8.6 -4.2 1.9 1.1 
Output, industry -8.6 -3.7 8.3 3.4 
Output, market services -6.3 2.1 4.4 3.2 
Consumer Prices -3.4 -1.9 2.0 2.7 
Non-agricultural Wage Rates -1.5 -3.0 2.4 4.2 
     
Year End:    2009  2010 2015     2020 
Personal Savings Ratio 11.2 10.7 8.3 8.5 
 
General Govt. Deficit, % GDP, including 
special payments to banks15  14.3 18.2 2.4 0.5 
 
General Govt. Deficit, % GDP, 
excluding special payments to banks 11.8 11.3 1.8 -0.1 
 
General Government Deficit, including 
special payments to banks % GNP 17.8 22.7 3.1 0.7 
Net Government Debt, % of GDP 32.1 51.2 63.1 51.2 
General Government Debt, % GDP 64.0 83.4 91.1 76.0 
General Government Debt, % GNP 79.9 104.1 116.5 96.8 
Balance of Payments, % GNP -3.2 0.9 1.7 1.9 
Unemployment Rate, % of labour force 11.9 14.0 4.8 4.4 
Net Emigration, 000s 7.8 60.0 -1.1 -17.4 
Participation Rate, PES Basis 70.4 69.7 69.6 70.6 
Investment / GNP ratio 19.3 15.2 19.8 20.4 
     
 
Because of fears for their future, many households are saving at an 
exceptional rate. In addition, investment in housing by the household 
sector has been dramatically reduced. However, once an export driven 
recovery becomes established in 2012 it is likely that the savings rate will 
fall gradually towards its long run equilibrium level. In addition, once the 
excess of dwellings in the major urban areas are occupied through sale or 
rental in 2012 or 2013, rents will begin to rise and investment in housing 
will show a limited recovery. This delayed recovery in domestic demand 
will be particularly important for employment growth in later years. 
 
Similarly, in the company sector, businesses are currently concentrating 
on reducing their balance sheets with the result that investment has fallen 
 
15 As discussed in Section 2.3, to facilitate comparison with the Stability Programme 
Update figures we exclude the exceptional items, specifically the once off payments to the 
banks. 
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to a low level. Once a recovery becomes well established and company 
profitability is re-established, a recovery in private sector non-housing 
investment is also anticipated. 
 
As shown in Table 3.1, the increase in output from the tradable sectors 
of the economy is expected to drive annual average GNP growth of 4.2 per 
cent over the period 2011 to 2015. Beyond 2015, growth is expected to 
moderate to an annual average rate of 3 per cent, close to the economy’s 
long run potential rate of growth (see Bergin et al., 2009 and Bergin et al., 
2010b, for details).  
 
The sharp contraction in the economy over the period 2008 to 2010 has 
resulted in a dramatic rise in the unemployment rate, as illustrated in Figure 
2. As a result of lower levels of activity in the building, manufacturing and 
market services sectors, total employment fell by almost 9 per cent in 2009 
and it is expected to contract by a further 3.7 per cent in 2010. The 
unemployment rate rose to almost 12 per cent in 2009 and is projected to 
stabilise at just over 13 per cent in 2010 and 2011. In line with the 
anticipated recovery in economic activity from 2011 onwards in this 
scenario, employment growth is expected to resume and average 2 per cent 
over the period 2011 to 2015. As a result, the unemployment rate is 
expected to fall to just under 5 per cent by 2015, a rate consistent with full 
employment.  
Figure 2: Unemployment Rate (ILO), Per Cent of the Labour Force 
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The fall in the unemployment rate to below 5 per cent by 2015 would 
reflect the rapid adjustment of the labour market which occurs in this 
scenario. This rapid clearing of the labour market contrasts with the 
experience of the Finnish economy in the 1990s where the unemployment 
rate still stood at 11 per cent in 1999, five years after economic growth had 
resumed. The difference reflects the observed flexibility of the Irish labour 
market. However, to ensure that the labour market clears and that those 
who are long-term unemployed find jobs in the recovery phase a more 
active labour market policy will be required (OECD, 2010 and O’Connell, 
2009). 
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Throughout these simulations migration is assumed to be driven by 
movements in after-tax wage rates and the unemployment rate in Ireland 
relative to the UK. As a result, the rise in unemployment would lead to 
substantial outward migration in this scenario. There would be cumulative 
net emigration of over 160,000 over the period 2009 to 2013, this is crucial 
to the rapid decline in the unemployment rate in this scenario. If migration 
were not to resume to this extent, this would lead to a higher 
unemployment rate and a slower decline in the unemployment rate in the 
recovery period than we have assumed here. This adjustment to the labour 
force through net emigration is likely to be completed by the end of 2014. 
In later years of the decade some return to limited net immigration might 
be expected. 
 
As discussed, households have reacted to the current economic crisis 
by increasing their personal savings rate. As shown in Table 3.1, the savings 
rate reached 11 per cent in 2009, significantly above its long run average of 
around 8 per cent. As the economy recovers, the savings rate is expected to 
fall back gradually to reach just over 8 per cent in 2015. The fall in the 
savings ratio and the associated rise in consumption in this scenario add 
further impetus to the recovery in the economy after 2011.  
 
As shown in Bergin et al. (2010a), for every 1 percentage point 
reduction in government borrowing through discretionary fiscal action the 
balance of payments current account deficit (surplus) also tends to fall (rise) 
by around 1 percentage point. The package of fiscal policy measures 
implemented in this scenario will tend to move the current account of the 
balance of payments into surplus in 2010. In addition, the recovery in 
world demand and the increase in Irish exports after 2011 envisaged in this 
scenario would together be likely to result in a substantial continuing 
surplus on the balance of payments current account over the medium term. 
The delayed recovery in domestic demand would contribute to this 
process.  
 
The emerging surplus on the current account of the balance of 
payments would, in turn, be matched by developments in the flow of 
funds. As noted in Barrett et al. (2010b) this has significant implications for 
the banking system, which are teased out further in Section 3.3. 
 
Turning to the public finances, the decline in economic activity has led 
to a collapse in government receipts from a range of taxes. At the same 
time government expenditure has risen due to higher welfare payments as a 
result of higher unemployment and a major increase in debt interest 
payments related to the borrowing undertaken to fund the resolution of the 
banking crisis. Based on the assumptions on the public finances discussed 
in Section 2.3, as well as the return to strong growth and the associated fall 
in unemployment envisaged in this scenario, the general government deficit 
is expected to improve significantly over the medium term, falling to 2 per 
cent of GDP by 2015 excluding special payments to banks, as shown in 
Figure 3. (While the borrowing including special payments to banks is 
shown in Table 3.1, here we exclude these payments to allow a comparison 
with the numbers agreed with the EU Commission in the Stability 
Programme Update.) This is the deficit which would remain assuming a 
normal world recovery and the full implementation of the package of fiscal 
measures outlined in Section 2.3.  
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Figure 3: General Government Deficit, Per Cent of GDP 
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Figure 4 shows the share of Government expenditure (current and 
capital) and revenue (current and capital) as a percentage of GNP. The 
dramatic increase in the share of expenditure in GNP over the 2008-2010 
period reflects both the fall in nominal GNP over the period as well as 
increases in welfare payments, due to the rise in unemployment, and in 
national debt interest payments. The fall in the revenue share in GNP from 
2007 to 2008, was driven by the fall in property related taxes and income 
taxes. Assuming the budgetary packages, outlined above for the period 
2011-2014, are implemented in full, the Figure shows that the gap between 
the share of expenditure and revenue in GNP will narrow over time.  
Figure 4: Total Government Expenditure and Revenue as a Percentage of 
GNP 
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Figure 5: Permanent Loss of Output in Terms of GNP Per Head  
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This scenario suggests that once the world recovery gathers 
momentum, which according to current forecasts could happen in 2011, 
growth rates in the recovery phase of 4 to 5 per cent would be likely. While 
this would represent a return to strong rates of growth, it should be noted 
that growth rates of this magnitude would be sufficient to restore only 
some of the losses sustained over the period 2008-2010. Set out in Figure 5 
is a comparison of the path of GNP per head in this scenario compared to 
the forecasts before the advent of the crisis. In this case we use the housing 
shock scenario from the 2005 Medium-Term Review to represent the pre-
recession base. We estimate that by the end of 2010, as a consequence of 
the severe contraction in the Irish economy over the period 2008 to 2010 
and the associated rise in unemployment, output per head will have fallen 
back to its 2000 level. On the basis of the growth rates envisaged in this 
scenario, output per head would not be restored to its 2007 level until 
2015. The pattern shown in Figure 5 implies a permanent loss of output 
per head of over 15 per cent in 2015 relative to the pre-recession base, a 
very painful permanent scar on the economy arising from the current 
recession.  
 
 
Box A: Comparison with World Recovery  Scenario from May 2009 
 
In May 2009, the ESRI published a paper (Bergin et al., 2009) which set out 
possible paths to recovery for the Irish economy. In that paper we argued 
that if the world economy recovered significant momentum by 2011, the 
Irish economy, as long as it regained competitiveness, could grow quite 
rapidly in the period 2011-2015 and recover some of the lost ground of the 
current severe recession. We remain of the view that this outcome is still 
possible but the extent of recovery of lost ground is more muted. The 
projections in the 2009 paper did not take account of likely further fiscal 
adjustment in 2011 and subsequent years.  Nevertheless, the current scale 
of the structural deficit in the public finances, combined with the 
deadweight costs of the banking bailout, currently estimated at 15 per cent 
of GDP, means that further fiscal consolidation will be necessary in the 
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period out to 2014. This in turn will reduce the growth path of the 
economy out to 2015. 
 
   Since the publication of Recovery Scenarios for Ireland, more detail has 
emerged on the likely scale of government funding required to resolve the 
banking crisis. In particular, it has now become clear that the State is likely 
to have to transfer an estimated €25 billion to the banking system. As a 
result, in developing the scenarios in this paper we have included an 
additional funding cost of €25 billion. These exceptional payments to the 
banks involve a medium-term cost to the economy in terms of output, 
income and employment. These costs are reflected in the normal 
government borrowing through a significant increase in debt interest 
payments required to remunerate this additional debt. 
 
   Table 1A compares our projections for GDP and the public finances 
based on the World Recovery scenario (May 2009) with our revised 
projections based on the High Growth scenario. The principle reason for the 
differences between these numbers relates to our assumptions on fiscal 
policy over the medium-term. Underpinning the scenarios presented in this 
paper is the assumption that the government will implement fiscal policy 
action to reduce expenditure or increase taxation by around €7½ billion 
between 2011 and 2014. In Recovery Scenarios for Ireland, we assumed that no 
further fiscal policy interventions would occur beyond 2010. The 
implementation of the €7½ billion programme of spending cuts and tax 
increases (equivalent to around 4½ per cent of 2009 GDP) contributes to a 
significant reduction in our current forecasts for economic growth 
compared to Recovery Scenarios. This is because the implementation of the 
package of fiscal cuts directly reduces demand in the economy and results 
in a lower level of employment and higher emigration flows than in the 
absence of such a package. For example, the government plans to 
introduce a €3 billion package of austerity measures in the 2011 budget. We 
estimate that such a budgetary package would reduce the growth rate by 
approximately one percentage point. 
 
Table 1A: Comparison of High Growth Scenario with World Recovery 
 Scenario Projections Prepared in May 2009 
 
   2010   2011-15 2016-2020 
GDP Growth Rates  Average Annual % Growth 
World Recovery Scenario, May 2009 -1 5 ½ 3 ¼ 
High Growth Scenario, July 2010 -½ 4 ½  3 
 
General Government Deficit, % of 
GDP, year end   2010    2015    2020 
World Recovery Scenario, May 2009 11 ¼ 3 ¼ 2 ½ 
High Growth Scenario, July 2010 12 2 0 
 
   The fiscal consolidation package reduces our forecasts for average annual 
GDP growth over the period 2011 to 2015 by one percentage point 
compared to the figures published last year. Total employment is 63,000 
lower by 2015, and the gross debt to GDP ratio is 17 percentage points 
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higher. Income per head in 2015 is 5 per cent lower, see Figure 1A. Our 
analysis here indicates that the full implementation of the budgetary 
package outlined in section 4.1 would ensure full compliance with the 3 per 
cent Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) target by 2015 (the cost of the 
remaining exceptional transfers to the banking system is excluded from the 
borrowing for the purpose of comparison with the SGP). Nevertheless, 
these figures confirm that implementation of this package of fiscal 
consolidation, of necessity, imposes real costs on the economy.  
 
Figure 1A: GNP Per Head, Constant Prices, 2007=100. Comparison of 
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 The High Growth scenario assumes that the Irish economy will react to the 
international recovery in the same way as in the past. In particular, it 
assumes that output in high-tech manufacturing and business and financial 
services, which is largely driven by world demand, will grow strongly.  In 
this scenario we consider the medium-term trajectory for the Irish 
economy if the relationship between output in the traded sectors and world 
growth is weaker than in the past. The fiscal assumptions are the same as in 
the High Growth scenario but the assumed risk premium on government 
borrowing is 0.5 percentage points higher. As discussed in Appendix 1, the 
scenario is generated by permanently reducing the elasticity of output in 
these sectors to world growth by around one percentage point. Reducing 
the elasticity of output in these sectors is purely a mechanism to generate a 
scenario with lower growth; as discussed earlier, there is a multitude of 
other factors that could generate such a scenario. 
3.2 
Low Growth 
Scenario 
 
Table 3.2 summarises the impact of this change on the key economic 
aggregates. As a result of the lower response to world output, external 
demand for Irish exports is lower than in the High Growth scenario resulting 
in lower output and employment. In this scenario output in the industrial 
sector would grow by 5.4 per cent per annum over the period 2011 to 
2015, compared to 8.3 per cent in the High Growth scenario. Output growth 
in the market services sector would be 3.4 per cent compared to 4.4 per 
78 
cent in the High Growth scenario. Average GNP growth over the period 
2011 to 2015 would be more moderate at 3 per cent, relative to 4 per cent 
in the High Growth scenario. 
Table 3.2: Low Growth Scenario, Major Aggregates 
     
  2009  2010 2011-15 2016-20 
Growth Rate Annual % Average Annual % 
GDP -7.1 -0.4 3.2 2.1 
GNP -12.2 0.0 3.0 2.2 
Total Employment -8.6 -4.2 1.3 0.9 
Output, industry -8.6 -3.7 5.4 2.3 
Output, market services -6.3 2.1 3.4 2.1 
Consumer Prices -3.4 -1.9 1.9 2.6 
Non-agricultural Wage Rates -1.5 -3.0 2.2 3.8 
     
Year End:  2009    2010    2015    2020 
Personal Savings Ratio 11.2 10.7 8.1 8.4 
 
General Govt. Deficit, % GDP, 
including special payments to 
banks16 14.3 18.2 4.8 5.2 
 
General Govt. Deficit, % GDP, 
excluding special payments to 
banks 11.8 11.3 4.1 4.5 
 
General Government Deficit, 
including special payments to 
banks % GNP 17.8 22.7 6.1 6.5 
Net Government Debt, % of GDP 32.1 51.2 73.6 80.7 
General Government Debt, % GDP 64.0 83.4 102.5 106.9 
General Government Debt, % GNP 79.9 104.1 129.4 134.1 
Balance of Payments, % GNP -3.2 0.9 -1.3 -4.0 
Unemployment Rate, % of labour 
force 11.9 14.0 7.1 7.1 
Net Emigration, 000s 7.8 60.0 5.1 -12.5 
Participation Rate, PES Basis 70.4 69.7 69.7 70.6 
Investment / GNP ratio 19.3 15.2 19.8 20.8 
     
 
In this case the permanent loss of output per head relative to the pre-
recession base is more severe than in the High Growth scenario. By 2015 
GNP per head is still 4.5 per cent below the 2007 level. In this scenario the 
permanent loss of employment amounts to 245,000 by 2015 relative to the 
pre-recession base, with GNP per head over 20 per cent below its pre-
recession base (Figure 6). 
 
 
16 To facilitate comparison with the Stability Programme Update figures we exclude the 
exceptional items, specifically the once off payments to the banks. 
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Figure 6: GNP Per Head – Permanent Loss of Output 
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Such a permanent reduction in output would have a significant 
additional impact on the public finances. The lower level of economic 
activity would reduce government revenue from taxation while the higher 
unemployment rate and borrowing would increase government expenditure 
on welfare payments and interest payments. This would result in a 
significant deterioration in the general government balance compared to 
the High Growth scenario, as shown in Figure 7. By 2015, excluding special 
payments to the banks, the general government deficit as a percentage of 
GDP under the Low Growth scenario would stand at 4.1 per cent compared 
to 2 per cent in the High Growth scenario. As discussed in Section 3.3, this 
implies that further fiscal action would be required to ensure compliance 
with the SGP guidelines. The deficit in the High Growth scenario would 
meet the 3 per cent Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) limit by 2015. 
However, with a lower response to world activity there would be a 
substantially higher deficit by the end of the period. By 2015 the net debt to 
GDP ratio would be 10.5 percentage points higher under the Low Growth 
scenario compared with the High Growth scenario.  
Figure 7: General Government Deficit as % of GDP 
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In this scenario the economy would under-perform relative to its 
potential and this would mean that the unemployment rate would remain 
persistently high. In fact, these average growth rates for the period 2011-
2015 are of a similar order of magnitude to those attained in second half of 
the 1980s. As discussed in Section 4, were the economy to record such 
sluggish growth levels, then the resultant deficit and debt levels would 
require further fiscal consolidation to achieve the Stability and Growth Pact 
2014 target.   
 
 
3.3 
Some 
Implications 
of Medium-
Term 
Scenarios 
POTENTIAL OUTPUT 
Under the two scenarios discussed above the long-term impact of the 
current crisis on the potential output of the economy is very substantial. As 
shown in Figure 8, in the High Growth scenario output is expected to end up 
in 2015 over 15 per cent below where it might have been without the crisis. 
This provides a measure of the dramatic impact of the severe recession in 
Ireland on incomes and living standards. To the extent that the severity of 
the crisis in Ireland has been heightened as a result of past policy mistakes, 
the loss of output as a result of the crisis (Figure 8) captures the cost of 
these past policy failures. While under this scenario the rate of future 
growth in potential output is unchanged from before the crisis at around 3 
per cent for the next decade, the catch up process anticipated for the years 
2012-15 would not be sufficient to restore the losses in the level of output 
sustained over the period 2008-10. 
 
Figure 8 shows how under the Low Growth scenario the loss in potential 
output (the permanent scar on the economy) might be closer to 20 per 
cent. In this scenario, it is assumed that additional damage has been 
sustained as a result of the recession, which changes the resilience of 
individual sectors of the economy. As a result, in the case of this scenario 
the actual rate of growth in potential output after the recession is also 
estimated to be below the 3 per cent suggested in the High Growth scenario. 
It will be the end of 2011 or 2012 before there will be sufficient evidence to 
establish with any certainty which of these two scenarios for potential 
output is likely to be correct.  
Figure 8: Permanent Loss of Output as a Result of Recession 
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DEBT SUSTAINABILITY 
In undertaking this analysis an important question is whether the fiscal 
policy stance planned for the period 2011-14 is appropriate. A key test of 
this is whether it will result in a sustainable path for the national debt in the 
future. Figure 9 shows that under the High Growth scenario the planned cuts 
of €7½ billion would be sufficient to restore the public finances to a 
sustainable growth path. Under this scenario the gross debt/GNP ratio 
would peak at just below 120 per cent in 2013 before steadily falling back 
in subsequent years to under 100 per cent in 2020.17 If the cash holdings of 
the State and the assets of the NPRF are netted off the debt, the ratio 
would peak at 100 per cent of GNP before falling back to under 80 per 
cent in 2020 (Figure 10). This path for the debt, while high, would be 
sustainable, with the ratio gradually falling over time. 
F
 
igure 9: Gross Debt/GNP Ratio Under Different Scenarios 
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However, in the case of the Low Growth scenario the debt/GNP ratio 
would be around 130 per cent in 2015 and would continue to rise slowly 
thereafter. This trajectory would not be sustainable indefinitely.  Under this 
scenario any new shock in the future could see a rapid further deterioration 
in the public finances. As a result, if this scenario proved correct, additional 
fiscal tightening would be required over the period 2011-14 to move the 
economy back onto a sustainable growth path. 
 
In addition to the national debt as conventionally defined, the bonds 
issued by NAMA are fully guaranteed by the State. While in last year’s 
publication we included this borrowing in the national debt, accounting 
conventions, as currently applied, suggest that they should be excluded 
from the headline numbers. However, as the NAMA bonds are a 
contingent liability of the State, they affect decision making. As bond 
markets  take  account  of  them when considering the liabilities of the state  
 
17 This is before deduction of cash and the NPRF assets held by the state. It also excludes 
the liabilities of NAMA. 
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Figure 10: Net Debt / GNP Ratio Under Different Scenarios 
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gmented debt to GNP ratio 
would peak at just over 150 per cent of GNP in 2012/3 (just over 125 per 
cen
T B P F FUNDS 
he latest forecast for the economy sees a return to a small balance of 
payments surplus this year with a slightly larger surplus next year. As shown 
above, under the High Growth scenario the economy should experience a 
continuing balance of payments surplus over the period to 2015. With the 
government continuing to borrow substantial sums out to 2015, albeit at a 
declining rate, and with a continuing balance of payments surplus, the 
counterpart to this borrowing by the government will be a large repayment 
of debt (or acquisition of financial assets) abroad by the private sector. 
Over the six years 2010-15 this repayment of foreign debt (acquisition of 
financial assets) should average over 12 per cent of GNP each year or a 
cumulative 75 per cent of GNP over the six years. 
 
Some of this repayment of foreign borrowing by the private sector will 
most likely take place by companies, especially multinationals, repaying 
foreign creditors or the parent company directly. However, much of it will 
 
18 Here we are assuming that the total amount of the NAMA liabilities peaks at around 
€40 billion. 
 
their presence undoubtedly contributes to the current high risk premium 
on Irish borrowing. 
 
If the NAMA bonds18 are added to the national debt, as conventionally 
defined, under the High Growth  scenario the au
t of GDP) before falling back over the rest of the decade. When 
NAMA is finally wound up, on the assumption that its assets then cover its 
liabilities, the debt to GNP ratio would revert to the pattern shown in 
Figure 9. Under the Low Growth scenario the augmented ratio would peak at 
just under 160 per cent of GNP and it would remain above 150 per cent 
until NAMA is eventually wound up.  
HE ALANCE OF AYMENTS AND THE LOW OF 
T
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pass through the banking system as firms repay borrowings. In the case of 
e household sector, the vast bulk of the funds are likely to pass through 
 
In the case of the Low Growth scenario the results are very similar. This 
rio is 
interest cost of holding 
dd
the 
dire
 
 of the long term impact on the output of the economy of this once-off cost. 
th
the banking system as households repay loans or hold their savings on 
deposit.  
To the extent that this repayment of foreign debt passes through the 
banking system it will serve to reduce the banking system’s net foreign 
liabilities. Total net foreign liabilities of the banking system (including 
borrowing from the ECB) stand at around 70 per cent of GDP. If more 
than half of this repayment of private sector foreign borrowing were 
effected through the banking system it would dramatically reduce the 
exposure of the Irish financial system to foreign markets in the medium 
term.  
 
reflects the fact that investment by the private sector under that scena
significantly lower than in the High Growth scenario resulting in greater 
availability of funds for repayment of foreign debt. Thus under that 
scenario there would also be likely to be a very substantial reduction in the 
dependence of the financial system on funding from the European inert 
bank market. 
THE FISCAL COST OF THE CRISIS IN THE BANKING SECTOR 
There are a number of channels through which the banking crisis directly 
affects the public finances on an ongoing basis: through the interest on the 
money lost in the banks, which has to be made good by government 
borrowing; through the higher cost of borrowing for the State as a result of 
he increase in perceived risk; and through the t
a itional liquidity. In the long run these costs are likely to be much less 
than the indirect costs for the economy of the banking crisis. In particular, 
the crisis has contributed to the dramatic fall in potential output. 
 
Under both scenarios the major direct fiscal cost of the financial crisis 
will be the estimated once-off loss of €25 billion in Anglo-Irish Bank and 
Irish Nationwide Building Society, which the State has to fund. The 
ongoing cost to the exchequer of this loss will be the interest on borrowing 
€25 billion. Given the current level of interest rates for government 
borrowing, once this sum is finally paid to the banks the interest bill will 
amount to around €1.25 billion or around 1 per cent of GNP a year for the 
foreseeable future.19 
 
The increase in the risk premium payable on borrowing by the 
government is at least partly attributable to the massive increase in the 
State’s contingent liabilities as a result of the banking crisis. It is not clear 
how much of the risk premium payable by Irish borrowers today is due 
ctly to the crisis in the financial sector as opposed to being due to the 
related crisis in the public finances. If half of the premium under the High 
Growth scenario were directly attributable to the crisis, with interest 
payments likely to account for over 5 per cent of GNP by 2012 (and the 
risk premium standing at 0.75 percentage points by 2015), this additional 
19 This cost, which is a flow, is not additional to the once-off cost of €25 billion. Instead it 
is a measure
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cost could amount to over 0.35 per cent of GNP. However, the indirect 
effects of the higher risk premium, applying to most Irish borrowers, could 
be substantially higher through its effects on investment and output. 
ee
ended 
as a
 
Finally, because of the extreme uncertainty in financial markets the 
Irish government has been holding a very large sum in cash since the end 
of 2008. This cash provides a partial cushion insulating the Irish 
government from the short-term volatility on financial markets. It means 
that, unlike some other governments, the Irish government, through the 
NTMA, has considerable flexibility in terms of when it borrows on 
financial markets and through what instruments. However, this cushion of 
liquidity comes at a price. The Irish government is currently holding around 
€20 billion in cash or on very short-term deposit. This asset attracts only a 
all interest payment. However, the funds to provide this liquidity have sm
b n borrowed at an interest rate of between 4.5 per cent and 5 per cent. 
Thus the total “excess” interest payments could amount to around €800 
million or around 0.6 per cent of GNP. While under normal circumstances 
the government would still hold some cash, the amount would be very 
much less than at present so that the bulk of this additional interest cost is 
probably attributable to the current financial crisis. However, this need to 
hold “excess” liquidity will decline as the volatility in the financial markets 
declines and as the government’s borrowing requirement also declines. 
 
Taken together, these three effects may result in a direct financial cost 
to the exchequer arising from the banking crisis of between 1.5 per cent 
and 2 per cent of GNP per year over the medium-term. However, these 
direct costs are likely to be dwarfed by the indirect costs. If only a fraction 
of the 15 per cent to 20 per cent permanent loss in output, discussed 
above, were attributable to the banking crisis it would be dramatically larger 
than the direct financial cost for the public finances estimated here. 
 
 Given the risks to the international economy, we also consider an 
International Risk Premium Shock, where the risk premium on government 
debt is assumed to be permanently higher from 2011 by 2 percentage 
points in each of the Euro Area, the UK and the US. This is not int
 forecast but rather to highlight the sensitivity of the Irish economy to 
events in the international economy. Table 3.3 shows the growth rates for 
the international economy under such a scenario and Figure 11 shows the 
impact on the level of output (not the growth rate) in the US, UK and 
Euro Area – it reduces the level of GDP by around 1.5 per cent below 
where it otherwise would have been over the medium term.  
Table 3.3: Real GDP Growth, International Risk Premium Shock 
     
 2009 2010 2011 2011-2015 
 
USA -2.4 2.9 2.0 2.5 
UK -4.9 1.0 1.3 2.5 
Euro Area -4.0 1.2 1.4 1.9 
World -1.0 3.9 3.6 4.1 
     
 
Given Ireland’s heavy exposure to the world economy, the effect of the 
3.4  
Sensitivity of 
Economy to 
International 
Risk 
Premium 
Shock 
shock would be to significantly reduce the external demand for Irish output 
and exports leading to lower employment and output in the medium term. 
In this scenario, employment would be around 16,000 lower than in the 
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High Growth scenario by 2015, while the unemployment rate would be 
around ¾ of a percentage point higher. Figure 12 shows the impact on the 
level of GDP over the medium term. By 2015 the level of GDP would be 
around 2 per cent lower than in the High Growth scenario. 
Figure 11: The Impact on the Level of GDP of the International Risk 
 Premium Shock 
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One of the most significant effects of this shock would be its impact 
on the public finances, the General Government Balance would be almost 
one percentage point worse than in the High Growth scenario by 2015 
(Figure 13). The lower level of economic activity as a result of the financial 
market shock would reduce government revenue from taxation while the 
higher unemployment rate and borrowing would increase government 
expenditure on welfare and interest payments.  The balance of payments 
86 
surplus would also deteriorate by around one-percentage point relative to 
the High Growth scenario. 
 
The effects would be very similar when applied to the Low Growth 
scenario. In both cases further fiscal action would be required to restore 
the public finances to sustainability, with further negative consequences for 
growth and employment. 
Figure 13: Effect on Balance of Payments and General Government 
 Balance of Financial Market Shock 
  
-1.5
-1.3
-1.1
-0.9
-0.7
-0.5
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
%
 o
f G
D
P
General Government Deficit Balance of Payments  
 
 From late 2008, when the financial crisis hit, there was significant 
international debate about the need for a fiscal stimulus to prevent the 
world economy falling into prolonged recession. This approach was taken 
in many developed economies such as the US, Germany and the UK. 
While the size of the stimulus applied in each case differed, the cumulative 
effect was significant and it played a role in moderating the depth of the 
world recession.  
 
However, in Ireland it was clear from late in 2008 that this was not an
ption. The severity of the deterioration in the public finances meant that a
ilure to take remedial action could have left government borrowing on an 
xp
additional premium of 1.5 percentage points 
com
3.5 
What If 
There Was 
No Fiscal 
Action? 
 
 o
fa
e losive trajectory. The borrowing requirement for 2009 was heading over 
15 per cent of GDP in the absence of fiscal action. Even with the very 
tough remedial action undertaken, the risk premium attaching to Irish 
borrowing rose to very high levels in 2009 and it has remained high in 
2010. In the absence of an adequate fiscal response this risk premium 
would clearly have been much higher. There could well have been 
significant difficulties for the government in financing such an exceptional 
level of borrowing at any price. While it is not possible to estimate how 
much higher the risk premium would have been, we here simulate the 
effects of a moderate 
bined with a failure to take fiscal action in 2009 and subsequent years. 
 
The fact that, for economies such as Ireland, the risk premium is itself 
affected by the level of borrowing and debt (and by the direction of fiscal 
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action) changes the way that discretionary fiscal action impacts on
. While a cut in taxation or an incre
 the 
economy ase in expenditure would 
rmally stimulate the economy in the short run, if it causes a substantial 
rise in the interest rate this can more than offset any short-term benefits. 
The corollary to this, as noted by Alesina (2010), is that if agents believe 
that the authorities’ stabilisation plan is credible and avoids or reduces the 
chances of default, international markets can ask for a lower premium on 
government bonds. If the reduction in the interest rate paid on government 
bonds in turn leads to a reduction in the real interest rate charged to 
consumers and firms, the decrease in interest rates can have a positive 
effect on economic activity. The current circumstances facing the Irish 
economy (and quite a number of other economies in the Euro Area) means 
that the benefits of early fiscal action are likely to be considerably enhanced 
and the costs of delay also considerably increased because of the sensitivity 
of this interest rate channel. 
 
In this section we consider in a stylised way what might have happened 
if there had been a failure to tackle the fiscal crisis at the end of 2008. 
Based on the results for the High Growth scenario, we assume that the 
government adopted a neutral fiscal policy after the advent of the recession 
 2008 (i.e. from 2009 onwards). 20 The results of this simulation illustrate 
e of the costs that would have arisen if no action had been taken. As 
 up front.  
Fig
no
in
som
indicated above these costs are, if anything, on the low side as the risk 
premium could have been even higher in the face of such a policy.  
 
Figure 14 shows the path of the General Government Deficit as a share 
of GDP in the case of no fiscal action compared to the trajectory in the 
High Growth scenario. From 2012 onwards borrowing would have been 
over 5 percentage points of GDP higher than in the case where the 
problem is tackled
ure 14: General Government Deficit as % of GDP, No Fiscal Action 
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20 This is implemented in the HERMES macroeconomic model through a series of 
detailed indexation rules for individual tax rates and discretionary expenditure items. For 
details see Kearney et al. (2001). 
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 The consequence of a failure to tackle the fiscal crisis and the greatly 
elevated borrowing requirement would have been a very rapid rise in the 
debt/GNP ratio. Figure 15 shows the debt/GNP ratio for the High Growth 
scenario and for this no fiscal action scenario. The impact would have been 
dramatic, with the debt ratio being almost doubled to close to 180 per cent 
of GDP by 2020.21 While under the High Growth scenario the debt GNP 
ratio would decline from 2013 onwards, under the No Fiscal Action scenario 
it would remain on a steadily more ex
Figure 15: General Government Debt to GNP Ratio  
plosive upward path out to 2020 and 
beyond. Even under the Low Growth scenario the debt/GNP ratio, by 
contrast, grows relatively slowly. 
 
This signals the fact that, while fiscal action may be delayed, it is 
inevitable. Also when fiscal action was eventually taken, it would have had 
to be even more severe than today because of the greatly elevated level of 
debt, debt interest payments and the interest rate itself.  
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Figure 16 shows the effect on GNP of such a policy of delaying fiscal 
action. Because debt interest payments rise rapidly, due to the much higher 
borrowing and higher interest rates on that borrowing, the gap between 
GDP and GNP widens rapidly. This is because interest payments paid 
abroad are part of the wedge between GDP and GNP – net factor income
aid abroad. While in the first few years with no fiscal action the growth 
ate
would be around three-quarters of that where early action was taken. 
 
p
r  of GNP would have been slightly higher than under current 
circumstances, the rapid rise in debt interest payments would have caused 
the growth in GNP to fall back. By 2014, even with the prolonged 
tightening in fiscal policy, the growth of GNP would be higher where fiscal 
action was taken than in the case of no fiscal action. Thereafter the benefits 
of early action will grow. After 2015 in the No Fiscal Action scenario GNP 
growth would slow further so that by the latter years of the decade growth 
 
 
21 During the fiscal crisis of the 1980s, the debt GDP ratio peaked at 111 per cent in 1987. 
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Figure 16: GNP, Real Growth, % 
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In addition, as indicated earlier, the economy cannot postpone 
indefinitely a fiscal adjustment. In the case of the No Fiscal Adjustment 
scenario, whenever the adjustment was undertaken it would have had to be 
much more severe than the adjustment we are currently experiencing and 
the resulting loss of output would have been much greater. In the absence 
of a fiscal adjustment, by 2020 GNP would already be 3 percentage points 
below the level under the early action scenario. As indicated above, even 
under the High Growth scenario, by 2010 the GGD would be over 9 per 
cent of GDP. To eliminate such a deficit would require more dramatic cuts 
ses in taxation than we are currently experiencing. 
hen account is taken of the further damage which would arise from a 
very
in expenditure and increa
W
 belated, and hence very large, fiscal adjustment, the final cost to the 
economy of delayed fiscal action could have amounted to at least 10 per 
cent of GNP. 
 
The assumptions concerning the risk premium and the willingness of 
markets to support a do nothing scenario are quite moderate. In 
experimentation, with a risk premium two and a half percentage points 
higher than in the base case, the reduction in the level of GNP in 2020 
relative to the base case would be closer to 5 per cent and the size of the 
fiscal deficit would have been further increased. 
90 
4. ESTIMATES OF THE 
STRUCTURAL DEFICIT 
Here we define the structural deficit as the deficit which would remain 
when the economy has returned to long-term equilibrium in the goods and 
the labour market. In that case actual output will have returned to its 
el and further growth will be constrained by the future growth 
 that potential. By implication, over and above the structural deficit the 
 of the High Growth scenario, equilibrium in the economy is 
estimated
retu
al items, such as the once 
off payments to cover the losses in the banks, should be excluded. This is 
because these payments will end when the losses are fully paid for, though 
they will, of course, leave a legacy of debt and interest payments. As a result 
of the once off nature of these payments they are excluded by the EU 
Commission when considering compliance with the SGP.  
 
In Table 4.1 we show at the top the structural deficit or General 
Government Deficit (GGD) as a percentage of GDP in the High Growth 
scenario.22 In this case the deficit takes account of the planned package of 
fiscal cuts amounting to €7.5 billion over the period 2011-14. Once these 
 
22 In this case we show the relevant aggregates as a percentage of GDP so that a direct 
comparison can be made with the commitments under the SGP. Generally in this paper 
we use GNP as it is a more appropriate aggregate for measurement in Ireland reflecting 
better the underlying national income. 
potential lev
in
rest of the deficit today is then considered to be essentially cyclical in 
nature, deriving from the fact that actual output is below its potential. With 
a recovery in the economy this cyclical element could be expected to 
disappear as a result of revenue buoyancy. (For a more extensive discussion 
of this issue see Bergin et al., 2010b.) 
 
The structural deficit, thus defined, is the most appropriate measure to 
use when quantifying the fiscal adjustment task which remains to be 
accomplished in Ireland – the reduction in the deficit to be accomplished 
by further cuts in expenditure or increases in taxation. In this paper we use 
the HERMES model to derive estimates of the structural deficit of the 
Irish economy.  
 
In the case
 to be reached in 2015, when the labour market would have 
rned to full employment and output and the capital stock in the 
tradable sector would also be close to its equilibrium value. Thus, in the 
discussion below, we define the structural deficit to be the deficit for 2015 
in the relevant scenario. 
 
In calculating the structural deficit exception
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cuts have b
deficit will be reduced to around 2 percentage points of GDP – be
SGP threshold of 3 per cent. However, if the deficit is to be eli
altogether further fiscal action would still be required, though tha
would be limited relative to the scale of the cuts that are currently plan
Under the Low Growth scenario, even with the planned cuts of €7.5 b
the structural deficit would only be reduced to 4.1 per cent of 
significantly above th
een implemented in 2014 it is estimated that the structural 
low the 
minated 
t action 
ned. 
illion, 
GDP, 
e SGP threshold of 3 per cent. Eliminating this 
structural deficit would take substantial further cuts. 
 
This analysis indicates that the planned fiscal action for the period 
2011-14 is likely to be the minimum necessary to restore the public 
ces to a sustainable path. If the development of the economy over the finan
period were to follow the less optimistic Low Growth scenario, then 
significant further cuts would be needed. 
Table 4.1: Estimates of the Structural Deficit 
  
Deficit as % GDP Structural Deficit 
HIGH GROWTH SCENARIO  
High Growth 1.8 
Neutral Fiscal policy from 2010 4.8 
No Fiscal Action 9.2 
LOW GROWTH SCENARIO  
Low Growth 4.1 
Neutral Fiscal policy 2010 7.2 
No Fiscal Action 12.1 
  
 
The row in Table 4.1 entitled “Neutral Fiscal policy from 2010” shows 
what the structural deficit is today, before the proposed package of fiscal 
cuts
o Fiscal Action” shows what the structural deficit 
 policy had been adopted from 2009 
onw
be seen that such a policy would have had very serious consequences on 
the 
structural deficit for Ireland and other countries. In its most recent 
 for the years 2011-14 is implemented. In the absence of this proposed 
package of cuts the structural deficit is estimated to be around 4.8 per cent 
of GDP under the High Growth scenario and around 7.2 per cent under the 
Low Growth scenario. 
 
The row entitled “N
would have been if a neutral fiscal
ards, involving no cuts at all (and no stimulus). In that case it is 
estimated that the structural deficit would have been between 9 per cent of 
GDP and 12 percent of GDP under the High and Low Growth scenarios 
respectively. However, as discussed in the previous section, this is a rather 
unrealistic scenario. Such a course of action would have left the public 
finances on an explosive growth path. With the benefit of hindsight, it can 
bond markets and, as a result, it probably would not have been possible 
to finance a “do nothing” approach. Clearly Ireland had no choice but to 
take urgent action to cut the deficit. 
 
The EU Commission uses an alternative methodology to calculate the 
forecasts (May 2010), the EU Commission estimates that the Irish 
92 
     93
omy embodied in the HERMES 
of increase in wages would 
stabilise at a much lower level of unemployment. With a total deficit in 
20 e cost of the bank bailout) of 11.3 per cent, this would 
im  the significant fiscal c asures 
undertaken in 2009 and 2010, almost 80 per cent of the deficit in 2010 is 
n nturn. We consider this estim to be much 
to utlines some of the other pro s with the 
methodology used by external institutions (IMF, OECD, EU Commission) 
to assess Ireland’s fiscal stance in the years preceding the cri
 
 
23 T
implicit in the HERMES model and its relationship to the HERMES model of the Irish 
labour market. This is critical to understanding the differences between our estimates of 
the structural deficit and those of the EU Commission. 
structural deficit in 2010 is 9.3 per cent of GDP.23 This number can be 
compared directly with the structural deficit under the assumption of a 
“Neutral Fiscal Policy from 2010” in Table 4.1 above. As shown in the 
table, in the High Growth scenario the current structural deficit, absent new 
fiscal measures, is estimated to be 4.8 per cent of GDP. Even in the Low 
Growth scenario the estimated structural deficit, using the HERMES 
methodology, is estimated at 7.2 per cent of GDP, very much lower than 
the EU estimate. Thus the analysis in this paper suggests that the EU 
Commission is too pessimistic concerning the future path of the public 
nances in Ireland.  fi
 
The EU estimate is based on an estimated Non-Accelerating Wage 
Rate of Unemployment (NAWRU) of 10.9 per cent – the level of 
unemployment which would leave the economy with a stable rate of 
increase in wages. This estimate does not fit with the extensive research 
into the past behaviour of the Irish econ
model. This research indicates that the rate 
10 (excluding th
ply that, notwithstanding onsolidation me
ot related to the cyclical dow
o high.24 O’Leary (2010) o
ate 
blem
sis. 
 
his is similar to the estimate of the Department of Finance in the Stability Programme 
Update. 
24 In Bergin et al. (2010b) we examine in some detail the measurement of potential output 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
T
 2015. The 
ea eight cost of the banking crisis has significantly added to the burden 
of fiscal adjustment, raising the estimate of the structural deficit relative to 
that in Bergin et al., 2009. 
 
The implementation of this programme of fiscal cuts imposes real costs 
on the economy in terms of lower output and employment; however we 
believe they are necessary to ensure the long-run sustainability of the public 
finances. If a more sluggish recovery in the Irish economy were to 
materialise over the coming years, as reflected in the Low Growth scenario, 
additional fiscal action would be required just to keep the debt on a 
sustainable path and to produce compliance with the debt target agreed 
with the EU Commission. 
 
We echo the findings of Bergin et al. (2009) in arguing that, if the world 
economy recovers significant momentum by 2011, the Irish economy, as 
long as it regains competitiveness, could grow quite rapidly in the period 
2011-2015. Even in the less optimistic Low Growth scenario there would be 
a significant recovery over the period 2012-2014. If the economy proves as 
flexible as it did in the past, there will be a major adjustment in the cost 
base driven by market forces. Already there is some evidence that this is 
happening in terms of wages, but more will be required. It is clearly 
happening in the case of other costs, such as rent and the cost of 
accommodation. This re-pricing will be an important factor in returning the 
economy to growth and public policy can play an important role through 
e-provided services and policies to enhance competition in the non-
he experience of recent years shows the very high cost of pursuing bad 
economic policies. The depth of the recession in Ireland, and the massive 
funding crisis in the Irish banking system, have necessitated swingeing 
interventions on the part of the authorities to stabilise the government 
deficit. We estimate that the austerity measures undertaken in the 2009 and 
2010 budgets have already achieved much of the heavy lifting in relation to 
reducing the structural deficit. Indeed, even if the economy were to record 
sluggish growth rates out to 2015, with persistent unemployment, we 
estimate that the structural deficit, while still substantial, would be 
significantly less than that estimated by the EU Commission. We estimate 
that the fiscal adjustment planned by the Government of a further €7.5 
billion over the period 2011-14 would be almost enough to produce 
compliance with the SGP by 2014 under the High Growth scenario. 
Nevertheless, further measures will be necessary to bring the deficit within 
he SGP target by 2014 and to eliminate the deficit altogether byt
d dw
the implementation of measures which improve competitiveness in the area 
of Stat
tradable sector. The recovery under the High Growth scenario will see some 
recovery of lost ground, while still leaving the level of output in 2015 15 
per cent or more below what it would have been without the recession and 
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the related financial crisis. The assumption that the economy will behave as 
it did before the recession underpins the High Growth s
 
While the current evidence suggests that the High 
be the more likely of the two, there is
cenario. 
Growth scenario may 
 a wide range of factors which could 
result in the actual outturn being closer to the Low Growth scenario. For 
example, if the future path of world growth were to prove less favourable 
than currently forecast, or if the Irish tradable sector were to prove much 
less responsive to world demand than it did in the past, the permanent loss 
utput would be significantly greater than in the High Growth scenario 
deflationary, could actually increase domestic 
acti
developed to re-skill the unemployed for the kind of jobs which will be 
of o
and the restoration of full employment would take much longer. This 
possible outcome is explored in the Low Growth scenario. Such an outcome 
would hamper the recovery in the Irish economy and it would require more 
painful fiscal action than currently planned by the authorities.  
 
Because of the uncertainty about the future and because of the 
asymmetric nature of the costs of being too optimistic relative to those 
arising from excessive prudence, the current situation calls for the full 
implementation of the Government’s programme of substantial further 
fiscal consolidation. This represents a “no regrets” policy in the face of 
considerable uncertainty about the future growth path of the economy. If 
the outturn proves to be in line with the High Growth scenario then little 
additional action would be needed over an above that already planned by 
the government. If the economy grows in line with the Low Growth 
scenario, while further fiscal action would definitely be needed over and 
above that already planned, it would still be consistent with an economic 
recovery, though not enough to restore full employment by the middle 
years of the decade. 
 
Recent experience shows that the risk premium attaching to borrowing 
in Ireland, and in a number of other Euro area economies, is very 
significant. Experience also shows that the risk premium is affected by the 
extent of government borrowing, the fiscal stance (whether government is 
acting to reduce borrowing) and the level of the debt, including contingent 
liabilities. In an economy as open as Ireland’s, the fiscal multipliers are 
already much smaller than in large more closed economies such as the US, 
the UK and Germany. This means that action to reduce borrowing, which 
wou d otherwise still be l
vity if it produced a sufficient reduction in the risk premium (Alesina, 
2010). Even if it were not sufficient to fully offset the initial deflationary 
impact of a fiscal tightening it would certainly moderate its negative impact. 
This is an important channel which, when taken into account, can 
substantially change estimates of the economic impact of fiscal action 
derived from more traditional models. This endogeneity of the risk 
premium means that if Ireland had failed to tackle its public finance crisis 
over the last two years the economic prospects in the immediate future 
would have been much worse than is actually the case. It also raises the 
question as to whether a more rapid fiscal adjustment than currently 
planned would have a more beneficial outcome for the economy. 
 
While past experience suggests that the labour market is sufficiently 
flexible to eventually return the economy to full employment, it is possible 
that labour market policy will not be adequate, which could leave Ireland 
with a legacy of unskilled unemployment. To avoid such an eventuality it 
will be important that labour market policies, broadly defined, are 
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available over the coming decade and to ensure that individuals are 
incentivised to retrain and to take up employment. Previous research on 
the labour market (Grubb, 2009) shows the importance of raising the skill 
leve
aken by the 
Irish government has been to try and crystallise the losses in the financial 
syst
further significant costs (benefits). Nonetheless it was 
essential that action was taken to ensure that Ireland has a working banking 
syst
mic and 
S
l of those who have lost their jobs or exited the labour force in order to 
minimise the risk of long term unemployment. It will also be important 
that labour market policies and general policy on support for the 
unemployed will be tailored to ensure a rapid return to employment 
(O’Connell, 2002 and O’Connell, 2009) and to minimise the danger of 
poverty traps occurring in the future which might prevent the unemployed 
from accessing future jobs. 
 
The very high contingent liabilities that the State assumed as part of the 
banking bail out have greatly exacerbated the difficulties facing the Irish 
economy over the medium-term. The subsequent approach t
em reasonably quickly. The objective in bringing up front the losses is 
to increase the certainty about the future. It now looks likely that the state 
will end up paying around €25 billion to cover the losses for which it has 
become directly responsible. The deadweight cost of this payment, while 
manageable under the scenarios presented here, represents an enormous 
cost to the Irish public in a time of unprecedented fiscal difficulties. In 
addition, the government is likely to end up with over €50 billion invested 
in the rest of the banking system, through recapitalisation and the purchase 
by the State of non-performing property loans at discounted prices. While 
we have assumed that these latter investments will cover their costs in the 
long run, the size of the implicit balance sheet of the Irish government 
leaves open the possibility that under-performance (over-performance) 
could translate into 
em. Without a banking system which is able to finance the economic 
recovery the very recovery itself would be put in doubt. 
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A NDIX 1: OUTPUT 
D  
THE HERMES MODEL 
A key factor in determining the growth rate of the Irish economy is its 
responsiveness to changes in world output. Over the last twenty five years 
we have developed our understanding of how the share of world output 
produced in Ireland is a function of competitiveness and technical progress 
(Bradley and Fitz Gerald, 1988 and Bradley, Fitz Gerald and Kearney, 
1993). This model has been re-estimated with more recent data and it 
forms a central part of the HERMES macroeconomic model of the Irish 
economy which we use to develop the scenarios outlined in Section 3 of 
this paper. The behaviour of the model is discussed in Bergin et al. (2010a). 
The HERMES macro-economic model was first developed in the late 
1980s (Bradley, Fitz Gerald, Hurley, O’Sullivan and Storey, 1993).25 Since 
its inception the model has undergone substantial further development to 
improve its treatment of how the Irish economy works, taking account of 
advances in economic research, and also to keep pace with the changing 
structure of the economy.  
 
HERMES is a model of the supply side of a small open economy. The 
determination of output is modelled separately for the manufacturing 
sector and the services sector.  In the manufacturing sector the share of 
world output located in Ireland is modelled as a function of Irish 
competitiveness, broadly defined26, relative to Ireland’s competitors. This 
specification encompasses both Irish firms who are competing for market 
share on what is essentially a world market and foreign firms who choose 
where to locate their production to service the world market. In this model 
of manufacturing the demand for labour, materials and capital is then a 
function of Irish output, the costs of these factors of production in Ireland 
and technical progress.  
 
In the original version of HERMES output in the services sector27 was 
driven solely by domestic demand. More recently this specification has 
been revised as set out in Conefrey and Fitz Gerald, (2008) to reflect the 
growing importance of traded services. This revision to the business and 
financial sub-sector of market services mirrors the specification of the 
 
25HERMES – Ireland was originally developed jointly with the Department of Finance 
and it replaced an earlier model, MODEL80 (Fitz Gerald and Keegan, 1982), used by the 
Department for policy analysis in the early 1980s.  
26 It is the unit cost of production covering the cost of labour, capital and inputs. 
27 See Bradley, Fitz Gerald and Kearney (1993) for details. 
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manufacturing sector, with Irish output of business and financial services
being sensitive to world demand and Ireland’s intern
competitiveness, broadly defined. 
 
Using the model, our estimates for the economy as a whole s
a fall in world output of 1 per cent in the long run reduces the d
Irish output by around 1.3 per cent. (Bergin, Conefrey, Fitz G
Kearney, 2009). This implies that Irish output is relatively sensitive to
global activity. 
 
Table A1 reports the HERMES estimates of the elasticity of outpu
 
ational 
uggest that 
emand for 
erald and 
 
t 
from each of the tradable sectors of the Irish economy with respect to 
changes in world output. Within the HERMES model, both the equation 
for high tech manufacturing output and exports of tradable services 
(driving output in the professional and financial services sector) include a 
-1990 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) dummy on world output. post
Effectively this raises the elasticity of output with respect to world demand 
in the post 1990 period, better reflecting the recent experience of the 
economy. The Low Growth scenario, which we develop in this paper, is 
generated by permanently reducing the elasticity of output to world growth 
in these sectors by around one percentage point. This scenario allows us to 
examine how the Irish economy might evolve over the medium-term if its 
sensitivity to changes in world demand is greatly reduced as a result of the 
current crisis.  
 
In the HERMES macro-economic model manufacturing is divided into 
three sectors, high-tech, traditional and food processing. High-tech covers 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals with the traditional sector covering the rest 
of the manufacturing sector.  
 
Manufacturing - High Tech Sector 
uw
ww wc 54321
where: 
qw = US GDP 
d = dummy between 1990 and 1998 is one, zero otherwise 
ci = unit cost of production in Ireland 
cw = unit cost of production abroad (proxied by OECD 
manufacturing prices) 
wi = wage rates in Ireland 
wu = wage rates in the UK in euros 
 
Manufacturing - Food Pr
ii wacadqaqaa* ++++= 28          (A.1) 
ocessing.
q
 
g
i
w w
caqaaq 421 ++=                                  (A.2) 
where: 
qw = UK GDP 
c  = unit cost of production in Ireland 
*
i
wg = wage rates in Germany in euros 
 
 
28 Lowercase letters in equations denote logarithms. 
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Manufacturing – Traditional Sector. 
gw
                    (A.3) 
manufacturing prices) 
wi 
ii
w w
wa
c
caqaaq 5421
* +++=  
where: 
qw = OECD GDP 
ci = unit cost of production in Ireland 
cw = unit cost of production abroad (proxied by EU 
 
= wage rates in Ireland 
wg = wage rates in Germany in euros 
 
Traded services Exports 
 
In the case of the professional and financial services sector exports of non-
tourism services are a function of world activity and Irish competitiveness 
(equation A.4) and the output of that sector is function of both exports and 
domestic demand. The effect of changes in wage rates on output occurs 
through its effect on the volume of relevant exports. 
x
u
i
wws taw
wadqaqaax 65321
* ++++=           (A.4) 
where: 
xs = Services (non-tourism) Exports 
w 
t tions in the Tradable Sector29 
q = US GDP 
tx = corporation tax rate in Ireland 
wi = wage rates in Ireland 
wu = wage rates in UK in euros 
 = dummy from 1990 onwards is one, zero otherwise d
Table A1: Estimation of Outpu  Equa
Variable 
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Equation (A.1) (A.2) (A.3) (A.4)
Constant a1 12.88 - 9.91 14.64 
  (19.0) (161.8) (-11.2) (21.8) 
World Output a  3.40 1.52 1.74 3.80 2
  (15.5) (9.9) (43.8) (15.3) 
Wo utpu  1990 onwards rld O t from a3 0.40   0.92 
  (3.3)   (4.9) 
Unit Costs a4 -0.61 -0.30 -1.23 -1.29 
  (-2.7) (-4.2) (-11.1) (-5.7) 
Relative Wages a5 -0.67  -0.14  
  (-3.4)  (-2.5)  
Corporation Tax A6    -2.21 
     (-4.9) 
Rho(1)      
R2 0.99 0.99  0.99 0.99 
 std.err. 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.11 
 D.W. 1.05 0.57 1.76 1.68 
 from   1975    1975    1980    1970 
 to   2005    2005    2005    2005 
 
29 t-statistics in parentheses, estimation by least-squares, Rho(1) denotes estimated first-
utt techniques. order autocorrelation coefficient using Cochrane-Orc
  
MANAGING HOUSING BUBBLES IN 
REGIONAL ECONOMIES UNDER 
EMU: IRELAND AND SPAIN 
*Thomas Conefrey and John Fitz Gerald 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 
 The international financial crisis has inflicted substantial damage on many 
economies around the globe. In Ireland and Spain, the impact has been 
particularly severe, due largely to the collapse of housing bubbles in both 
economies. The significant economic instability caused by the abrupt ending of 
such housing market bubbles highlights the importance of developing policy 
instruments to manage housing markets and to prevent dangerous bubbles 
from emerging. Our recent paper** shows how the advent of EMU relaxed 
financial constraints in Ireland and Spain, allowing for a more rapid expansion 
of the housing stock in those countries to meet their specific demographic 
circumstances. If this process had been properly managed there would have 
been significant benefits for both economies. However, because the housing 
boom was not controlled by governments these two economies have suffered 
serious damage. Due to the idiosyncratic nature of housing markets, monetary 
policy, as implemented by the ECB, cannot be used to manage housing 
markets within regional economies in EMU. However, the paper argues that 
fiscal policy instruments can and should be used to manage housing bubbles 
and thereby avoid the severe damage caused to economies by their collapse.  
 
 The rapid rise in house prices in Ireland over the past decade has meant that 
adults continued to share accommodation (either with parents or friends) to an 
extent that was unusual by EU standards at a time when living standards, 
measured in terms of real disposable income, rose dramatically. The natural 
increase in the adult population alone means that around 20,000 additional 
dwellings a year are needed in Ireland to take account of the rising number of 
adults. The role of demographic factors, in addition to variables such as 
disposable income, the per capita housing stock and the user cost of housing, 
is reflected in the model of house prices for Ireland and Spain which is 
specified in the paper.  
The Drivers 
of the 
Housing 
Market  
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The advent of EMU had a major impact on the cost and availability of credit 
in many member states of the Euro Area. Prior to EMU countries such as 
Ireland and Spain faced a significant exchange risk premium attached to 
borrowing in their own currency relative to borrowing in Deutschemarks. This 
raised the cost of capital for housing in these countries relative to Germany 
and meant that, prior to EMU, even with similar income levels and 
demographics, the optimal long-run stock of dwellings would have been lower 
than in Germany or the Netherlands. The advent of EMU, reducing the cost 
of capital permanently for households, raised the optimal long-run stock of 
dwellings.  
EMU and the 
Cost of 
Capital 
 
The liberalisation of credit markets following EMU had a second important 
implication. It allowed the domestic banking systems in Ireland and Spain to 
borrow substantially from abroad without any exchange rate risk. This 
borrowing from abroad, as reflected in the rapid increase in the net foreign 
liabilities of the banking system after 2003, was used to finance the domestic 
housing booms in both Ireland and Spain. This increase in foreign borrowing 
through the domestic banking system was the counterpart to the major 
increase in the balance of payments deficit which emerged in Ireland after 
2003. It should be noted, however, that while EMU played an important role 
in relaxing credit constraints in Ireland and Spain, the wider liberalisation of 
financial markets also had an effect in countries outside the Euro Area.  
 
 The rapid expansion of the building and construction sector in Ireland and 
Spain resulted in a sharp increase in the share of housing investment in GDP. 
For Ireland and Spain, housing investment in 2005 accounted for record shares 
of GDP of 14 and 9 per cent respectively compared to a more normal 5-6 per 
cent of GDP in countries such as France and Germany. The housing price and 
output booms in Ireland and Spain had a major impact on both these 
economies. High prices for housing and the enhanced profitability of the 
sector resulted in a dramatic increase in the labour force employed in that 
sector. While an influx of immigrants moderated the impact on wage rates, it 
was not sufficient to prevent wage rates throughout the two economies from 
rising much more rapidly than in the rest of the EU, so that both economies 
lost competitiveness. The crowding out of the tradable sector of the economy 
by the building and construction sector was reflected in the rapid decline in the 
export market share for both economies and in the increase in their balance of 
payments deficits.  
The Role of 
Building in 
the Economy 
 
 Prior to EMU, countries could use monetary policy to manage the domestic 
housing market. However, under EMU monetary policy is targeted at the Euro 
Area inflation rate and, because of the idiosyncratic nature of the housing 
sector across the Eurozone, the stance of monetary policy will only help to 
control housing bubbles by accident. While more vigilant financial regulation 
should play a crucial role in ensuring the stability of the financial system, in a 
financially integrated world where banks operating in one economy are 
regulated by different national authorities, better financial regulation may not 
be sufficient to manage the domestic housing market. This paper argues that, 
under these circumstances, the best instrument available to governments to 
manage regional housing markets is fiscal policy. For countries such as Ireland 
Managing 
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and Spain, this may entail a shift in focus away from the Stability and Growth 
Pact target of not running a deficit to the requirement to run large surpluses 
for a number of years where there is a housing boom. In addition, more active 
use of taxation would manage risks to the wider economy arising from housing 
market bubbles by specifically targeting the housing sector. 
 
 
 
 
**CONEFREY, T., J. FITZ GERALD, 2010. Managing Housing Bubbles in 
Regional Economies Under EMU: Ireland and Spain, National Institute Economic 
Review, No. 211, January 2010. 
 
SATISFACTION WITH LIFE IN 
EUROPE 
Dorothy Watson* 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 
 What makes Europeans satisfied with their lives? Do supportive 
relationships and the quality of public services matter?  Do some things matter 
more to poor than to rich European citizens? These were some of the 
questions addressed in a recent report** using data on 31 countries from the 
2007 European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS). 
 
Figure 1:  Average Life Satisfaction by Country  
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Source: EQLS 2007, Satisfaction with life: “All things considered, how satisfied would you say 
you are with your life these days?” Scale: 1=lowest level of satisfaction to10 is highest level. 
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It is now generally recognised that it is not enough to focus on wealth and 
economic growth in order to improve the quality of life: health, relationships, 
social participation, education, work and the quality of public services also 
need to be taken into account. Indicators of life satisfaction have a key role to 
play in this process as they directly capture people’s experience and draw 
attention to aspects of people’s lives that matter to them.   
 
There are important differences in life satisfaction by country, with the 
highest levels in the Scandinavian countries and the lowest in Bulgaria, FYR 
Macedonia and Hungary (Figure 1). Ireland is in the top third of countries in 
terms of overall life satisfaction.   
 
Health is very important to life satisfaction. Compared to those who report 
good health, those who report bad health are less satisfied by 1.1 points on the 
10-point satisfaction scale, when other factors are controlled.   
 
Living standards matter a great deal in all countries. This is captured by a 
measure counting which of the following six basic items the household does 
not have because of lack of resources: keeping the home adequately warm, 
having an annual holiday, replacing worn-out furniture, having a meal with 
meat, chicken or fish every second day, buying new rather than second hand 
clothes, having friends or family for a meal or drink once a month. In all 
countries, those who cannot afford two or more of these six basic goods and 
services are less satisfied (by 1.7 points, on average) than those who have 
access to all six.  
 
Unemployment has a negative impact on life satisfaction, over and above its 
effect on income levels and standard of living. Those who are unemployed are 
less satisfied than those at work by 0.6 points. Retirement, on the other hand is 
associated with slightly higher satisfaction levels than being at work, as long as 
income is adequate and health is good. 
 
Relationships matter as well. With other factors controlled, those who are 
separated, divorced or widowed are 0.3 to 0.5 points less satisfied than those 
who are married, and those parenting alone are 0.4 points less satisfied. We 
also examined social support more generally, based on asking people from whom 
they would get support if they needed to urgently raise €1,000 to face an 
emergency (financial support); if they were feeling a bit depressed and wanted 
someone to talk to (moral support) and if they needed help around the house 
when ill (practical support). Not surprisingly, those who have nobody they can 
rely on for support have lower levels of life satisfaction Social support matters 
most to people who are materially deprived. Support from family members is 
even more important than support from other people in buffering the impact 
of deprivation on quality of life. 
 
Gender and age differences in life satisfaction are small, when other factors 
(including marital status, income, living standards, health and economic status) 
are taken into account. Women are slightly more satisfied than men and  
younger and older adults are slightly more satisfied than people in the 35-64 
age group.  
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We measure the quality of public services using a 10-point index, 
representing people’s average rating of the quality of six public services: health, 
education system, public transport, child care, care services for the elderly and 
state pension system. People who give a high rating to the quality of public 
services tend to be more satisfied with their lives by between 0.8 and 1.4 points 
on the ten point satisfaction scale. Even more important, however, is the 
finding that the quality of public services matters most to people who are 
materially deprived. This is understandable: people with greater resources can 
more readily insulate themselves from the impact of poor quality public 
services. 
 
To return to the questions we asked at the beginning, material living 
standards, good health, access to employment and social relationships all 
matter to people’s quality of life. Supportive social relationships, particularly 
from family, can buffer the impact of poor living standards on life satisfaction.  
The quality of public services also matters, and it matters most to those who 
are economically vulnerable. 
 
It is important to note that the data were collected in 2007, months before 
the crisis in the world economy. This has brought rising unemployment and 
pressure to cut public spending throughout Europe. The results reported here 
indicate that both of these changes are likely to further reduce the quality of 
life among the most vulnerable European citizens.   
 
 
 
 
**WATSON, D., F. PICHLER and C. WALLACE, 2010. Second European 
Quality of Life Survey: Subjective Well-being in Europe, Dublin: European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 
STUDENT EXPERIENCES OF THE 
LEAVING CERTIFICATE APPLIED 
PROGRAMME 
Joanne Banks*, Delma Byrne, Selina McCoy and Emer Smyth 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 
 Some countries incorporate all young people into a comprehensive school 
system and others divide students into different educational ‘tracks’ based on 
levels of ability. The relative merits of these different approaches have been a 
central focus of international academic and policy debates on second-level 
education. Traditionally, the Irish second-level education system has been 
characterised as a general education system, which deals more with academic 
than vocational learning. In 1995, however, the Leaving Certificate Applied 
(LCA) programme was introduced to provide an alternative to the Leaving 
Certificate Established (LCE) and the Leaving Certificate Vocational 
Programme (LCVP). The aim of the LCA is to prepare students for the 
transition from the world of education to that of adult and working life 
including further education; however unlike the LCE/LCVP there is no direct 
access to third level with an LCA qualification. Since its introduction, 
participation has increased and LCA students now make up seven per cent of 
the Leaving Certificate cohort. A new study† examines students’ experiences of 
the LCA and explores the processes involved in Irish students choosing or 
being assigned to the different Leaving Certificate programmes. The study 
draws on information about student experiences of school prior to entering 
the LCA, their learning experiences during the programme, and their 
educational and occupational experiences when they leave school. 
 
International research has shown the process of placing young people into 
programmes according to their ability can have two sets of effects: firstly that 
programmes provide a safety-net for young people who are at risk of leaving 
school early or academic underachievement, or secondly, that the process of 
tracking students channels working class students into subordinate roles and 
limits their educational opportunities. This research shows clear social class 
inequalities in the take-up of LCA and highlights how the option of a 
differentiated curriculum at senior cycle attracts a distinct social profile of 
students who are predominantly working class. The report finds that LCA 
students are quite different from students in the LCE and the LCVP, before 
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reaching senior cycle. Students’ negative academic and school experiences 
formed during junior cycle determine their entry into the LCA and the 
programme appears to attract a diverse group of students, which includes 
those who struggle with schoolwork, experience behavioural problems, wish to 
enter the labour market when they leave school (particularly males), have 
special needs or learning difficulties, and those who feel ‘misdirected’ by the 
school into taking the programme.  
 
The report shows that a discussion of the LCA cannot be carried out in 
isolation but must incorporate the wider educational context in which the 
programme operates. Findings highlight how junior and senior cycle 
programmes could benefit from the teaching approaches and methodologies 
used in the LCA. The ways in which students re-engage with the school 
process is evident in how they respond to small class sizes, modular credit 
accumulation, work experience and an interactive teaching style. Findings also 
show, however, that issues exist for students around lack of challenge in LCA, 
in particular Maths and English, which some young people found too easy and 
repetitive of junior cycle subject content. Moreover, feelings of exclusion and 
in some cases segregation from their peers in the LCE/LCVP programmes are 
compounded by the lack of flexibility in moving between programmes and the 
limited choice of subjects available to them.  
 
The report provides a valuable insight into the post-school transitions of 
young people who participated in the LCA programme. In particular, the 
analyses point to the channelling of LCA participants into the labour market 
upon leaving school with a high proportion of LCA students entering 
unemployment relative to LCE/LCVP students. Furthermore, the research 
highlights relatively low levels of progression to post-school education and 
training. Where such transitions are made, they are highly gendered and, due to 
a lack of recognition for direct entry to third-level institutions, restricted to 
courses in further education. Among labour market entrants there are also 
difficulties,  with LCA school leavers often confined to distinct sectors such as 
construction for young men, and personal service jobs for young women.  
 
The findings of this research suggest that the LCA can re-engage young 
people with school and, in many ways, act as a safety-net for those at risk of 
early school leaving, However, the study also shows that the ‘ring-fenced’ 
nature of the LCA programme may facilitate the reproduction of social 
inequalities. In addition to attracting students from predominantly working 
class backgrounds, the way in which LCA is provided in schools means that 
students often feel excluded from other Leaving Certificate groups and, in 
some cases, segregated from the main student body. In line with findings from 
international research on the effects of curriculum differentiation (Gamoran, 
1987; Oakes, 1985; Ayalon, 2006), this report suggests that the differences in 
post-school outcomes between LCA and LCE/LCVP students are attributable, 
in part, to the nature of the LCA curriculum and its restrictions in accessing 
third level. In addition, however, there is evidence that students self-select into 
LCA as a result of low achievements, aspirations and overall negative 
experiences of school during junior cycle which has important policy 
implications for all of second-level. 
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The analyses presented in this report are based on survey data of young 
people leaving school over the 2001-2005 period and qualitative interviews 
with young people in the summer of 2008. This period was, for the most part, 
an era of exceptionally rapid economic growth and (almost) full employment. 
The situation has changed dramatically since then. Unemployment in general 
and youth unemployment in particular have risen at an unprecedented rate, 
making new entrants to the labour market extremely vulnerable. The position 
of school leavers from the LCA programme is likely to be particularly 
problematic today, given that these groups have been traditionally 
concentrated in the construction and services sectors. Their low levels of post-
school educational participation relative to other LCE/LCVP school leavers 
are likely to leave them further exposed in the current climate. Economic 
changes are also likely to impact on the ability of current LCA participants to 
secure work experience placements and thereby gain the full benefits from 
participation in the programme.  
 
 
 
 
 
† BANKS, J., D. BYRNE, S. MCCOY and E. SMYTH, 2010. Engaging Young 
People? Student Experiences of the Leaving Certificate Applied Programme, Dublin: The 
Economic and Social Research Institute and the National Council for 
Curriculum and Assessment.  
BASE-BROADENING TAX REFORMS 
Tim Callan, Claire Keane and John R. Walsh* 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 
 At given levels of economic activity, increases in tax revenue require either 
higher tax rates or a wider tax base. Higher tax rates cause greater distortions 
to economic decisions, so widening of the tax base is preferred on efficiency 
grounds. But considerations of fairness and ability to pay are also relevant, as 
pointed out by Geary Lecturer, James Poterba: “There is often a trade-off 
between an efficient tax system which has a very broad base and low rates and 
a tax system which ....does not put substantial burdens on those with relatively 
low ability to pay”. (Poterba, 2010, p. 135) The balance between these 
considerations cannot be decided on a purely theoretical basis: careful analysis  
of particular proposals for widening of the tax base or changes in tax structure 
are needed. Recent research under the Institute’s programme for Taxation, 
Welfare and Pensions has helped to clarify the impact of alternative base-
widening options in three areas: property tax, the tax treatment of pension 
contributions, and the tax treatment of child benefit. Brief summaries of the 
findings of each of these pieces of research are given here, and links to the full 
publications are to be found at the end of this article. 
 
 Annual taxes on property make a significant contribution to tax revenues in 
many OECD countries. In the Irish context, taxes on property have been 
focused on stamp duties, payable when a property is changing hands. There are 
two major drawbacks to this transactions-based approach. First, stamp duties 
put barriers in the way of mobility and distort decisions about whether to 
move or to refurbish/extend an existing home in the face of changed 
circumstances. Second, a transactions-based tax is vulnerable to cyclical 
variation, as evidenced by the collapse of stamp duties from the housing 
market in the recent past. An annual property tax, of the type proposed by the 
Commission on Taxation, could provide a more stable source of revenue while 
encouraging efficient use of the housing stock.  
Property Tax 
 
How could a property tax be designed to take account of ability to pay? 
Callan et al. (2010) show that a property tax could be designed to take account 
of the income of property-owners, and still raise substantial revenue. For 
example, a tax which provided full or partial relief to the poorest one-third of 
the population could still raise revenue of close to €1 billion per year. 
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An annual property tax would widen the tax base from one consisting of 
sales and purchases of property, to one including all residential property. 
Instead of a high rate on infrequent transactions, there would be a low rate for 
an annual tax. There are strong efficiency arguments in favour of this 
approach. But there are also issues of fairness involved in the transition from a 
long-standing regime based on stamp duties to one based on an annual 
property tax. The Commission on Taxation recommended an exemption from 
the annual property tax for a fixed, seven-year period from the date of 
purchase. An alternative would be to vary the length of the exemption to take 
account of the rate of stamp duty paid, and the point in the house price cycle 
at which it was paid. Consequently those who paid most stamp duty during the 
years of rapidly rising house prices would obtain greatest relief. 
 
 Currently, pension contributions are excluded from taxable income. The 
National Pensions Framework contains a commitment to change the tax 
treatment of pension contributions. Instead of providing relief on pension 
contributions at the taxpayer’s marginal rate (either the standard rate of 20 per 
cent or the top rate of 41 per cent) the Framework envisages a matching 
contribution equivalent to tax relief at a hybrid rate of 33 per cent (with the 
delivery mechanism yet to be determined). Recent ESRI research (Callan et al., 
2009b) helps to identify the potential impact of this approach. 
Tax 
Treatment of 
Pension 
Contributions 
 
The rationale for a standardized rate of relief or support for pension 
contributions is that under current arrangements there are strong incentives for 
high income earners to participate in pension schemes, but a weaker incentive 
for those with low and middle incomes. The proposed changes would tilt this 
balance, with a reduction in the incentive for those on high incomes and an 
increased incentive for those on low and middle incomes. Analysis of a shift 
towards relief at a single 30 per cent rate – similar to that proposed in the 
National Pensions Framework – shows that the immediate impact would 
involve gains for standard rate taxpayers and losses for top rate taxpayers, and 
a net gain to the Exchequer in the region of €500m per year.  
 
Evidence from the UK and the US suggests that much of the saving by 
high income households would take place even without the incentive (what 
economists call “deadweight loss”) – although it might take place in different 
forms. There is also growing evidence that decisions on pensions can be 
strongly influenced by non-economic factors, at lower cash cost to the 
Exchequer. For example, pension schemes in which the default option is to 
enrol in the scheme (“auto-enrolment”), but with an option for individuals to 
withdraw (sometimes called “soft mandatory”), have been found to be 
effective in other countries. The National Pensions Framework also contains a 
commitment to the introduction of an “auto-enrolment” scheme.  
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Currently child benefit is not included in the definition of income for 
taxation purposes. Widening the income tax base to include child benefit could 
allow the net benefit to be better targeted, ensuring that the greatest net benefit 
is obtained by those with the lowest incomes. A key advantage of the taxation 
approach is that it would not involve new benefit withdrawal rates but would 
instead use the existing tax rates to improve targeting. Means-testing, on the 
other hand, would involve new benefit withdrawal rates which would operate 
in addition to the income tax rates. These issues were explored by Callan et al. 
(2009a) in the context of the choices facing government in framing cuts in 
expenditure in Budget 2010, and remain relevant today. 
Child Benefit 
 
The Commission on Taxation advised that Child Benefit should be included 
in taxable income, but that this suggestion should be compared to the 
alternatives, such as means testing. The Report of the Special Group on Public 
Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes also suggested either making 
Child Benefit taxable, making it a means-tested benefit or reducing rates to 
arrive at a 20 per cent cut in expenditure. Budget 2010 opted to reduce Child 
Benefit payment rates by 10 per cent, with a compensating increase in the child 
dependant additions for recipients of social welfare payments. 
 
A means test on Child Benefit would involve a new “benefit withdrawal 
rate” which acts to increase effective marginal tax rates (i.e., the proportion of 
an increase in gross income which is deducted either in the form of increased 
tax and social insurance or withdrawal of welfare benefits). Thus it would tend 
to boost out-of-work income relative to in-work income, and would certainly 
lead to higher marginal tax rates facing some of those in work. Making the 
payment taxable would also have some impact on marginal tax rates, as some 
of those with children would move to a higher tax rate, or into the tax net – 
but the net impact on incentives would be lower. The “rate cutting” option 
would reduce income in work and in unemployment by the same amount, 
leaving the gap between the two unchanged. Cutting rates of Child Benefit 
while providing compensation through child dependant addition payments – 
the option chosen in Budget 2010 - tends to narrow the gap between in-work 
and out-of-work incomes. Looking to the future, the option of broadening the 
base to include Child Benefit as part of taxable income offers a structure which 
could help to balance the objectives of providing greater support at lowest 
income levels, moderate effective tax rates, a payment which reaches all 
children, and a sustainable overall Exchequer cost. 
 
 Efficiency considerations point towards the advantages of low tax rates on a 
wide base. Tax policy must also take into account other considerations, 
including concerns for fairness and ability to pay. Where these goals come into 
conflict, careful analysis of the options is needed to inform judgements as to 
the best balance. The research summarised here illustrates how the issues vary 
depending on the nature of the base-broadening proposal – there is no short-
cut method which can provide easy answers or avoid difficult judgements. 
Conclusion 
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